E. VENIZELOS: Good morning. I thank you for being here. In particular let me note the presence of the Ambassadors of the EU member states, who are honoring us with their presence, and the Embassy press attachés. The presence of the Ambassadors is a great honor, but it also indicates how the Hellenic Presidency, which ends today, was received.
So, ladies and gentlemen, today, 30 June, the fifth Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the European Union comes to a close. Our fifth presidency since joining the European Communities.
The semester that ends today was a semester full of challenges, but, allow me to say, also full of achievements.
The Prime Minister and I will have the opportunity this evening – here at the same venue, the symbolic venue of Zappeion, which housed the Hellenic Presidency – to refer to the intensity of the first semester of 2014 at a brief closing ceremony.
For the purposes of our discussion, allow me to remind you that this semester was not only the semester of the Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the European Union, but also the semester of municipal, regional and European elections. The European elections concerned the 28 member states of the European Union, but here in Greece we also had politically charged municipal and regional elections.
This semester was the semester of the confirmation of the primary surplus that our country achieved in 2013, with all that that means for the completion of fiscal adaptation and exiting the crisis. And, of course, this semester was a semester full of international crises, topped by the Ukraine crisis, and, as such, the crisis in the relations between the West and Russia, with major impacts in all sectors, and mainly in the energy sector.
I said when the Presidency began that we possess a considerable institutional memory at the Foreign Ministry and throughout Greece’s public administration, due to the previous four presidencies, which are associated with major developments in European affairs – mainly with major waves of enlargement of the European Union, which, during Greek presidencies, went from the Europe of 12 to the Europe of 15, and from the Europe of 15 to the Europe of 25.
We set clear priorities for the Hellenic Presidency of this semester. You are all well aware of these priorities. Priorities identified in reality with the concerns and needs of the peoples of the European Union. We tried to organize the Presidency with a maximum of professionalism and as frugally as possible, and I think this combination worked.
We also managed to have the highest possible degree of internal coordination; that is, interministerial coordination in Greece. We coordinated all the individual configurations of the Council of the European Union, through the coordinating role of the General Affairs Council. And I must also point out here the role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives – Coreper I and II – and the Political and Security Committee.
We hosted our fifth Presidency of the Council of the European Union in a climate of close and productive cooperation with the permanent presidencies of the European Council, President Rompuy, of the Foreign Affairs Council, EU High Representative and Vice President of the Commission Catherine Ashton – and naturally in collaboration with her services – and also in coordination with the permanent Presidency of the Eurogroup, which is connected with issues of ECOFIN, one of the most important Council configurations.
We worked in full coordination with the President and members of the Commission, the European Commission, and, of course, in cooperation with the College of Commissioners. We also have very good and amicable cooperation with the Secretariat of the Council.
I would like in particular to stress – not out of institutional obligation, but because it reflects the truth – our very good cooperation with the outgoing European Parliament, under President Martin Schulz, with the Conference of Committee Chairs, with the chairs of all the Committees of the European Parliament.
Allow me to note, as the Foreign Minister, the cooperation with the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and chairperson Brok, and, naturally, with the Plenary and with all the Parliamentary Groups of the European Parliament.
I think it is very important that we make some indications of a statistical nature. Over 161 meetings were held in Greece, with 21 on the ministerial level. Under the Greek Presidency, 36 meetings of the Council – in various configurations – were held in Brussels and Luxembourg. Over 1,500 meetings were held of 150 different working groups. Sixty-seven meetings of Coreper I and II were held. Zappeion hosted over 12,000 members of delegations and over 3,000 journalists from European and international media outlets, technicians and communications-related people.
It is also very important to remember that the Hellenic Presidency held a frugal but symbolic cultural programme. Our communication policy, from the outset, with the Presidency’s logo and motto, was met very warmly and rewarded. It had – thanks to the Presidency spokesperson, Mr. Koutras, his alternate, the personnel of the Foreign Ministry and, naturally, of the Secretariat General for Communication – a very strong presence on the web and with the Presidency’s website, as well as on twitter, which got a very big response.
Allow me, before I move ahead to a political account, to express my warm thanks to my closest collaborator on Presidency issues, the Deputy Foreign Minister for European Affairs, Dimitris Kourkoulas, who stood in for me in a number of activities at the Council and the European Parliament. Deputy Foreign Minister Kyriakos Gerontopoulos, who took on longer-range and multilateral missions, usually beyond Europe.
I would like to thank the Foreign Ministry’s Secretaries General – Secretary General Ambassador Mitsialis and Secretary General for International Economic Relations Mihalos – and all of the Foreign Ministry personnel and Greek public administration personnel in general. I would like to make special reference to the Director General for European Affairs, Ambassador Alexandra Papadopoulou, the Permanent Representative to the European Union, Ambassador Theodoros Sotiropoulos, Deputy Permanent Representative Andreas Papastavrou, and the head of the Presidency Office in Athens, Ambassador Dimitris Karamitsos-Tziras.
Before I review the political achievements of the Presidency, I would once again like thank all of the sponsors, who we will honor in an appropriate manner, because without them, we would not have been able to respond with the necessary flexibility on all issues.
Needless to say, from the very outset we were in very close coordination with the next Presidency, which starts tomorrow: the Italian Presidency. We agreed on the priorities. Together with the Italian Presidency we have put together what really is a Mediterranean Year in the European Union. It is no coincidence that the Med-Group was put together again during the Hellenic Presidency, with the seven Mediterranean member states of the European Union. We have already met twice: once in Brussels, and once in Alicante, Spain.
