“Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
I also thank you, ladies and gentlemen, MPs, for responding to my letter, in which I requested that the Standing Committee be convened for a briefing on developments in the field of foreign policy.
Yesterday, we had the opportunity to discuss these issues with the representatives of the parties in the National Council on Foreign Policy. But all of the members of the Standing Committee need to receive the same briefing, and that is why I am pleased to have this opportunity to make this introduction, saying things that are more or less well known, so that we can have a systematic framework within which to formulate our questions, concerns and, first and foremost, our planning.
We are currently experiencing an unusually problematic state of affairs. There are a great number of crises and challenges. In my opinion, the greatest since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of post-war bi-polarity. I would say that in the sider region of the European neighbourhood – the southern and the eastern – more energy is being emitted, perhaps, than the sum of the energy generated by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the first phase of the Arab Spring.
Moreover, as a country we have, in recent years, been facing the economic crisis. The economy is a parameter of national power, and our aim is to neutralize any impact the economic crisis might have on the exercising of our foreign policy and our security and defence policy. Europe as a whole, as an entity, and the Eurozone in particular, is experiencing a universal crisis that is not just economic, but also political, because it cannot consolidate and prove its power as a political entity.
Additionally, in the narrow neighbourhood of the Balkans we have an striking stagnation with regard to the European and Euroatlantic integration of the countries in the region, as well as with regard to many regional problems, which are reigniting, though I am not ignoring the fact that some steps of progress have been achieved.
Many “stagnant” historical tensions in our regions are reviving with great ease, as we saw in the recent incidents between Serbia and Albania, which started from a football match and continued with yesterday’s confrontational statements from the two prime ministers in Belgrade.
The crisis, in brief, is manifesting itself in two geographical wings: The southern crisis in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and the eastern crisis, with its epicenter in Ukraine, impacting the West’s relations as a whole with the Russian Federation.
The common denominator of these two wings of the crisis is, without a doubt, the disputing of existing borders. The disputing of the notion of statehood, because all of these are linked with the breakup of states, with the disputing of existing borders. With the appearance of terrorist entities that are taking on sub-national characteristics, as is the case with ISIS.
Naturally, there is always the classic factor of energy, which plays a definitive role in both wings, and the impressive thing is that, now, all of the phenomena linked with terrorism are taking on a powerful dimension as an external threat, not just an internal threat. This is apparent mainly in the issue of ISIS’s foreign fighters, who come from Western countries, and this is now the number-one issue being highlighted in the international community, following the latest Security Council resolution. But this is also not a new experience, because we already had such phenomena in various stages of the war in the former Yugoslavia.
A common denominator is the difficulty in managing migration flows, the change in the state of affairs regarding the refugee problem, especially in the southern wing. A common denominator is the imposition of economic sanctions. We started with Iran, but now our major issue is Russia. And of course, on a level of values and ideology, the deeper issue arising from the Western point of view is the relationship between Democracy and Rule of Law, on the one hand – according to the Western outlook – and security, on the other, from a perspective that is Western, but not just Western: It also has universal characteristics.
We have many cases of overflow of tensions. There are countries that are traditional victims of this overflow, as is the case with Lebanon, while we have an mix of preexisting, classic problems, like the Palestinian problem, and new open fronts, like those we are seeing, for example, with regard to ISIS.
While all of this is happening in our region, I would say in the world in general, we have been facing, in recent weeks, a new acute tension in Cyprus, due to Turkey’s provocative decision to openly and overtly violate the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus, sending the research vessel Barbaros into the Cypriot EEZ and continental shelf to carry out seismic research that flagrantly – not just symbolically, but materially – violates the sovereign rights of an independent member state of the UN and the EU.
Naturally, the issue we need to examine today is Greece’s stance, and, I would say, that of Cyprus, within the current regional and international framework, but naturally we cannot avoid the parallel consideration of Turkey’s stance within the same regional and international framework.
You will allow me – so that we can recall certain basic particulars within which Greek foreign policy moves – to very briefly outline the parameters that have constituted the strategic framework of Greek foreign policy for the past forty years, since the fall of the dictatorship.
