Foreign Minister Kotzias’ interview in Cyprus’ “Sunday Phileleftheros”, with journalist K. Venizelos
JOURNALIST: The Greek government has pointed up the issue of guarantees
as a key issue of its foreign policy. Is this policy paying off? Is it
gaining ground internationally?
N. KOTZIAS: First of all, let’s
agree that it is a correct policy that places the Cyprus issue on its
real foundations. The Cyprus issue is not first and foremost an issue of
dividing natural resources or of disputes between the communities. It
is a problem of the occupation and use of violence on the level of
inter-state relations. When we stated publicly to the international
community that the occupation forces must leave Cyprus and that we have
to be done with the anachronistic and oft-violated system of guarantees,
we were stating the truth. We pointed to the core of the solution of
the Cyprus issue, as far as we are concerned, in an institutionally
correct manner and based on international law.
The impression I
have is that more and more people understand that there cannot be a
solution to the Cyprus issue without our doing away with the
aforementioned system. China and Russia understand it positively. The
same goes for France. Britain is not interested in insisting of the
rights of guarantees, but the rights to the bases, which is an issue on
which the Cypriot government has exclusive responsibility. I think that
the discussion has to a degree shifted from whether or not the
guarantees are needed to what can follow them.
JOURNALIST: You
recently met with Turkish officials in New York. What did you understand
to be their reaction to your position on doing away with the
guarantees?
N. KOTZIAS: I also discussed the issue with them
during my visit to Turkey a few months ago. They have their views, but I
think they are now aware that there cannot be a real solution to the
Cyprus issue if the guarantees system is maintained; that the Cypriot
people – the Greek Cypriots in particular – will not accept the
continuation of this system. Attempting to maintain the guarantees means
a pretext for non-solution of the Cyprus problem. A member state of the
European Union cannot be subject to third-country guarantees. Moreover,
guarantees for a state that is being set up are one thing, and they are
another for an existing state. Let me put it another way: Guarantees
are given to a state to safeguard it from third countries, not as a
pretext for occupation by third countries. And you will be aware that
the Treaty of Guarantee has been violated time and again. According to
the Treaty, the use of rights takes place under three conditions: a)
consultation with all of the parties, b) to take action to restore the
state of affairs in case of disruption, and c) immediate withdrawal.
Do
I need to explain to you that Turkey has violated all of these
conditions for exercising guarantor rights? I don’t think so. Perhaps
Turkey, with pragmatism, will at some point admit the truth: that it is
in its own interest to withdraw from such rights. But this is not
something that happens automatically, and it depends mainly on Turkey
itself.
JOURNALIST: You have been working on the Cyprus issue for
years. Do you think that the current state of affairs if favorable for
achieving a solution?
N. KOTZIAS: The circumstances have never
been exactly right for resolving the Cyprus issue. There have always
been positive sides that favored a solution, together, in “symbiosis”,
with negative ones. In the positive column, the actions of the Republic
of Cyprus, I value the work of my colleague, Foreign Minister Ioannis
Kasoulides, very highly. And that Athens isn’t involving itself in
Cyprus’ domestic issues, while it is helping decisively with regard to
the guarantees. I also put among the positive factors the person who is
leading the Turkish Cypriot community, because he still has a Cypriot
conscience and only needs to think and act autonomously. The difficult
points at this time include the economic crisis Cyprus is going through –
and Greece even more so – and, to a degree, a “natural” suspicion as to
where many of those involved are taking things. These negative points
can be overcome with patience, composure, democratic dialogue and
maximum communication of the real facts and developments. Finally, there
is also a long-term difficulty that has to do with the war crisis; the
instability and insecurity in the wider region.
JOURNALIST: Can an agreement include deviations from the Community acquis, as the Turkish side is asking?
N.
KOTZIAS: I wonder whether it is asking for them only with regard to
Cyprus, or also in order to create a precedent for its own negotiations
with the European Union. There are deviations in a number of the
European Union’s agreements with third countries that are in the
accession process or have even joined the EU. But in the vast majority
of cases these are temporary, transitional deviations, and they never
have to do with the fundamental principles of the European Union. What
Turkey is asking for is very different from the above. Turkey is asking
for permanent deviations and on issues that are fundamental to the very
existence and identity of the European Union. That is, the European
Union is being asked to alter its very physiognomy, to renounce
principles and values on which it was founded, such as freedom of
movement and establishment of persons. And this cannot be accepted by
anyone – neither by us nor, in particular, by the Commission, which,
according to the treaties, has to safeguard the Community acquis.
JOURNALIST:
You have often referred to respect for minority rights – and this is
the first time this has happened with regard to the Cyprus issue. What
do you mean on this issue.
N. KOTZIAS: The decision-making system
provided for by the various schemes for a solution to the Cyprus issue
have, as a rule, ended up with the decisions being taken by certain
institutions with the participation of foreigners. My proposal was that,
for this system, we could think about using – instead of foreigners –
representatives of the three separate population groups beyond the two
communities: the Maronites, the Latins and the Armenians. I believe that
such a proposal would be very persuasive, despite the objections from
the other side. It would show that, beyond the communities, we want the
rights of all of the existing religious and ethnic groups in Cyprus to
be guaranteed. And, moreover, this shows that when we defend the human,
political and social rights of the citizens of Cyprus, we want to do so
for everyone, without exception, and we mean it.
JOURNALIST: Do you confirm that your meetings with Mr. Eide are always difficult and are carried out in a tense atmosphere?
N.
KOTZIAS: No, quite the contrary. I think they are extremely
interesting. As you may know, I have studied all of Mr. Eide’s texts,
and his book on security in particular. And I urge him to deal with the
Cyprus issue based on these very texts. I also urge him not to forget
for even a second that he is a representative of the UN and thus of
international law and the UN Security Council resolutions on the Cyprus
issue, which are binding in excluding the use of violence in
international relations and the occupation of the territory of a UN
member state. I think he listens carefully to these and many other
positions that I set out in the meetings. Similarly, I, too, listen to
his concerns. In discussions, there are moments of difficulty and
moments that are relaxed. The truth is, I am not an easy collocutor. But
that is my duty. I think that Mr. Eide appreciates that I always go to
our discussions very well prepared, as I should. I am sincere and I want
the Cyprus problem to be resolved. To be resolved correctly and justly,
of course.
JOURNALIST: Greece and Cyprus have an important role
to play in the wider region. Trilateral cooperation with Egypt and
Cyprus. How is their role being upgraded geopolitically, and how is this
strategic added value being capitalized on?
N. KOTZIAS: Like the
Republic of Cyprus, Greece is a pole of stability and security within
an unstable triangle that has Ukraine, Libya and Syria/Iraq at its
vertices. Within this triangle, Greece and Cyprus emit waves of
stability. Contributing to this are the two countries’ policies on
Israel and Palestine, their joint cooperation with the former, and with
Egypt. There are now thoughts of a similar configuration with Jordan. In
this way we are endeavoring to establish “internal lines” of stability
within the triangle of instability. I think that the powers that want
stability and security in the region appreciate these choices deeply. At
a time when Greece is economically and financially weak, there are
those who are trying, in the name of this weakness, to have us back down
from the positions of relative geopolitical power that we have. We have
made precisely the opposite choice: We are trying to introduce our
relatively stronger position in geopolitical issues into the
negotiations that have to do with the debt. And, to a degree, this has
been achieved. Finally, we will not allow anyone to exploit the
migration and refugee currents to add geopolitical power to themselves
while their own failures in Syria are paid for by third countries.