And I am pleased because, with Italy, the other two presidencies that make up the next trio – the Presidencies of Latvia and Luxembourg – are truly prepared to continue the work started by the Greek Presidency, which, in turn, capitalized as much as possible on the achievements and efforts of the Lithuanian Presidency. This is an ongoing EU relay that is of very great importance, because it points up a principle that must not be forgotten: the principle of the institutional equality of all the member states.
And if you want me to put into a single phrase the greatest challenge of the Hellenic Presidency of the semester that ends today, this challenge was the Greece of the crisis, which fuelled many articles, many negative and unfair comments, many stereotypes that do not reflect the reality of recent years. So this challenge was for Greece, based precisely on the principle of the institutional equality of the member states, to exercise the presidency for the fifth time, to exercise the Presidency in an organized, effective, professional and, in the end, successful manner, because this points to a Greece that is different, a Greece of normalcy, a Greece that can successfully direct the procedures of the European Union on the level of the Council, representing the Council credibly and in a dignified manner at the European Parliament and internationally, within the framework of the responsibilities of the rotating Presidency, and not the responsibilities of the permanent presidencies and the EU High Representative in particular.
So I remind you that the first priority we set for ourselves as the Presidency was growth and the creation of new jobs – matters linked with employment, and with youth employment in particular.
It is very important that in this sector in particular – the sector of growth and employment – we managed over the course of these six months to put emphasis on the EU’s own resources package, which can ensure the timely and steady funding of European policies in the context of the multiannual financial framework.
From this point of view, the agreement on the funding of the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund – which ensures the uninterrupted funding of the new common Fisheries Policy of the Union – and the adoption of legislative acts of the single market, with the ultimate goal of strengthening the competitiveness of the European economy and the quality of services provided, to the benefit of the citizen, are two characteristic developments.
An even more characteristic development is our effort towards the activation of the EU’s Youth Employment Initiative, which concerns the heart of the European problem, which is high youth unemployment and providing prospects for the absorption of young people, up to the age of 24, into the job market.
The second priority concerned the deepening of the Eurozone and economic governance in the European Union and the Eurozone. It is already very well known that we managed to agree on the regulation for the Single Resolution Mechanism, which is an important step in the direction of the Banking Union, in combination with the intergovernmental agreement on the Single Resolution Mechanism.
Also completed were a significant number of pieces of legislation in the sector of the financial services market, which are aimed at strengthening the security and transparency of the financial system, as well as the accountability of those involved.
Anything that has to do with economic governance, with the Banking Union, with financial services does not concern bankers or banks, but citizens, their deposits, businesses, and SMEs in particular, that are trying to get access to the European banking system, and the truth is that a truly single market will never be able to function in the European Union if there is not a single Banking Market and if the major internal inequalities in this sector between the member states are not resolved.
These inequalities have to do principally with two matters: interest rates on loans to businesses, and particularly to SMEs. A Greek SME cannot borrow at an interest rate 5 or 6 points higher than that at which a German business borrows. And the second very important element is for there to be the same sense of security of deposits on a pan-European level, precisely for there not to be a flow of deposits from peripheral countries – from the weaker countries of the European Union – to the stronger countries of Europe.
Our third priority put emphasis on protection of the European Union’s borders, management of migrant flows and movements, mainly through the promotion of the debate on the future of the European space of freedom, security and justice.
I think we managed to make it clear that migration is not a problem just of the countries of the European south or the countries on Europe’s external borders. Rather, it is a problem of a pan-European nature, because its impact on the economic growth and cohesion of the European Union is felt by everyone, though to a different extent and at a different intensity. From this point of view, we think that perhaps the Hellenic Presidency’s greatest achievement was the setting of the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning in the sector of Justice and Home Affairs. This is the so-called package of European Union measures. This new text once again places at center stage the principle of solidarity and burden sharing among the member states. It places this principle, in practice, at the center of our policies on asylum and the management of borders and migrant flows. It links migration with the Union’s foreign policy, with development cooperation and cooperation with third countries. It introduces the principle of positive conditionality into the European Union’s cooperation with third countries, and it includes the development of effective visa and readmission policies.
The fourth pillar of our priorities, as you will remember – our so-called horizontal priority – was a comprehensive maritime policy, which reflects the nature of our country as a shipping and island country.
Over the past six months, Greece pointed up the value of the sea as a source of prosperity and security for European citizens and set the terms that must govern maritime governance, with the aim of ensuring security and capitalizing on the opportunities arising from maritime activities for the economy of the European Union and its member states.
A pivotal development in this area was the adoption of the European Maritime Security Strategy at last week’s General Affairs Council, on 24 June 2014, which was the last General Affairs Council of our Presidency. We reached an agreement on an exhaustive inventory of the strategic interests of the Union and its member states, which will facilitate the promotion of these interests. We pointed up the importance of the delimitation of maritime zones to the economy and prosperity of the European Union, as well as to the citizens themselves and to energy security and the importance of energy security to the European economy.
The Strategy for Maritime Security sets out and delimits in a clear manner the term “external maritime borders,” and it points up the importance of patrolling these borders and confronting relevant threats: migration, piracy, terrorism and other illegal activities. It also notes the importance, as a frame of reference, of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This, as you can see, is of obvious importance to Greece, given that a large portion of our national border is also the external border of the European Union.
