G. LIANIS: Might a “heated incident” or provocation take place in the Aegean, in Cyprus or elsewhere?
E. VENIZELOS: We are in a high state of readiness and alert to avert any such eventuality. We are making direct moves to avert escalation, because military escalation has never helped the region and Greece. It’s one thing to say that I have a defensive shield, that I have a deterrent force and whether I will use it, and another to enter into crises that have no perspective, no strategic framework, and always result in damaging situations that unfortunately become entrenched, frozen.
G. LIANIS: Mr. Venizelos assesses the results of the Greece-Cyprus-Egypt trilateral Summit Meeting as positive, and he sees them as being the result of very long and painstaking preparation.
E. VENIZELOS: Everything started in August-September 2013, with our targeted actions. My visit to Cairo was one of the first of a European Foreign Minister following Morsi’s ouster. We supported Egypt from the outset. The transitional government. We supported Egypt in the European Union, as well, with many difficulties, because at that time many European countries, and the U.S., were extremely cautious. Just imagine, now that all of these fronts have opened up – from the Palestinian problem to Syria and Libya – if there were an unstable Egypt. Now Egypt is playing a stabilizing role. It’s mediating in Gaza. It’s mediating in Libya. It is a point of reference in the fight against ISIS. Imagine if this country – with 86 million residents, the largest in the Middle East and North Africa – this leading force in the Arab world had been caught in the vortex of instability. So we held the first trilateral meeting last year, in September, at the UN. We met again this September at the UN. We met in Nicosia on 29 October, and then we came to the Summit Meeting, having, in the meantime, imparted fresh momentum to the negotiations of the technical committees on maritime zones. The Egyptians showed very serious tokens of good will.
G. LIANIS: And the other triangle: Greece-Israel-Cyprus?
E. VENIZELOS: We have a partnership with Israel, without compromising our traditional relations with the Arab world. Cyprus too. Cyprus, as you know, has very close energy cooperation. In October, Antonis Samaras and I went and had the first G2G council in Jerusalem. We are now preparing for the next G2G, here in Greece. At the same time, there have been meetings on the level of Energy Ministers, and now we are having meetings on the level of Foreign Ministry Secretaries General, so that we can arrive at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Lieberman was in Cyprus the previous week, and I met with him on 29 September, in New York.
G. LIANIS: And do you think all of this will contribute decisively to easing the crisis with Turkey?
E. VENIZELOS: I didn’t say that Egypt and Israel will contribute to the solution of the Cyprus issue. We’re not naïve. But a regional environment is being created that functions as pressure on Turkey, because this environment is being created in the name of international legality, the international Law of the Sea. And this is very important. The European parliament resolution constitutes a very harsh condemnation of Turkish conduct against the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus. The State Department has repeatedly referred to respect for Cyprus’s sovereign rights.
G. LIANIS: My sense, Mr. Minister, is that the European Union is keeping a low profile in all of these cases.
E. VENIZELOS: Absolutely right. But this is a very old story. It is simply continuing and being reconfirmed in the major crises in both the Middle East and Ukraine. The EU’s role is one that is always complementary to that of the U.S. But this has been the case since 1917. Since then, when the U.S. entered World War I to throw its weight behind the allied forces to end the war to their benefit.
G. LIANIS: And after all this, do you have the impression that Turkey showed something different?
E. VENIZELOS: Turkey has not hidden its annoyance and has expressed it to us directly. And we have made it clear that these trilateral meetings – Greece-Cyprus-Egypt and Greece-Cyprus-Israel – are not in the nature of being hostile to Turkey.
G. LIANIS: Why were the Turks irritated?
E. VENIZELOS: Because they view what happened as a hostile move against them.
G. LIANIS: And what does the future hold?
E. VENIZELOS: There is a Greek-Turkish High-Level Cooperation Council – between the governments – set to take place on 5 and 6 December. This meeting should have taken place in March. We had moved it back, to after the end of the Greek Presidency of the Council of the EU. We also discussed it with President Anastasiades, and we deemed that it would be preferable for us to state the views of Greece and Cyprus directly, instead of through various intermediaries who may forget certain things …
G. LIANIS: Are these triangles that are developing now independent of one another, or do they have spheres of influence on one another and contact with one another?