• Our policy is a policy of principles; that is, respect for international law and human rights. Respect for existing borders, rejection of revisionism with regard to existing borders, and defence of national rights and interests. None of these is self-evident. All of them entail very serious obligations, but these are certainly the principles that govern our policy.
• The second point is what I have already mentioned: Our concern with ensuring – and we have succeeded here – that the economic crisis not impact our national power and not exert a negative influence on our national issues.
• The third point is the need to harmonize our capacity as a member state of the European Union and NATO with our stance on regional and international crises, in a manner that, in the end, strengthens our position in terms of national security and with regard to the narrow list of our national issues, such as the Cyprus issue, Greek-Turkish relations, the situation in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, the FYROM name issue, the situation in the Western Balkans, and so on. From this perspective, of course, we have added and important opportunities, like our fifth Presidency of the Council of the EU, which we held in the first half of 2014, and our BSEC chairmanship this semester.
• The fourth parameter is maximum capitalization on Hellenism abroad as a pressure group, and, at the same time, the protection of Greek communities or communities of Greek origin, as is the case at this time with the Greek communities in Ukraine, and particularly in the wider region of Mariupol.
• The fifth parameter is our effort to make the absolute most of cultural and church diplomacy and the Orthodox presence throughout the world, which is linked to the need to protect Christian populations and monuments, mainly in the Middle East. The fact that we have three Greek Orthodox Patriarchates in the wider region, those of Jerusalem, Alexandria and Antioch, and that we have the Monastery of St. Catherine, in Sinai, which is a World Heritage Site, means that we have particular reason to and special arguments for raising these issues.
• The sixth parameter is capitalization on our country’s multiple regional identities; that is, beyond our European and Euroatlantic identity, we have a strong Balkan identity, Mediterranean identity, particularly now that we have established the Adriatic-Ionian Macroregion, and for historical reasons we have an active Black Sea identity, and we currently hold the BSEC chairmanship.
• Abreast of our traditional relations with the Arab world – and this is the seventh parameter – new strategic alliances are emerging on a bilateral or multilateral level, as we have already seen with the trilateral Summit Meeting between Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, and as in the case of the trilateral cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, and as is happening with other countries. I refer, for example, to the example of the United Arab Emirates, from among the Gulf countries.
• The eighth parameter is also obvious, but we must mention it. The emphasis on energy diplomacy, which functions as a common denominator of all our initiatives. When I refer to energy diplomacy, I am referring, of course, to a number of issues, including the need to exploit our own natural resources. I will refer in particular to the pipeline policy, the LNG terminal policy, but, naturally, these all begin with the need for Greece to capitalize on its sovereign rights, in accordance with International law, and the International Law of the Sea in particular.
I remind you that from this perspective, in 2011 Greece passed Law 4001, determining, legislatively, the ultimate limits of our continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. We then submitted these geographical coordinates to the UN, and moved ahead, through the collaboration of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Energy, to issuing a call for tenders for exploration for and exploitation of fields in the Ionian and south of Crete, beyond tenders for mainland regions or in Greek seas within our territorial waters.
But beyond this, the fact that we have the Revithoussa terminal and our given geographical position allows us to talk not only of the TAP and the interconnector pipelines, but also of new and very important ideas, like the Aegean-Baltic Central Corridor, which serves almost all of the countries of Southeast and Central Europe and is based to a very great extent on Greece’s potential to deliver LNG.
The EastMed discussion remains open; that is, discussion of the pipeline that, in reality, links the Levantine Basin with Greece, via Crete-Peloponnese. And, naturally, the trilateral cooperation with Cyprus and Egypt and with Cyprus and Israel has a very salient energy dimension. But our contact with other countries as well – like our systematic meetings with Algeria, Qatar and Kuwait – have a strong energy dimension.
• The ninth parameter is the emphasis on a comprehensive maritime policy, which was one of the priorities of the Greek Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2014. The comprehensive maritime policy is not just European, it is also national, and it begins from our endeavor to resolve issues of the delimitation of maritime zones in a systematic manner, acknowledging, in this sense, that one negotiation impacts the other.