The new Maritime Security Strategy points to solidarity amongst the member states in confronting threats in the maritime space as a basic principle governing this strategy. It ensures respect for the principle of the autonomous decision-making of the European Union within the framework of the Union’s cooperation with international organizations, such as the UN and NATO, as well as with third countries, for the joint management of threats in the maritime space.
We have to bear in mind that 90% of the Union’s external trade and 40% of its internal trade is transported by sea. The European Union is ranked third among exporters and is in fifth place among producers of fishery products. Over 400 million passengers travel through the ports of Europe every year. I think this gives us an idea of the magnitude of this achievement from an economic and political standpoint.
Beyond that, I would like to note certain achievements in the sector of European institutions. One important development is the adoption of the Regulation and status and funding of European political parties and European political institutions. Also important is the fact that we pointed up various aspects of the principle of solidarity as a fundamental principle of the European Union.
On the one hand, I should point out the new regulations for the European Solidarity Fund, which will allow for shorter reaction time in cases of natural disasters, and on the other hand, the decision on the manner of implementation.
The solidarity clause is provided for by the treaties and is now being put into implementation. Practically, this means the strengthening of the joint actions of the member states and of the Union for assistance to member states in cases of terrorist attacks or man-made or natural disasters.
Apart from this, there were, of course, our longstanding priorities with regard to the enlargement of the European Union in the Western Balkans, as well as with regard to the Neighbourhood Policy, and to us this meant mainly sustaining the southern dimension and contact with the Middle East and North Africa, with the Arab world in general, because, in any case, the Eastern Neighbourhood, due to the crisis in Ukraine, was the focus of international attention throughout this semester.
You will allow me to note that, during our Presidency, we hosted the Ministerial Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the European Union and the Western Balkan countries, on 8 May, in Thessaloniki, to revitalize the Thessaloniki Agenda launched during our 2003 Presidency.
Our meeting provided an opportunity to reaffirm our support for the Euroatlantic perspective of all the countries of the Western Balkans. The conclusions of this meeting will, I think, impact future relevant decisions from the Council and the European Council.
In terms of the Southern Neighbourhood, you will allow me to attach particular importance to the fact that we hosted here in Greece, on 10 and 11 June, in Athens, here at Zappeion, the Meeting of EU and Arab League Foreign Ministers.
Very important conclusions were drawn from this Meeting, impacted, naturally, by the ongoing crises in Iraq and Syria. But many bilateral meetings were held – of equal importance to the meeting we had in Brussels, on the margins of the EU-Africa Summit.
Equally important is the fact that, during the Hellenic Presidency, we had important developments concerning the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood. We had the pleasure of welcoming the political leadership of Moldova here, on the day the visa constraints were lifted, and we also had the opportunity to chair a number of Association Councils or intergovernmental conferences that were of great importance in this area.
Indicatively, I note that, during the Hellenic Presidency, we held EU Association Councils, Association or Stability and Association Councils, with Iraq, Uzbekistan, Tunisia, Albania, Algeria, Turkey, Montenegro, and Moldova.
We had the honor of chairing the first Intergovernmental Conference for the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia, as well as the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Conference, at which we opened another 5 substantial chapters in Montenegro’s accession negotiations with the European Union.
In particular, allow me to note the EU-Turkey Association Council that was held last week, on 23 June, in Luxembourg. At this Council we had the opportunity – on behalf of the European Union, naturally – to point up the importance of Turkey’s accepting a very simple reality: that the European Union has 28 member states, including the Republic of Cyprus, with everything that this means for the implementation of the Ankara Protocol, as well as for the ratification and implementation of the readmission agreement signed recently by the European Union and Turkey.
The fact that, at the General Affairs Council of 24 June 2014, under the Greek Presidency, accession-candidate status was granted to Albania also pleases us, because Albania is very well aware that this status is granted within the framework of the European Acquis, European Law, the Copenhagen political criteria, and, naturally, international law.
I remind you that candidate status was granted to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2005. Turkey not only has candidate status, but is a country in open negotiation with the European Union, at the rate, of course, at which chapters open. And chapters are opened by unanimous decision of the member states, because this process is of a strictly intergovernmental nature.
I think this provides a snapshot of what we managed to do during this semester; a semester that was parliamentarily shorter than usual, because our contact with the European Parliament lasted only four, rather than six, months, due to the European elections.
The Greek Presidency coincided with the European elections. To the extent possible, we handled – within the framework of the European Council and, thus, of the General Affairs Council, which prepared the meetings of the European Council – the major issue of a new narrative for Europe.
A narrative that responds to the various forms of euroscepticism; a narrative that responds to the real concerns of European citizens, who, in many European states, do not see how it is possible for Europe to be identified with austerity measures, with slower growth rates, or with unemployment, and with youth unemployment in particular.
This is a major issue that is being faced – and must be faced – by the European Union on the level the European Council and on the level of the Council and the European Parliament. We are now in the process of filling posts at the EU institutional organs, based on the results of the recent European elections.
I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker, because he was proposed by the European Council for the post of President of the next European Commission.
As a choice, this respects the new strengthened role of the European Parliament, the votes of European citizens, and a parliamentary interpretation, I would say, of the Lisbon Treaty.
