Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias stated the following at a press conference, on 13 December 2016, within the framework of the proceedings of the EU Foreign and General Affairs Councils (FAC/GAC) held in Brussels:
"As you know, I was also here in Brussels a few days ago, because we had the two-day NATO meeting. Then we had the OSCE, and yesterday and today we had the Foreign and General Affairs Councils. The latter is normally attended by Mr. Katrougalos, but it included issues within my competency; that is, EU enlargement and the negotiations with candidate countries for EU membership. Yesterday, at the Foreign Affairs Council, we dealt with Congo, Syria, Africa and the migration issue -- but from the perspective it is seen by the Foreign Affairs Council. Today we had the countries that are candidates for EU membership; that is, the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey.
With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was a discussion between Croatia and the European Commission regarding the adaptation of the election law and the constitutional framework in general, because in Bosnia-Herzegovina the 1995 Constitution has a problem: it refers to three ethnic groups and, as a result, anyone who does not self-determine as belonging to one of these is de facto outside the constitutional system for certain legal situations. For this reason, an adjustment is needed -- it is an issue in which Croatia has a special interest.
Regarding our friendly country to the north, as I call it -- that is, FYROM -- there was no discussion. A working breakfast was held yesterday, organized by three countries and participated in by two others, Malta and Finland. From the time when there were 18 member-friends of FYROM, they then fell to 11, and yesterday only five Ministers. No serious discussion took place. In general, there were some who hoped for a clear victory of the governing party on the part of the Slavomacedonians. This didn't come to pass. The final result was 51 to 49 seats; that is, a very small difference. Moreover, the new Albanian party, Dvizenje Besa, came between the other two. But, in essence, there was no discussion.
In the draft conclusions on FYROM, correctly, I think, the positive role of the confidence-building measures is stressed. How well these are progressing is shown by the fact that they have forgotten who initiated them. I remember that in June 2015, when I went to Skopje the first time and talked to them at the Luxembourg Council about the confidence-building measures, they didn't believe me because they didn't think they would have any result. They are very intensive, as you know. The Bitola-Florina rail line is being rebuilt now. A natural gas line from Thessaloniki to Skopje is being built. There was an old one that carried oil and that has to be cleaned. In the context of cross-border cooperation, collaborations have been created in the sectors of tourism, exchange of information and fire-fighting, as well as in the research sector, with collaborations between research centres and universities. There is recognition of this role in the EU texts. Also underscored is the role of the political crisis in FYROM and the need, of course, as always, for the name issue to be resolved. My personal assessment is that there will be many deliberations for the forming of a new government, and there are perhaps those -- not me, certainly, and I underscore this -- who are thinking they might hold elections again in the spring, if a majority is not achieved. The majority is 61 seats, I remind you. DUI, the Albanian party, has 10, Gruevski 51. This makes 61 seats, but it is the precise minimum of parliamentary seats with which a majority is formed.
The two countries Turkey and Albania were of greater interest. With regard to Albania, the draft conclusions contained nine paragraphs (47-55). I have to say that I am satisfied, because all of the Greek proposals were accepted with regard to the Commission’s report, as well, which didn't have them set out in this way. The one issue with Albania is that there are five priorities that have been set for it. Certain countries wanted to limit the discussion to only that priority which concerns justice. The law they created on judges is interesting. I don't know whether you know that many of the judges in Albania do not even have a degree -- it's like when we had the "practitioner" doctors in rural areas of Greece. So these are "practitioner" judges -- that is, without formal qualifications -- that have to be replaced.
Paragraph 48 stated that these five priorities must be implemented before negotiations open for Albania's accession to the EU. There were some countries -- and Italy reiterated it today -- that wanted to have an accession date, an orientation date. On this, there was agreement at the COREPER and in the Council that they won't get the date, and they didn't get it. Moreover, in paragraph 49, which refers to the court system, the fight against corruption and organized crime had been incorporated. Some tried to play down this element initially, but the degree to which one is ready to join the EU is linked with the way one deals with organized crime, which, as I have said, supplies funds in many, many directions.
The fight against corruption and organized crime had been included in paragraph 50, as well as the trafficking issue; that is, trafficking in human organs, which is an issue they asked me persistently to raise in Parliament, particularly on behalf of the women's movement. Also included was the problem of money laundering, which, in our opinion, is serious.