But apart from maritime zones, for us it is very important to ensure free shipping traffic and protect the interests of Greek shipping, which is one of the major parameters of our national power and the international entity of Hellenism.
From this point of view, we have of late unified our efforts and our techniques with regard to the consultations that have been under way for the past 12 years, I could say, for the past 38 years, since 1976, with Turkey regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf, initially in the Aegean, and subsequently the continental shelf and EEZ in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, with regard to everything we are doing to convert the old Agreement of 1977 on the delimitation of the continental shelf between Italy and Greece into a comprehensive agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ between these two member states of the European Union. With regard to everything we are doing to safeguard the Agreement signed in Albania in 2009, with regard to everything we are endeavoring to do now in relation to Egypt, and which we will discuss – I imagine – in detail. So there is an integrated, comprehensive policy with regard to maritime zones.
• The tenth parameter is the emphasis we put on the management of migrant flows, not just through a comprehensive European migration policy, which the Greek Commissioner is now being called upon to manage, but also through the efforts we are making to intervene, as the European Union, at least, at the source of the crisis; mainly in the southern neighbourhood, in countries like Syria, Libya, Tunisia, and so on.
• But there are also other parameters that are very important, as is the eleventh parameter: the need to pursue internal consensus in the field of foreign policy. I think that there is a very serious attainment of our post-dictatorship polity that teaches that, despite given tensions or apparent disagreements, in the major strategic choices there is stability, continuity and very broad consensus, at least among the parties that have been called upon to manage government policy.
• The twelfth parameter is the need to incorporate whatever we do in foreign policy into the constitutional framework for exercising foreign policy, which should be considered self-evident, but let’s mention it anyway.
• The next parameter is the need for our foreign and European policy to be incorporated into the broader framework of national security policy; that is, to be linked to our defence doctrine and more generally with the defence needs, not only of foreign policy, but also of domestic security and, of course, the need for all given manoeuvers to stem from a strategic framework that utilizes historical experience and makes the reminder that patriotism means knowledge of history, understanding and utilization of the balance of power, strengthening, or at least maintenance, of national power.
From this perspective we can now look briefly at everything that is happening, first of all the current issues, starting with the Turkish violation of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus. The facts are well known:
Turkey issued a NAVTEX, based on which a research vessel, the Barbaros, moved into a point within the EEZ, and thus the continental shelf, from this point of view, of the Republic of Cyprus, at a location that is not a point of dispute with regard to delimitation between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. It is not a location over which Turkey can potentially claim sovereign rights.
So Turkey is invoking as a “legal” title for this action, first, its capacity as a guarantor country, based on the 1960 London and Zurich Treaties of Guarantee, precisely as it did for the invasion of 1974. Second, and cumulatively, a trade agreement that has been concluded between the authorities of the pseudo-state, the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” and the Turkish state company for exploitation of hydrocarbons, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation, TPAO.
It is very, very important that the international community be made aware that there is no dispute over delimitation, that there isn’t a disputed region. In fact, even if we accept the more extreme and barbaric approach, which says that there is a de facto partitioning in Cyprus – which isn’t accepted by anyone in the international community – this region is a region that corresponds to the southern region, in which the legal Republic of Cyprus and its organs exercises legal control.
The international community’s stance is well known: You are aware of the statements from the UN Secretary General, the State Department spokesperson’s responses, the EU’s official statement at the highest level, which is the conclusions of the European Council. You know what the Russian Federation’s stance is, you know the statements included in the joint communiqués we have issues with countries such as Egypt.
There are international players who are talking opening about Turkey’s unilateral actions, about the need for Turkey to immediately cease this provocation. But there are other international players who refer, on the one hand, to the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus – they recognize them, respect them – but also ask that initiatives be taken to achieve de-escalation and avert any continuation of the tensions by the involved parties. This means that the perpetrator of an international illegal act is being confronted on an equal footing with the country exercising its sovereign rights. In this sense, obviously, we want to pursue a clear stance on the part of the international community in all fora, because this approach, which is, to a very great extent, descriptive or neutral in nature, doesn’t cover what is for us the issue.