And because, at a very critical phase for Greece, I have worked closely with Mr. Juncker, President of the Eurogroup, I know that he is a man who can operate constructively, not just synthesizing, but often transcending, as a genuine European who is conscious of the difficulties the EU has and of the sensitivities and reservations of many member states.
In the context of our Presidency, we had the opportunity to organize, at the General Affairs Council, with President van Rompuy in attendance, a very interesting debate on how to interpret and implement the principle of conditionality, and I believe that this, now, can be used by the new Commission and the Council in contact with the new European Parliament.
It is also very important to stress – and I will close with this – that journalistic interest may easily focus on the choice of persons who will fill critical European posts, but for the peoples and citizens of Europe, the issue is not the choice of one person or another, but the choice of one policy or another.
A smarter and more effective policy might be based on the existing texts for the Stability and Growth Pact, but the existing texts must be interpreted in such a way as to really fuel growth and job creation, and to create prospects for European citizens of all ages, and for young Europeans in particular.
From this perspective, the Greek Presidency did everything it could. We know the limits of each rotating Presidency. We do not lack a sense of proportion from this perspective. But we believe that insistence on the principle of the institutional equality of member states is of very great importance.
And finally, it is of even greater importance for us, as Greeks, to say that Greece showed that it is and will remain a normal, institutionally equal member of the European Union and the Eurozone.
Thank you very much.
D. BOTONIS: Mr. President, on the last thing you mentioned, regarding persons and policies. Naturally, regarding persons, Mr. Juncker is questioned by many, many political forces in Europe. They don’t see him as the best person to implement these policies. Do you identify with these austerity policies, as many, many political parties in Europe say? And I also want to mention an issue that may not be on the agenda, but it is certainly an issue of national importance and value, regarding the national success yesterday in Brazil, where our country came within a breath of the eight.
E. VENIZELOS: I would like to express – as I have already done in writing, but the spoken word always has its own value – my joy and how much I was moved, my congratulations, but mainly my gratitude as a Greek citizen to our international players, to the coach and personnel of the national football team, because they made us proud, they got us very far in the most important global football tournament, but mainly because they sent the Greek people a message of pride, competitiveness and tenacity. We may have lost in penalties, which are to a high degree a matter of chance, but I think we won in terms of the impression we made, and that is of very great importance.
Now regarding your question on Mr. Juncker. Mr. Juncker has the backing of three large parties in the European Parliament: the European People’s Party, the European Democrats and Socialists, and, in the end, the Liberal group. Even the other groups came out in favor of this interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty: that the European Council should choose as the next President of the European Commission – so that he could come before the European Parliament and ask for a vote – the candidate chosen before the elections by the party that won the relative majority of votes and seats. Because, naturally, not party has an absolute majority.
This virtually parliamentary interpretation of the Treaty also meets with objections, which were expressed at the European Council by two countries: the UK and Hungary. I imagine that all the member states respect the minority countries, but the necessary qualified majority was reached here.
Mr. Juncker is an old European citizen who served for a long time as the Prime Minister of Luxembourg. As President of the Commission, he will not implement the programme of the European People’s Party. European policy is always based on two very large pillars. One pillar is the community principle, the second pillar is the need to respect intergovernmental interrelations, because without those, the European Council and the Council cannot easily arrive at consensus decisions.
Europe is governed by a large rolling coalition. Because one party on its own does not suffice on the pan-European level, because you have to bear in mind 28 national election cycles, which are constantly present and constantly shift the balance of power, not on the level of the European Parliament, which is elected every five years, but on the level of the Council and the European Council, where governments change. Moreover, governments do not express just the policy of their party identity – single party or coalitions. They express long-term national strategies that are served in many countries by all governments, regardless of their political color.
So the European political reality is extremely complex. The principle of majority and minority, the difference between government and opposition, which is well known on the state level, cannot function so simply and straightforwardly on a European level. It isn’t easy on the level of the European Union to talk about a government and an opposition, a majority and a minority.
Because there aren’t procedures that provide for this contact at this time. The contact the Council of the European Union has as the Econfin configuration with the European Council is one thing, and another thing with the activities of the Eurogroup. And there are also configurations that have arisen from the crisis, like the Troika configuration; that is, the collaboration between the Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which in reality is not provided for in any of the institutional texts and is a reality that exceeds the institutional framework of the European Union. We have to look at all of this now in a realistic manner, but at the same time transcendently, because it does not suffice for us to understand and describe reality. We have to provide responses that take us forward overall, as the European Union and the Eurozone.
Naturally, every country has its national interests. There is economic patriotism; very often, economic nationalism. We have to understand again that there is a common European interest, and, in the end, this common European interest is clear in the numbers; that is, in the economic results of the single market and in the economic results of the forming of the Eurozone and the creation of the common currency. There is a positive economic result from the transactions amongst the member states and from the overall outlook for the Europe Union and the Eurozone, and we have to believe this.
Greece made huge efforts to stay in the Eurozone. The Greek people have made very great, unwieldy, unbearable sacrifices. But imagine what would have happened here if we hadn’t followed this path and had been left at the mercy of developments and found ourselves outside the Eurozone and, in reality, on the margins of the European Union.
The losses for household incomes, for businesses, for employment, for the banks, for deposits, for the future of the Greek economy would have been incalculable. We cannot compare the large losses of a charted course with the annihilation of the Greek economy that would have resulted from a disorderly default. That is, very briefly, the framework we are moving in.