In paragraph 51, reference was made to an issue that we have been raising since last year. Last year, for the first time, a relevant reference was made, and this year it is stated more clearly. The issue concerns Albania's obligation to recognize minority rights throughout its territory. This is an essential reversal of the Hoxha policy on minority zones. You know that in the past, in Albania, when one left a minority zone, one ceased to have minority rights, to speak, for instance, one's language in court. Additionally, areas like Himara were not recognized as minority areas, with the well-known incidents we have witnessed from time to time. So I think it is a great success for us -- apart from our managing to have five, rather than one, issues included -- that the need for recognition of minority rights throughout Albania's territory was reconfirmed. Also on this, in the very phrase that concerns minorities, the implementation and inclusion of the property rights of these minorities in all of the actions of the Albanian state is mentioned. These are two initiatives -- one we added last year and had reconfirmed this year and extended to property rights issues as well. It is a new issue that has been raised by Greek foreign policy -- or rather in the new way we raised it -- and was incorporated in the texts of the EU.
Also, paragraph 52 included the barring from public office of people who stand accused of criminal activity. Paragraphs 53 and 54 concern the reform of the electoral system, on which everyone agrees, and the better climate for investments. This point is of interest to us, because there are Greek investments in Albania that are not always respected.
Finally, included in paragraph 55 is something we promote very systematically: the importance of good neighbourly relations, with whatever this entails for Greece. So there wasn't an issue that we wanted that wasn't included in the draft conclusions. We have new issues raised for the first time in the Council conclusions, and we think that they will help us protect the rights of the Greek National Minority, like the property rights.
But I would like to say that these pending issues with Albania are part of a framework of good will on the part of our country towards Albania. We want Albania to join Europe. In our estimation, steps have been taken towards the reconstruction of Albania. But we don't accept two things: First, the shaping of client relations by third European states with candidate countries, with these EU countries evaluating these countries based on clientism and interests. Second, supplementary to the first, that there be an à la carte process; that is, instead of all the principles that are in effect to date remain in effect for accession to the EU, suddenly they are not being in effect for one country or the other.
We want Albania in the EU, and we believe this will be a significant gain for geographical and economic reasons, but also for reasons of good neighbourliness. Albania's accession to the EU is therefore in the interest of Greece and of the stability of the Western Balkans. But accession must happen in a European manner, with European assessment, based on European values and principles, and not based on some other expediency. And we have told Albania that we are willing to provide and open to providing them with anything they need of our know-how, our expertise. Because, as you know, with Albania we are also open to negotiation on a number of issues, which we have told them we should continue.
The main subject of discussion today was Turkey. You can see that right now, due to its policy, Turkey is not the most popular or influential country with many member states of Europe. We came out against the coup from the very outset. I have always underscored at the EU Council that it is of great importance for you to be against coups, to defend democracy and the institutions. This is why it is important, when you are against coups, from which point of view you fight against them -- from a point of view that gives you authoritarian and personal power, or from a point of view of defending democracy and the institutions or the effort to further democratize these institutions. Whatever I said regarding Albania is even truer with regard to Turkey; that is, that we want its Europeanization and further democratization, perhaps more than any other country. We have a strategic outlook that it is good for the region and for the region's stability for Turkey to become a European country. However, as we always underscore and underscored today, this depends first of all on Turkey itself. My personal position and that of the government is that we are not the ones that will exclude Turkey from the European Union. Rather, it will be Turkey itself that decides whether it wants to be Europeanized or wants to leave itself outside the EU.
The second issue that we underscored today was that any decision we take must be made understood to Turkish public opinion and to the Turkish elite, as well as be read in the right way. Following the bombing and terrorist attacks it suffered in recent days, Turkey would read a policy of its exclusion from the European process as vindictive on the part of the EU, while the issue of whether or not it is excluded depends on the degree to which Turkey itself is willing to be Europeanized and democratized. From this perspective, we are in favour of maintaining all channels of communication on a European level. We are doing the same thing on a national level with Turkey, and we do not agree with proposals for "freezing" EU-Turkey relations.
As there are many who are saying that, because the Cyprus issue is being resolved, there should be good relations with Turkey, I took the opportunity to say that Turkey, among the other issues that Europe sees, should not appear restless. Turkey is discernible for a certain restlessness and it shouldn't conduct itself as a revisionist power; that is, raise issues like the Treaty of Lausanne, or regarding islands that, as the Turkish opposition says, are supposedly occupied by Greece. I always explain to the Europeans that we are talking even about islands that are inhabited, like Gavdos, the most southern and remote point in the country.
The discussion within the framework of the EU Council was good in general, as most of the participating Ministers accepted that we have to keep the channels of communication open, along with Turkey's European perspective, but at the same time many colleagues noted the major problems with freedom of the press, handling of the opposition, arrests and so on".
December 14, 2016