One might ask oneself why this is happening now and how far it might go. This is happening, obviously, because it is linked to the international state of affairs, with the fact that Turkey is at the epicenter of all the regional crises, and because of the fact that Turkey believes it can claim some international immunity due to its being a critical factor in confronting the barbaric aggression of ISIS.
Obviously, Turkey links what is happening in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean – as was also apparent from the latest debate and decision of the National Security Council – with what is happening at home with regard to the management of ethnic and religious minorities, and mainly the Kurdish issue. But, of course, none of this justifies so flagrant a violation of international law.
You can also see that there may be an, I would say, uneasy reading of Greek initiatives, like the trilateral cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, or Greece, Cyprus and Israel, although we have declared, in every tone, that we want a good neighbourly relationship of friendship and cooperation. We are in favor of Turkey’s European perspective. We want a Turkey that is stable, prosperous, trustworthy; a Turkey that does not export crises. We want to promote our cooperation in all sectors.
We want to have open channels of communication. We want to be two serious and trusted allies within NATO. We want the avoidance of artificial tensions and, mainly, the non-militarization of tensions. And we have also made it crystal clear that neither the trilateral Greece-Cyprus-Egypt cooperation nor the trilateral Greece-Cyprus-Israel cooperation is hostile in nature or in any way directed against Turkey.
In actual fact, in the Declaration we made last Sunday, in Cairo, we extended an invitation to all the countries in the region to accept international law, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and a shared perception of cooperation, international legality, and overcoming the crisis to the benefit of all our peoples.
As you know, this provocation caused the suspension of the talks, because, as President Anastasiades deemed, the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot community, could not continue these talks while this violation of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus continues.
The root of the problem is still that Turkey refuses to recognize the existence and international legal personality of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey refuses to recognize the legal situation that exists on the island. In Cyprus there is a member state of the UN, of the EU and the Eurozone; a state that has an international legal personality, national sovereignty and sovereign rights: the Republic of Cyprus.
The Republic of Cyprus has legal organs, democratically elected. It is represented internationally by its president, President Anastasiades. Until the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the constitutional organs of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963, early 1964, the Turkish Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot citizens of the Republic of Cyprus participated in the organs of the Republic of Cyprus. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot community was the vice president of the Republic of Cyprus. They were in all the organs – the parliament had Turkish Cypriot MPs, the assistant prosecutor, the assistant governor of the Central Bank were Turkish Cypriots, Cypriot citizens.
You can see that this is a reality and a legal situation that no one can underestimate and no one can ignore. The fact that this state exists – a state with all of the rights of a member state of the UN and the EU – does not mean that the communities do not exist. But the communities as constitutional entities provided for by the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, which was of a bicommunal nature and was and is based on the existence of the two communities.
The dialogue is intercommunal and is seeking a solution that, as has repeatedly been agreed – most recently in the 11 February 2014 Joint Communiqué of President Anastasiades and Mr. Eroglu, the leaders of the two Communities – is a federal solution, bicommunal, bizonal, in accordance with the Security Council resolutions, the High-Level Agreements. When we say High-Level Agreements, we mean the Makarios-Denktash Agreement of 1977 and the Kyprianou-Denktash Agreement of 1979. And the community acquis. This is a configuration on two levels, which has to be seen by Turkey.
The state has control of mineral wealth, underground and offshore. This state will continue to exist, transformed into its continuation, as soon as a mutually acceptable and viable solution is found and agreed upon – and there are two communities, which are participating in the intercommunal talks. So the fact that Turkey doesn’t accept this, doesn’t recognize the Republic of Cyprus, doesn’t implement the Ankara Protocol, doesn’t implement the readmission agreement, creates problems in Turkey’s European perspective, in the course of the intercommunal talks, creates problems in the alliance against ISIS, creates stability problems throughout the region.
So you can see that the EU, the UN, the international community – first and foremost, the UN, which has the relevant competency – are taking initiatives mainly via the UN Secretary General’s new adviser on Cyprus, Mr. Espen Eide, to restore the talks that have been suspended. And it is obvious that the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek government, which supports President Anastasiades, want a return to the talks, and our goal is for the talks to resume and go well, but this cannot happen with the continuation of the provocation against the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus; a provocation being carried out by Turkey in the name of the pseudo-state, or, at best, in the name of the Turkish Cypriot community, which, as an entity, participates in the talks.