A. ATHANSOPOULOS: Two questions. The first is this: You talked about the European maritime security strategy and granting a date for the opening of accession negotiations with Albania.
I realize that the first issue is very much related to our relationship with Turkey and the problems we have there with maritime zones. And, correspondingly, the issue that concerns Albania is also related to the problem we have with Albania, with the maritime zones. I would like to ask how you think we should utilize these two developments until there is progress on these two fronts. That is the first question.
The second question concerns what you just said a short while ago. You see that there is a new conversation in Europe on austerity and growth. Italian Prime Minister Renzi appears to be leading an effort towards, if not relaxed, at least flexible implementation of the Stability Pact, and I want to ask you, for a country like Greece, which has been enduring this difficult adaptation all these years, how fair is it, how fair would you say it is, for certain countries to ask for a more flexible implementation of the Stability Pact and, potentially, new extensions in the implementation of limits on fiscal deficits, while things are very strict for us? Thank you.
E. VENIZELOS: I’ll start with the second question, which is a continuation of the first. You will allow me to remind you that, last Thursday, the Prime Minister and I had the opportunity to participate, in Ypres, Belgium, in two parallel institutional meetings of the two large European political parties.
Before the European Council, Mr. Samaras participated in the meeting of the leaders of the parties of the European People’s Party, and I participated in the meeting of the governing parties that participate in the Party of European Socialists.
I had the opportunity there to talk to President Hollande and with Italian Prime Minister Renzi, and with other Prime Ministers. There were eight prime ministers present and six deputy prime ministers. There really is a need for a smart implementation of a pact that is not just a stability pact, but also a growth pact. And we have to remember that this is a pact not just on stability but also on growth, and therefore on employment. Because if we do not give a perspective to competitiveness, the flexibility of the European economy, its potential to function not just as a very large market, but also as a productive engine of innovation that increases Europe’s GDP and gives opportunities to European citizens, we will not have responded to the concerns of our societies.
Moreover, we also have a very great historical burden: We have to preserve the European social acquis, the European social state in any form whatsoever. Whether we are talking about the British version, the Scandinavian version, or the southern European version, there is a common denominator that is called European social state, European social acquis, which exists at a very high level.
There may be discrete differences, but the common denominator is very, very important. So you cannot invest in the annulment of the European social state or in the reduction of the cost of labor as the only ways to leverage European competitiveness and Europe’s new course in the world.
Because there is no doubt that Europe is shrinking in terms of population, ageing, and has many competitors. There are other regional entities that are very dynamic. So we have to take this very seriously into account.
No one is saying we should change the texts, but even in the European Council the central idea was that we must have a dynamic and smart interpretation so that we can jumpstart the European economy, responding to these complex questions it has to respond to.
Speaking now, if I may, as the President of a political party that participates in the Party of European Socialists, there is no doubt that the pre-election platform of the Party of European Socialists must be present in the policy of the new Commission.
The Commission has a President who comes from the European People’s Party, Mr. Juncker, but the Commission’s policy must be perceptibly influenced by this campaign platform of the Party of European Socialists, you will allow me to say, and of the Liberal group with Mr. Verhofstadt, who came out in favor of Mr. Juncker’s candidacy.
This is of very great importance, but of course we have to bear in mind state interests, state sensitivities, though the fundamental role of the Commission is as the depositary of the social dimension of the European Union.
Now, regarding your first question, first of all I am afraid that there has been a misunderstanding. What the Council decided on, and what the European Council approved, was not the opening of accession negotiations with Albania, but the granting of candidate-country status to Albania, which is completely different.
And that is why I made the reminder that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has had candidate status since 2005 – and dates are significant. Turkey many years ago, because it has a very old association agreement. Turkey has open negotiations, but you see how difficult it is for individual chapters to open. Of the Western Balkan countries, only two have open negotiations: Montenegro, which has moved ahead on many chapters, and we opened a further five chapters last week at the Intergovernmental Conference; and Serbia, with whom we have opened the negotiations, but we have not really opened a single chapter yet, despite our wanting to.
So accession candidate is a different status from the opening of negotiations. To get to the opening of negotiations, all of the Copenhagen criteria have to be met, all the indications and proof of the acceptance of the Community Acquis have to be given. This concerns both international law and the Law of the Sea. And when the European Union, the Council, comes and passes the new European Maritime Security Strategy and insists on the importance of maritime zones and the International Law of the Sea, it means something.
Because the 28 member states of the European Union naturally accept the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the notion of maritime zones and the need for delimitation in accordance with the International Law of the Sea.
N. CHRYSOLORAS: Mr. President, now that the Presidency is ending, do you have an overall assessment of the cost to the Greek taxpayer? As far as I know, we have an assessment up to 30 May. Whether there is a general assessment now that the Presidency is ending, and whether there really is money left over, as appeared in May, from the overall budget, which was, I think, about €45 million. Whether there is any thinking as to what to do with the money left over.
E. VENIZELOS: As Mr. Kourkoulas has said – and he handled these issues with his services and the Presidency Office – we will move on an ex-post basis, because we have yet to pay some of our obligations, on the order of 18 to 19 million euros; that is, we will have spent some 30% of the total budget of €50 million.
The budget was frugal from the outset, because the budgets of other countries who held the presidency were well over €50 million. So, based on European best practices, we had a budget of €50 million for the expenditures of all the Ministries and all the Services and all the activities.
