Briefing of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs, on developments in the Gaza Strip, by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos

Briefing of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs, on developments in the Gaza Strip, by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister VenizelosE. VENIZELOS: Madam Chairperson, I thank you and the Committee very much for your sensitivity and the invitation you extended to me, in my capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, regarding the huge problem in Gaza.

First of all, there is some good news: A few hours ago, as you know, a temporary ceasefire agreement was finally reached, and we hope that this agreement will be respected and go from temporary to definitive. In recent days, unfortunately, we have often seen the declaration of a ceasefire agreement that, subsequently, was violated and fell apart, and, as such, we remain wary, but, at the same time, all of us, as the international community, need to press ahead in this direction.

So, on the part of the Greek government, I express our satisfaction, because, better late than never, this ceasefire was achieved. We express our urgent hope that it be respected and, moreover – together with the whole of the European Union and the international community – we are continuing  the efforts aimed at a more permanent truce and, even more so, an agreement for the resolution of the Middle East problem, within the framework we are all familiar with and that is the firm Greek position, as well as the European position: a two-state solution that respects the right of the Palestinians to the existence of a Palestinian state, that respects the existence of the state of Israel and its right to security, that respects the 1967 border, and that, of course, must be supported by the whole of the international community and by the United Nations in particular.

In this battered region, over the past two weeks, we have seen, first of all – this is what is fundamental – a major, an unusually large, humanitarian crisis, a tragic humanitarian crisis, in which there are many victims every day: civilians, women, children, mainly, and these are the most tragic victims of the crisis. Everything else pales – all of the strategic and military developments pale before the human pain and the need for fundamental human rights – the right to life and security, every child’s right to live – to be respected.

We also need to draw a very clear line between the population of Gaza and the leadership of Hamas. One mustn’t confuse the population, the citizens, the families, the children with Hamas as an organization and the leadership of Hamas, because if one mistakenly identifies these two things as one, then of course the humanitarian sensitivity and priority – which is a very clear priority from this point of view – loses ground.

We unfortunately had a series of events that led to this tragic phenomenon, while the previous months had seen the creation of all the conditions for a negotiation that had the potential to lead to an agreement.

Very briefly, I remind you of the persistent initiative of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the fact that the negotiations began, because the Israeli government, and Prime Minister Netanyahu personally, expressed strong political will, as did the Palestinian Authority and President Mahmoud Abbas personally.

The negotiations went through difficult rounds, because there was a need to satisfy conditions that seem simple to us, but that are, for the involved parties, very, very difficult, apparently, like, for example, the release of prisoners.

As Greece, we had the opportunity to participate twice in the small team of member states of the international community monitoring the developments in the Middle East, through the initiatives of the International Peace Institute, which holds a relevant meeting at least every six months, on the initiative of Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates.

I had the opportunity in recent months to participate in two such meetings: one in New York and one in Luxembourg. Unfortunately, however, the talks were discontinued. We had the opportunity to discuss these issues in October, during the visit we carried out with the Prime Minister and the government delegation to Jerusalem. I also met personally with Ms. Tzipi Livni, the Israeli Justice Minister and negotiator for Israel. As you may remember, I then stayed on an extra day, after the departure of the governmental delegation, for a visit to Ramallah. I did the same thing with President Mahmoud Abbas.

I  have had a number of meetings with my Palestinian counterpart, most recently here in Athens, on 10 June, within the framework of the meeting of EU and Arab League Foreign Ministers, which was one of the major initiatives of the Hellenic President of the Council of the European Union during the first half of this year. We are in ongoing telephone contact with the Palestinian Foreign Minister and with the Foreign Minister of Israel, who has just taken up his duties – he hadn’t yet taken the post in October. And we had a very positive sign in the formation of the Palestinian government of national unity – a technocratic configuration, basically, but with the same Prime Minister and the same Foreign Minister. That is, in reality we have a government accepted by Hamas, but controlled by Fatah, despite the fact that the tradeoff is de facto control of Gaza by Hamas and not by the government.

But this provoked a major reaction from the Israeli side, and afterwards we had the chain of very unpleasant events that precipitated the current crisis: the abduction of the three Israeli youths, the murder of a Palestinian youth, the Israeli military operation for the destruction of the tunnels connecting Gaza with Israel. We are well aware that there are similar phenomena – large numbers of tunnels – in Rafah, towards Egypt, that is, which is of great concern to us, as Greece, because it is connected with the broader security of the Sinai Peninsula and with the security of Saint Catherine’s Monastery. This led to the escalation of operations quite early on – as of 9 July.

Egypt undertook an initiative for the truce and the reopening of the talks in a second phase; an initiative unanimously supported by the Arab League – this is of very great importance – and we also supported it as a friend of Egypt, as a friend of the Arab people, with very good relations with Israel.

When, as early on as that, I communicated with the Egyptian Foreign Minister to tell him that we stand by him and his intentions, he asked us to convey this initiative on the EU level, and, in fact, in collaboration with the French Permanent Representation, the Greek Permanent Representation entered the Egyptian initiative expressly into the Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council.