The answer, in essence, is that there is no premise and there is no reason for concern, because it has been made very clear by President Anastasiades and the Greek Cypriot community as an entity that, in any case, mineral wealth issues, and thus the sovereign rights, will belong to the federal state; that is, they belong to the central government, and the central government in the new configuration on which an agreement is being pursued is that which, according to the Constitution of this state, will secure the rights of all citizens, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots proportionately, thus within the framework of a proportionate equality.
It will also ensure the rights of the two sides, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, in a manner that is not merely equal, but will be more favorable to the Turkish Cypriot side in order to reduce the gap in the levels of development of the two sides. This has been agreed in earlier stages of the negotiations, between Messrs. Christofias and Talat, and then by Messrs. Christofias and Eroglu.
But these issues will be regulated at this stage by the state of the Republic of Cyprus, which is competent for these issues, and, if and when a solution is achieved, by the central government of Cyprus, which will be bicommunal and bizonal in nature. These types of assurances can take on an institutional nature, and thus the ongoing violation of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus remains groundless. The reaction is strong, the reaction has political, and may take on legal, characteristics, but this is an issue that is open to debate. Certainly, we want this debate to be rendered moot via de-escalation and via the restoration of international legality, to which end we are making every possible effort.
In our talks with President Anastasiades and Foreign Minister Kasoulides, and in our talks with the heads of the Cypriot political parties – on Friday, when the Prime Minister and I were in Nicosia, and I was there a week earlier as well, for the trilateral Greece-Cyprus-Egypt Ministerial – we looked a great deal at the matter of Greek-Turkish contacts while the Barbaros remains in the Cypriot EEZ.
We deemed that this channel of communication between Greece and Turkey is perhaps the most effective and the most fertile channel for promoting arguments based on international law -- the arguments of the Republic of Cyprus, which, unfortunately, is not recognized by Turkey – and, thus, for achieving our goal, which is the restoration of international legality and, subsequently, a return to the talks.
In this sense, my agreed visit to Ankara will be carried out on 29 November; that is, on the eve of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s thronal feast, at the same time as the visit of His Holiness the Pope’s visit, as the Head of State of the Holy See, to the Republic of Turkey and, as the primate of the Roman Catholic Church, to the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Subsequently, on 5 and 6 December, as agreed in the telephone conversation the Prime Minister had with Mr. Davutoglu, the regular Meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council will take place between the two governments. This will be the third such meeting, which should have taken place in March but was moved back, to after the end of the Hellenic Presidency. It was moved back again, as agreed in Cardiff, at the meeting we had with Mr. Erdogan, to take place at the end of the year, because otherwise we would have lost a whole year on this platform – and we considered that it is a series of meetings and actions that enables us to state our views frankly and know firsthand the parameters of Turkey’s position.
Of course, I remind you that the Cairo Summit Meeting has already taken place.
This week, on the level of Foreign Ministry Secretaries General, a bilateral Greece-Israel meeting is being held, as well as a trilateral Greece-Israel-Cyprus meeting, here in Athens. And on the eve of the meeting of the two governments here in Athens, two very important international activities are scheduled: The NATO Ministerial, on 2 and 3 December, and the OSCE Ministerial, on 4 and 5 December.
In this sense, there is a series of actions that we can talk about, if necessary, and in the final phase of the discussion, under other conditions.
After that, there is no need for me to refer to where the Cyprus talks stand, always within the framework I referred to and based on the joint communiqué of 11 February 2014.
I just want to say that, when the joint communiqué was agreed upon, all of the data had been formulated with regard to the Cypriot EEZ and the exploitation of mineral wealth; that is, the interstate agreement on the delimitation of the EEZ had been concluded, and the commercial agreements with consortiums had been signed. So both the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey were aware of how things stood before 11 February 2014, when we had the opening of the intercommunal negotiations in this phase.