In the end, very strict management was achieved, expenditures were held down, sponsors were used, and we have reached this result, which, I would say, is impressively good. The money left over will be returned to the Finance Ministry, which will disburse it based on its priorities, because, as you know, in public accounting there is the principle of specific expenditure, but general revenue.
The Finance Minister gathers everything together, regardless, to spend it according to the budget. In this sense, I want to thank Mr. Kourkoulas and Ambassador Tziras, and all the services of the Ministry, as well as the other Ministries, because they accepted this mindset of limited spending, which proved to allow us to get by.
M. KOURBELA: Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, I would like to go a little to the dimension of ethics in the European Union. I want to ask you this: there are many interesting issues. I am aware that our European Partners have really accepted that the Greek Presidency was very successful. But has it been realized that a country in such a big crisis managed a success that corresponds to previous successes, so that what has been suffered by the Greek people – that is, attacks and injustices – can be somewhat redressed?
E. VENIZELOS: I think I have responded to that. Our main goal was to show that Greece is a normal, equal member state. We heard a lot of praise from the Parliament and the Council and the European Council. Praise is routine in Europe, because there is a civility and a deontology, and the rotating presidencies are obliged to do certain things in any case, but I think – from my experience, because this is the third Presidency I have participated in, I have watched many other presidencies – that the words were not simply kind words of the routine sort.
There was something more. And this is also due to the fact that everyone realizes that this semester was a semester of very great difficulties, as well as very great goals, for Greece. It isn’t just the Presidency. There were many other things. And I believe this helped and will continue to help restore the country’s image.
G. IGNATIOU: Mr. President, I want to ask you two question. During the Greek Presidency there were results that were very worrying, that gave rise to concern among many people. In many countries – that is, France, Britain, Denmark, and here – we had results that gave rise to a great deal of analysis regarding the Europe of Mitterrand, Kohl, Andreas Papandreou, and the Europe of today.
That is, regarding the imperatives of Europe then, and the imperatives of today’s Europe. There is already an Andreas Papandreou interview circulating – with guidelines, etc. You are the best person to respond to this, in the sense that you have experienced both periods. Does this have to do with some sort of conspiracy? With a prettification of the past, due to Europe’s current difficulties? Or is it to be expected that leaders were more caring then, having lived through wars, deprivation, poverty?
And a second question, regarding the Greek judges decisions – which also came to us from the Pasok press office – regarding the existing reality. The question is this: The volume of work done by Greek judges is 60% higher than that done by Europeans. What does this say to you? Thank you.
E. VENIZELOS: I’ll start with your second question. The Greek Judiciary is facing a lot of major problems. The volume of work, the volume of pending cases are a major issue for many countries of the European Union, not just for Greece. That is why we have to meet the need for radical reforms in the Judiciary.
We have to accept the necessary changes to court regulations, to the new institutions, like, for example, the alternative forms of Justice, through mediation, and, naturally, we are all fully aware of the institutional role of judges, who must be protected with guarantees of personal and functional independence that are expressly provided for in the Hellenic Constitution, in a manner much more detailed and clear than in any other European Constitution.
There are, of course, matters of organization of the so-called Constitutional Justice, the manner in which it is exercised in Europe, the vetting of the constitutionality of laws. Among the issues under vetting for constitutionality are issues of economic policy, issues that concern the adaptation programmes of the European economies that were at the epicenter of the crisis, like Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland.
Here in Greece we have a diffuse system for vetting constitutionality. We don’t have a constitutional court. In other countries there is a specialized constitutional court. We see how that sort of vetting proceeds in countries like Portugal; we see how it happens in Greece.
Allow me now, speaking in another of my capacities – the capacity of Professor of Constitutional Law, which I have never given up – I will say that on all these matters we have to think about what the so-called constitutional law of a disorderly default would be.
In other words, what would have happened in the country if the country had not taken the difficult path of adaptation and sacrifices, but had been allowed to default, with a primary deficit of 15.7% -- to be precise, with a deficit of 15.7% in 2009, with a primary deficit of 12.5%, or 26 billion euros. If the country had not paid salaries, had not paid pensions at all; if the country watched the banks collapse, deposits evaporate, what constitutional protection would there be for the employee who didn’t get her salary, for the pensioner who didn’t get her pension, for the depositor who found her deposits gone?
We have to think of this, too, if we want to see the meaning of general interest and how the term general interest should be interpreted when we face issues of major political and historical dilemmas, because there is this difference.
The judge always tries based on applications. Based on a suit, an application, a case. She always tries within what is petitioned. No one can draw all of this up in a comprehensive policy. Only the Parliament can do this, and the government, which depends on the trust of the Parliament, which can look at the complete picture, because there is no institutional process for anyone else to do it. This is what democracy provides for.
Regarding your first question, I must say that, because I experienced the Greek Presidency of 1994, at Andreas Papandreou’s side, as Press Minister and Government Spokesperson – and I experienced it first hand, from the inside, including the Corfu Summit Meeting. At that time, the country that held the Presidency hosted the Summit Meeting.
In Corfu, there was Thatcher, Chancellor Kohl, Francois Mitterrand and President Yeltsin, because the EU-Russia Association Agreement was signed at that time.
Europe had 12 member states at that time, and the economic cycle of the global economy was extremely favorable for Europe, which did not yet have the EMU, but it had a perspective. Things have changed since then.