Unfortunately, the Egyptian initiative was not supported by everyone. It was not accepted by Hamas, and, subsequently, there was the appearance of a parallel, not to say competing, initiative put forward by the governments of Qatar and Turkey, which was taken under very serious consideration by the American government. Mr. Kerry’s repeated visits to the region, and especially to Cairo, were moved to Paris, with the participation of the governments of Qatar and Turkey, but there was no result, and all of the other efforts towards a return to the 2012 truce failed, unfortunately, until a few hours ago, when we finally got a truce. In the meantime, we had the exchange of rockets, bombardments and victims: casualties every day, and mainly children, which is appalling.

We have also tried to help the Jerusalem Patriarchate, which is operating on very small means – and its requests are also very small – to help with the functioning, under emergency conditions, of the Monastery of Saint Porphyrios, in Gaza, but, as you can understand, if there is not a real desire on the part of the involved sides, this ceasefire cannot stand. Fortunately, the meeting in Cairo bore this fruit. I think that all of the other initiatives are symbolic or in the nature of PR, to be frank. Under these conditions, and as long as people, innocent civilians, are dying, there is no point in PR-type initiatives.

Unfortunately, once again we see the limits of the EU as a political entity and as a factor on the international landscape and on the major pending fronts in our region and in our time. Even the EU member states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council could not develop an effective initiative, but here the big problem is the functioning of the UN, which participated in the operations, in the sense it suffered the attacks on its schools: regardless of what really goes on in those schools, it is something that we can no longer control now. What’s important is that these are institutions over which the UN flag flies. We experienced this in Yugoslavia, in the initial phase. The major incapacity is the institutional incapacity of the Security Council, because here we might have had a Security Council resolution that we did not have, regardless of whether or not it would have been be respected. According to international law, UN Security Council resolutions must be respected. There is a legal obligation on the part of all UN member states to respect and implement the resolutions of the Security Council. But such a resolution has not been passed. There have been debates and announcements. Political will has been expressed. But there has not been a resolution.

D. AVGERINOPOULOU: Mr. President, has a veto been used by any of the superpowers in the Security Council?

E. VENIZELOS: No, a resolution has not come before the Security Council, but this, too, means something, as you can see. Your question gives me the opportunity – suffice it to say that the Palestinian side itself accepts the idea of a solution’s being found that will have a buffer zone that is controlled by NATO. To give you an example of the point where the debates on the major issue of security stand. The American initiative has the great advantage that no other initiative has, including the so-called Quartet, which has been operating in the region for some time: that it was accompanied by a thorough military plan for security, drawn up by the American armed forces, with the know-how that they have.

And, of course, Lieberman himself proposed yesterday that Gaza be placed under UN control, which means that there is still room for UN initiatives, but the only ceasefire initiative is the Egyptian one, under American support. And the only initiative for talks, if we get past the crisis and return at some point to where we were a few months ago, is the one drawn up by Mr. Kerry, if we are to be practical and serious about the region and its problems.

And of course all of this is happening in an environment, a region, that is tragically burdened and is going from bad to worse. Because now we have to confront the break-up of Syria, unfortunately, the complete failure to implement the Geneva I and Geneva II agreements. I remind you that Greece did not participate in Geneva I, but was called upon to participate in Geneva II. There was a long delay in replacing Mr. Brahimi, who was the joint representative of the UN and the Arab League. Now, the new representative is an Italian Swedish diplomat, so the Arab element is missing and he has not really taken up his duties. And to be realistic, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant came out of the situation in Syria, and this widens the band, because we have Syria’s unity and statehood being questioned, with the tragic repercussions you are aware of. In Greece alone, we have received 25,000 people since the war broke out; 25,000 people seeking the status of refugee, though very few have requested it officially.

We have Jordan bearing up under the strain, but how much can Jordan take? It traditionally bore the huge weight of the Palestinian refugees, and now the Syrian refugees. How much can a state like Jordan shoulder? It is bearing up, none the less. It is a pocket of security and stability. We have Iraq’s unity and statehood under challenge. And, as you can see, this creates a whole new and drastically different state of affairs with regard to Iran’s role in the region. Further down, we have Lebanon once again feeling the repercussions of the Syrian crisis, shouldering the permanent burden of the Palestinian refugee camps. We a disorderly dissolution under way in Libya, where a few days ago we carried out the operation for the evacuation of the Embassy and Greek citizens and citizens of friendly countries, whom we transported by frigate, but that was a drop in the ocean – fewer than 200 people – which was a militarily and politically important operation. Egypt is currently asking for our assistance transporting 6,000 of its citizens who are fleeing Tunisia and want to travel to Egypt by ship. China alone has another 1,500. The Philippines have 7,000 persons. That’s just to give you a few examples.

And of course we have to look very carefully at what is happening with the countries that are currently maintaining their stability. The pivotal point is always Egypt, the large country of 80 million, the base and source of all the situations in the Arab world and in the African world. And Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, which are, shall we say, a notional axis of stability that must be maintained.

As there may be some questions from colleagues, I remind you that we took a stance, as the government and as a country – because we have to bear in mind the real balance of power and not be misconstrued by our international collocutors – from the very outset and supported the Egyptian initiative. And we did everything we could within the EU so that the statements that have come from Ms. Ashton and Messrs. Barroso and Rompuy could be as good as possible. And, as I said, I am in ongoing contact with my Egyptian counterpart and the Egyptian government – yesterday and the day before, constantly – working for a positive outcome from these efforts. And the truth is, they see us essentially as the channel of communication with the EU. I will stop here regarding the Gaza issue, and we can expand the discussion into other areas if you like.

August 6, 2014