E. VENIZELOS: One can also see the square that is being formed. Because Egypt knows of the relationship with Israel. Israel is aware of the relationship with Egypt. Israel knows that Egypt’s role is catalytic in the Gaza issue and in the Middle East issue in general.
G. LIANIS: However, the Barbaros, “slow speed ahead,” continues its journey. Doesn’t that worry you?
E. VENIZELOS: Any flouting of international law is worrisome, especially when memories of the invasion of 1974 are reignited. If Turkey, as it says, supports the intercommunal dialogue in Cyprus, it needs to take care that efforts be shaped for the reopening of the talks; for there to be de-escalation, and not escalation or diffusion of the tension. As I had the opportunity to tell the National Council on Foreign Policy, for months now there has been an announcement regarding a number of explorations that Turkish research vessels intend to carry out in maritime regions that are of Greek interest. Regions that are within the outer limits of the Greek continental shelf and EEZ, according to Law 4001/2011, which was announced by the UN. These vessels intend to carry out sediment sampling, but the symbolism is there, nevertheless. And we don’t want there to be added tension – even on a symbolic level – but insist that the international law of the sea must be strictly implemented and strictly observed.
G. LIANIS: Everything we’ve heard recently regarding developments in the Skopje issue is void of content. “There is no new Nimetz proposal. There won’t be immediate developments in the name issue, because no steps at all are being taken by the other side.” The Deputy Prime Minister is categorical on this issue. And very revealing of the prevailing climate. “As of 2008, Greece has done everything it was going to do. With the cabinet’s decision, which was accepted by almost all of the parties in that Parliament. Since then, we have been awaiting a corresponding move from FYROM. Not only have they not backed down at all, but if one hears the latest statements from Mr. Gruevski and Foreign Minister Poposki, one understands exactly what is happening. They will not, he says, change their constitutional name. This is one of their fundamental positions. And that whatever decision is taken regarding the name, it will be put to a referendum.” The Foreign Minister set out Greece’s national position for me: “A compound name with a geographical qualifier, for internal and external use. This presupposes a change in the constitutional name. And the new name will be erga omnes: for use in relation to everyone. The same everywhere: for international and domestic use, in international organizations, in international relations, in bilateral and multilateral relations. Mr. Poposki’s recent statements are suggestive of complete intransigence.”
G. LIANIS: But this situation has dragged on for over 20 years, distressing both peoples. How much longer will it go on?
E. VENIZELOS: It’s one thing to say it in 1991, and another to say it in 2014. We can’t ignore the truth. It is all too clear. Mr. Gruevski is using the name as leverage in domestic politics. The number-one problem of our neighbouring country is that of ethnic cohesion and the full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. These problems are bigger than the name issue. Just as the issue of national identity and language between FYROM and Bulgaria is more serious than the name issue. The tactic of antiquisation, whereby our neighbours present themselves as ancient Macedonians, claiming the heritage of Alexander the Great, is in complete contradiction with their also presenting themselves as genuine Slavs who lay claim to the heritage of Tsar Samuel. When we go to the European Union and to NATO, we tell them that there is the issue of the name, but behind the name there is an issue of democracy, there is a human rights issue. A rule-of-law issue. An issue of the relations between Albanians and Slavomacedonians. An issue of the relations between the government and the opposition. The European Union knows of the existence of these problems of democracy, rule of law, freedom of the press, transparency, ethnic relations. There is also the name issue, which must be resolved through a mutually acceptable solution within the UN processes, which Greece supports.
G. LIANIS: And NATO? What is NATO’s role?
E. VENIZELOS: Of course, with regard to states that are candidates for membership in NATO, there is less interest in issues of institutions and transparency. Because the issue of security takes priority. But what security are you seeking if you don’t have regional stability. If you have a FYROM that has tensions with Greece, tensions with Bulgaria, tensions with Albania, and tensions with Serbia regarding church issues. FYROM has a schismatic church, in relation to Serbia. So, with all of these pending fronts, how can FYROM be a factor for stability.
November 16, 2014