First of all, the world changed. Germany reunited, the Soviet Union fell apart, Yugoslavia broke up, the dividing lines of the Cold War were erased.
Now, Europe must again find its perspective, its place in the world. On foreign policy issues, of course, the structural elements have not changed, because the issue of European security was and always is a Euroatlantic issue. This has been the case since the First World War. Since then, when President Wilson decided the U.S. would participate in the final phase of WWI, the outbreak of which we are now commemorating – I wouldn’t say celebrating, because you don’t celebrate such an abhorrent event, but we are commemorating the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War, of WWI, which cost so many millions of people their lives, together with the Spanish flu, of course.
What the European Union is now facing as a political reality and as an economic dilemma is much more complex. The dilemmas have become exceedingly complex and technical, extremely difficult. Of course, the truth is, the Treaties describe a Europe of 28 equal member states, but the European Central Bank, which reflects the reality of the situation, is an institution that allots votes based on each country’s contribution to the European GDP.
Thus, a country with a large GDP has greater potential for influence than a country with a small GDP. This is the reality of the situation. And the reality in the Eurogroup, as I said earlier, and as I had the opportunity to say at the meeting of Socialist leaders a few days ago – at the Eurogroup we see a completely different reality, because there are countries that are “fiscally and macro-economically virtuous”.
This is a very small group of five countries, four countries, because we see many countries leaving this group, and none joining it. We have very few countries who belong to this group, and we have the rest of the countries, which are a little “sinful”, and others “prodigal” – I use these terms in quotation marks – and others of these that are entered straight into economic support programmes, like, for example, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus.
Others are put in a programme without support, as is the case, to a great extent, with Italy, and in part with Spain, which was support only for its banks, with others under the threat of numbers.
I want to remind you here that we, with everything we have gone through, have at this time not only a primary surplus, but also a fiscal deficit under the 3% ceiling provided for by the Stability Pact. Greece’s fiscal deficit is at 2.1%. So we are within the limits of the stability and growth pact, I remind you.
M. POPOVIK: Mr. Minister, I wanted to ask you whether Greece did everything in its power, as the Presidency, to help Skopje towards European accession? That is, did you show good will?
You had some meetings with Mr. Poposki. Do you believe that these will continue, now that the Presidency is ending, to help your neighbouring country to move ahead? Because I think it is in Greece’s interest, too, for us to move towards the European Union. And whether you could tell us, briefly, how Greece helped in general towards enlargement in the Western Balkans.
E. VENIZELOS: I’ll start with the second question. The Greek Presidency, following the “Thessaloniki 2014” Agenda, had the pleasure of chairing the EU-Serbia Intergovernmental Conference for the opening of Serbia’s accession negotiations, also rewarding the Belgrade-Pristina talks.
We also had the opportunity to chair the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Conference and to help open five chapters. We also had the opportunity, through the Association Councils that we chaired, to strengthen the relations of many countries of the region with the European Union.
In this context, allow me to mention Moldova, which is very close to the Western Balkans, despite belonging to the so-called Eastern Neighbourhood – but geographically it is adjacent to the Western Balkans.
And with regard to Skopje, to which you referred, during my visit there, as the Presidency of the Council, and not as the Greek Foreign Minister, I had the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Gruevski, and we agreed to put greater emphasis on the process that exists, under Ambassador Nimetz, within the framework of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
But the Presidency is obliged to implement the decisions of the Council, and the latest Council decision regarding Skopje is the decision of 19 December 2013, which sets two important conditions and asks for tangible steps with regard to these conditions.
One prerequisite is the full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, which is an inter-ethnic agreement on the relations between the Slavic and Albanian communities, and, second, the implementation of the 31 March 2013 Agreement on the relations between the two large parties; relations that, however, deteriorated following the latest elections, because they led to MPs of the Social Democratic party resigning their seats.
So there is a problem, not simply of the implementation of the March 2013 Agreement, but of getting to the framework of the agreement, because now we have gone backwards from the framework of the March 2013 Agreement.
And I also want to remind you here that the so-called name issue is not a bilateral issue, as is often said, but an international issue on which there are specific resolutions from the UN Security Council, and what we want is for our neighbouring country, with which we have such close economic relations, to meet, in general, the Copenhagen criteria. That is, on issues of democracy, rule of law, respect for freedoms, respect for freedom of the press, good relations with the opposition, absence of irredentism, respect for international law.
These are not bilateral issues. They are issues of regional stability and the general implementation of the Copenhagen criteria.
A. TASOULI: My question concerns the domestic political scene. You said earlier that Greece fought to stay in the Eurozone. You have also stressed many times in the past that governmental stability is the issue. I wanted to ask whether you agree with the view stated by certain members of the government: that if, in the case of elections, there is not a single-party governing majority, all options are open for collaboration of the parties of the constitutional arch with New Democracy, Pasok, Syriza – that is, for there to be a large coalition of parties. Thank you.
E. VENIZELOS: The country is not heading for elections. The country, allow me to say, came out of the European, municipal and regional elections on its feet and unscathed.
Some called these elections a referendum for or against the government and its policies. The people answered in favor of governmental stability and the national strategy. So what we have to do – all together, all the parties of the national constitutional arch – is to fight to complete our exit from the crisis.