Now, with regard to Greek-Turkish relations, after everything we have said, I just want to remind you that we naturally never omit to stress that the catalyst for the development of Greek-Turkish relations and the achievement of a positive dynamic is the resolution of the Cyprus issue.
Moreover, we have never hidden the fact that Turkey’s European perspective depends to a great extent on the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Because how can there be a European accession process, which is of an intergovernmental nature, and which requires the conclusion of an agreement between the new member state and the 28 member states of the EU, when the accession candidate does not recognize one of those 28 member states? Aren’t things very simple?
Of course, it is always up for discussion what the Turkish choice itself is regarding its relations with the European Union, but this is a subject of discussion, as well, for the meetings we will have at the High-Level Cooperation Council between the two governments.
But we are continuing all of the meetings on all levels. I remind you that, from 2002 until today, 58 rounds of exploratory talks have been held on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean; talks that have, for the past 18 months, on my instructions, included exploratory rounds regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. And we have reached the point of discussing the rule of reference. Turkey is not a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but it now expressly recognizes the customary law of the sea, which is recorded in the case law of international judiciary organs that delimit maritime zones based on the Convention on the Law of the Sea. So this is very important.
Moreover, we never interrupted the dialogue on the confidence-building measures of an aeronautical nature in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Characteristically, these include, of course, the well-known Papoulias-Yilmaz memorandum, which we can talk about further, in the course of our discussion. You are well aware that this foreign policy framework has been formulated over the past forty years. Today is perhaps an opportunity for us to remember some things, so that we can have a clearer picture in this regard, but based on your questions.
I now come, very briefly, to a simple reference – I will answer questions on this, if need be – regarding issues that concern the Middle East. Very briefly, the Eastern Neighbourhood, as well. And we will go into it further in the discussion.
As you know, a few days ago we held a meeting, at the Foreign Ministry, of all of our Ambassadors accredited to countries in the Middle East. This gave us the opportunity to carry out an in-depth analysis of the issues. If someone asked me what the common denominator of the crises in the Middle East is, I would say that, in actuality, there is a value-based/ideological underpinning that concerns the relationship between democracy and security, in accordance with the Western stereotypes I referred to. A reconsideration is now being carried out of the assessments of the Arab Spring two years ago. It is obvious that the international community has no unified stance. There are clear national priorities and a different assessment of the regional balance of power regarding both the large countries and the countries pursuing a role as a regional power.
It is obvious that we are very often confronted with perceived patterns that are reminiscent of the League of Nations, the regime of mandates in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa; that is, a state of affairs that led to the Asia Minor campaign and the Asia Minor catastrophe, with regard to the Greek experience. We are facing situations reminiscent of the notorious Sykes-Picot agreement on how the zones of influence were carved up the Middle East between the great powers of the era, which continue to be great powers today – with the exception of the role of the U.S., which was not present in the region at that time. But France, the U.K., Italy, in part, and Russia are still present.
In reality, we have very manifest internal contrasts in the Arab and Muslim world. It is obvious that the fora that are functioning – like the Arab League and the African Union – cannot play a great role. We see how much the potential of the EU, as such, to intervene has fallen off, and, naturally, we are still experiencing the crisis in international legality on the level of the UN Security Council’s inability to make decisions in a timely manner and impose its resolutions.
But there is a more specific issue. There is a very great clash with regard to the meaning of inclusiveness in relation to how we confront the crises in all the countries. In the Middle East issue – among the Palestinians, internally – in Syria, in Iraq, in Libya, in Lebanon. In reality, this may be the biggest issue. The question, in other words, is whether, when we go to find a political solution with the inclusion of all the forces participating on a front, whether we also mean terrorist forces, which, in some cases, appear to be moderate, or whether this cannot be accepted.
This flirtation with the idea of an inclusiveness that sometimes has to do with forces that implement terrorist practices is what is behind the sudden mushrooming of ISIS, the so-called Islamic State. Because this became the object of a diplomatic, politico-diplomatic and military game in Syria, and this now exists as a problem in Libya, which is heading for disintegration as a state, but there are very big contrasts. And there are now very serious doubts as to what policy the UN expresses from this point of view, via its special representatives; that is, Bernardino Leon, in Libya, and Staffan de Mistura, in Syria. This is a major issue.