Fight to confirm, on the best possible terms, the sustainability of the Greek public debt. The Greek public debt, with the haircut of 2012, and mainly with the radical restructuring of 2012, is a sustainable debt, provided the parameters are changed, and these changes are considered more or less self-evident and have been presented repeatedly by the head of the European Stability Mechanism himself, Klaus Regling.
It is very easy for one to adjust issues of interest rates, due dates of instalments or bonds, or overall extension of the average duration of the debt.
We have said repeatedly that if one counts the debt correctly – that is, in terms of net present value – the Greek debt is smaller and much more sustainable that the debts of many key European countries.
But we will not question the Eurostat regulations. Eurostat itself needs to look at how it should confront the European public debt and the public debt of each member state. We follow the mainstream. In this sense, the priorities are clear.
Now, you say, if there isn’t a single-party majority. There will not be such a majority. The people do not want it. The people want collaboration. The political system has changed, society has changed, the state of affairs has changed. Gone are the times of the large, single-party parliamentary majorities. We have gone from the parliamentary system of single-party governments to cooperative parliamentarianism. So there will be coalitions.
In 2012, we decided to cooperate with all the forces that believe in Europe and are responsible. We proposed cooperation with Syriza, as well, and with the Democratic Left and with New Democracy. No one listened to us in May. New Democracy and Democratic Left listened to us in June. Then Democratic Left backed out of the coalition.
Our proposal was rejected by Syriza outright, and it is still being rejected. We have a clear stance on this. It is others who need to take a stance.
P. GALIATSATOS: Mr. Minister, you met with Mr. Davutoglu on the margins of the NATO Ministerial, and you had the opportunity to chair the EU-Turkey Association Council.
And a week ago, we also had another round of Greek-Turkish exploratory talks.
From the meeting with Mr. Davutoglu, and from all the meetings, etc., in recent weeks, do you have a sense of Turkey’s willingness to do something on the Cyprus issue, as you have asked? Do you think Turkey is willing to discuss maritime-zone issues?
And a third thing that would be interesting is whether you have ascertained if the Turkish stance is at all impacted by everything that is happening right now on its eastern border, with the ISIS and ISIL, etc. Thank you very much.
E. VENIZELOS: I met with Mr. Davutoglu in Brussels, on the margins of the Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, late on Sunday night, because he wouldn’t be coming, in the end, to the Association Council in Brussels, at which European Affairs Minister Çavuşoğlu headed the delegation. Mr. Davutoglu had to deal with very delicate moves regarding the hostages in Mosul.
It is obvious that Turkey has a very great interest in what is happening on its borders. Due to its geographical position, Turkey is currently adjacent to many crisis hotspots: Syria, Iraq. It is obviously very interested in what is happening with Iran, with the 3+3 or 5+1 process, depending on how you look at it. It is obvious that Turkey is facing a large range of pending issues and open crises that it must handle.
With regard to the Cyprus issue, Turkeys role is decisive. Because, as the European Court of Human Rights has ruled repeatedly, Turkey is responsible for the occupation and the violation of human rights in occupied Cyprus.
Turkey does not have the same position as Greece on the Cyprus issue. Greece is the motherland of the Greek Cypriot community, respects the institutions of the Republic of Cyprus, and supports the initiatives of President Anastasiades, who is the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the leader of the Greek Cypriot community.
Turkey has an international responsibility, borne out by the international courts, like the Court in Strasbourg, and there are pending rulings that must be respected, including rulings on inter-state applications, as you know and as was reaffirmed recently by the Court itself, which awarded damages from this perspective.
Moreover, Turkey needs to recognize the simple reality that the Republic of Cyprus exists, is a member state of the European Union and of the Eurozone. When someone makes an agreement with the EU-28, they make an agreement with the Republic of Cyprus as well, as it exists and before the resolution of the political problem of Cyprus – a solution that must be in line with the principles of the community acquis and the resolutions of the UN Security Council.
We are always prepared to support the initiatives of the UN, the initiatives of President Anastasiades and of Mr. Eroglu, who is the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. We received in Athens the negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Ozersay, because Mr. Mavrogiannis was received in Ankara, and we are also open to a further meeting, as soon as there is a point to it and it is requested by President Anastasiades.
But it would be very important for this process to be supported by specific steps of good faith that change the general impression, and this concerns the so-called confidence-building measures proposed by President Anastasiades.
Moreover, we support every international initiative that can help. An effort was made with the visit from U.S. Vice President Biden. Such efforts must continue, always within the framework of international law and the community acquis.
In any case, a solution is being sought that is compatible with the community acquis and is approved, via a referendum, by the Cypriot people. If it isn’t approved by the Cypriot people in a referendum, it doesn’t exist.
We also have Greek-Turkish relations. Obviously, we are also talking about the delimitation of maritime zones. Fifty-seven rounds of exploratory talks have been carried out from 2002 to 2014, and Greece always moves based on what it has said publicly.
And it is also very important, from this perspective, for us to say that Greece, as announced by the Ministry for Environment, Energy and Climate Change, is now ready to call for tenders on major offshore fields in its maritime zones, over which it exercises sovereign rights, in the Ionian and south of Crete. And this is, in my opinion, the most practical and important move that has been made in recent years with regard to the exercising of national sovereign rights.
And this, naturally, is being done in consultation between the Foreign Ministry and the Environment Ministry, the Services that very closely monitor the issue, based always on respect for international law, on absolute respect for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which also provides for the development of the relations between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.
July 1, 2014