From this point of view, now, during our discussion we can talk about the Palestinian problem, about Syria, about ISIS. We will talk again about the role of Egypt, which is catalytic with regard to all the issues. Catalytic for the Palestinian issue, the ceasefire in Gaza, for the situation in Syria, the situation in Libya, for everything. We’ll talk about our relations with the Gulf countries and their relations with each other. This is also very important with regard to energy sources, because, for us, our relations with Qatar or with Algeria are very important for covering our natural gas supply needs. About countries that are feeling the brunt of the crisis, like Lebanon, about how much longer Jordan can bear up under the burden, about what our relationship with Iran is. What is our policy on Libya, and what is our policy on the other countries in the region, like Tunisia, Morocco?
I will only say that we have announced that we are not just maintaining, but also strengthening our presence in the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL), because the region does not allow us to be present with a single gunboat. It is a very small vessel for the region’s needs. Naturally, we are participating in the NATO missions – like Active Endeavor, with a submarine. But these are international obligations for our country.
I remind you that I visited Iran in September 2013, and we are awaiting the reciprocation of that visit.
I have met over seven times with my Algerian counterpart.
We had very high-level meetings with the President and Foreign Minister of Tunisia, of Morocco, and we are trying to have a relationship of trust with the whole region.
I will conclude with just a general reference to the Eastern Neighbourhood. The problem is that Russia is assimilating the fall of real socialism and the breakup of the Soviet Union 25 years after the fact. This is a very serious issue. That is, the issue, in reality, is Russia’s perception, and the West’s perception, of Russia’s international political role and its lebensraum.
It is obvious that Russia sees the Commonwealth of Independent states and the Customs Union differently than the EU or NATO does. We have here, as you know, a variety of situations. We have the Baltic countries, members of the EU and NATO for some time now. We have countries that are concerned, like Azerbaijan. Countries that are very, very cautious in their relations with Europe, despite their participation in the Eastern Neighbourhood, like Armenia.
We have countries like Georgia, which have a clear European and Euroatlantic choice, but you see what is happening: We have a major governmental crisis and we have pending problems like the situation in Abkhazia. Naturally, we also have the pending issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, between Azerbaijan and Armenia. We have Moldova, which, despite its small size, has more or less the same dilemmas as Ukraine and is approaching elections. Coincidentally, we are also coming up on elections in Romania.
In reality, behind all of this is also the matter of Europe’s energy policy, as well as the energy policy of Russia, which, as you know, draws 60% of its fiscal revenues from the sale of oil and natural gas. So there is such an issue.
You know that we are doing everything we can for the Greek communities of Mariupol, so that they can stay out of military clashes, but, unfortunately, we had victims a few days ago. The Consulate General has returned to Mariupol and gone into operation. The Consulate General in Odessa has lost touch with Crimea, because there has been a de facto change in the international political status there.
But, within the framework provided by our capacity as a member state of the EU and NATO, we are trying to keep all of the channels of communication with Russia open. I am expecting Mr. Lavrov to set a date for reciprocation of his visit with a visit from myself to Moscow. The Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs, Mr. Meshkov, will be here on the 24th of this month for consultations with the Foreign Ministry’s Secretary General, Ambassador Mitsialis. Russia’s Transport Minister will be here on the 14th to meet with Mr. Kourkoulas, because they are co-chairs of the Greek-Russian Joint Interministerial Committee. We are promoting 2016 as a Greek Year in Russia. At some point we will discuss the sanctions, the countermeasures, and what could be done, what is being done, and what will be done.
Naturally, we are determined to capitalize on the last two months of our BSEC chairmanship, despite the fact that they coincide with changes in governments and ministers in many countries.
I will not refer at all to Western Balkan issues.
I’ll just say that Mr. Nimetz will be meeting in New York tomorrow with the negotiators for the two sides, because the other side has changed negotiators, and this will be the new negotiator’s first meeting. And that the Greek position is the well-known position formulated in 2008; a position that has been promoted and has been accepted across a broad range of the political spectrum. This is the policy we are following, without any change.
November 14, 2014