Below is the text of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Evangelos Venizelos response, of 30 January 2014, to a Current Question on FYROM from the President of the Independent Greeks party, Panagiotis Kammenos:
E. VENIZELOS: Ladies and gentlemen MPs, allow me, before I respond to the question from the President of the Independent Greeks party, to express on behalf of the government, I am sure, on behalf of the whole of the Hellenic Parliament, the state’s reverence for the heroes who fell in the line of duty on Imia, on 31 January 1996. We honor the memory of lieutenants Panagiotis Vlachakos and Christodoulos Karathanasis, as well as the memory of chief petty officer Ektoras Yialopsos.
Ladies and gentlemen MPs, the issue of the name of Skopje – but I would say of Skopje’s more general position in the Western Balkans and its Euroatlantic perspective – is one of the major open chapters in Greek foreign policy.
Of course, the importance of this issues cannot be compared with that of the major longstanding national issues, mainly the open wound of Cyprus, but also the tension that appears from time to time in Greek-Turkish relations and the need for there to be implementation of and respect for international law throughout the air- and maritime space of the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.
In the course we have run on the issue of the name of our neighbouring state, the initial Greek stance, which was set down solemnly by the Council of the Leaders of the political parties, under the then President of the Republic, was that Greece cannot and will not accept a name for this state that includes the term “Macedonia” or its derivatives.
As the President of the Independent Greeks party – who posed this question – will remember, this occurred before the critical date of 7 April 1993, when, under the New Democracy government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis, Greece accepted Resolution 817 of 7 April 1993, in which the UN Security Council recommended that the General Assembly accept the accession of our neighbouring state to the UN under the provisional name “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
Our neighbouring state having thus joined the UN, the Security Council, in Resolution 817/1993 and a subsequent Resolution, 845/1993, advised the two sides to resolve the international dispute that had arisen as to the name through the mediation effort of the Co-chairs of the Conference that had been set up and was functioning with regard to the former Yugoslavia. The two Co-chairs were supplanted by the UN Secretary General’s special envoy, Cyrus Vance, initially, and, later, ambassador Matthew Nimetz, who has continued in this capacity for the past twenty years or so.
When the last government under Andreas Papandreou took office in 1993, this was the situation that had taken shape with regard to the UN, and at the same time, unfortunately, a long list had also formed of countries that had recognized our neighbouring state bilaterally under its so-called constitutional name.
Then an historic decision was taken by the Ministerial Council of 1994 – of which I had the honor of being a member, as Press Minister and Government Spokesperson – regarding the imposing of special restrictive trade and economic measures, the so-called embargo, in relation to our neighbouring country.
And the imposition of this embargo and the court battle that opened up before the Court of the European Union at the time led to the Interim Accord of 1995, the New York agreement between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries, Karolos Papoulias and Stevo Crvenkovski, which was co-signed/witnessed by UN special envoy Cyrus Vance.
Since then – since April 1993 – when the UN used the term “Macedonia” with historical qualifiers – rather than with the geographical qualifier that we want – a compound name containing the term “Macedonia” has been used internationally.
So, since then, without exception, Greek governments have included in their platform papers before the Hellenic Parliament, based on which they received a vote of confidence – all the governments: the Simitis government, the Kostas Karamanlis government, the Loukas Papademos government, the Antonis Samaras government – state the position that Greece, with moderation, with absolute respect for international law, for the resolutions of the Security Council, the Secretary General and his personal envoy, participates in the process, participates creatively.
Greece is prepared to accept a compound name with a geographical qualifier for the term “Macedonia”; a qualifier that will clearly differentiate this state from Greek Macedonia. And, of course, we want this name to be erga omnes: a name for all uses domestic and international, bilateral and multilateral. We express this position in all our meetings with the UN Secretary General. We set this position out in all the international fora. We state this position in our meetings with special envoy Matthew Nimetz. We also set this position out directly to our neighbours, because there have been a number of meetings on the level of Prime Ministers in the past, and on the level of Foreign Ministers.
This position is not accepted. And this position is not accepted because, without a doubt, the other side has no desire to participate in the dialogue in good faith. It does not respect international law and it does not respect the moderation and the creative and responsible stance of the Greek side.
Their basic objection is that it is supposedly impossible to alter their constitutional name, for reasons of national and institutional dignity. All of the member states of the European Union proceed – on a regular basis – to constitutional revisions in order to bring their national constitutions into line with European community law or the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and thus a single European constitutional space is gradually being formed. Moreover, the Ohrid Agreement itself, the inter-ethnic agreement, which is the foundation of the political existence and functioning of our neighbouring state, is in reality a double-natured agreement, which has both international and constitutional characteristics and, naturally, has altered the constitutional state of affairs in our neighbouring country.
That is the outline of our position, which has been set down and has functioned since we accepted – as we were obliged to do – the relevant UN Security Council resolution.
But this is not the issue – and I want to stress this in addressing the Hellenic Parliament – as compared to the exceedingly critical issue of our neighbouring country’s Euroatlantic perspective. First of all, our neighbours obviously know that, despite the crisis, during and after the crisis Greece will be their most important trade and economic partner. Greece is the number-one foreign direct investor in Skopje. the Port of Thessaloniki has been, is and will be their main gateway to the Mediterranean, and Greece is the favorite destination for tourists from this country.
But this is the least of it. There are other countries in the region, neighbours of ours, member states of the European Union and NATO, who have bilateral issues of respect for international law with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – issues infinitely more serious than the name issue.
Because, naturally, the name issue interests us because behind it hides a problem of regional stability, peace, respect for existing borders, and latent and/or manifest irredentism. Such issues exist with Bulgaria, for example, which has raised issues of the ideological use of history by Skopje; issues of constitutional irredentism, issues of respect for historical events and circumstances.
But there is something that is even more critical. I had the opportunity at the latest Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers and at the latest meeting of the EU General Affairs Council – which looked at enlargement issues – to make it clear that Greece is not raising objections to FYROM’s accession to NATO or the EU because the name issue is pending, because of the name, because we want to force a change in the name.
The resolution of the international legal issue regarding the name is an obligation of respect for the resolutions of the Security Council and of the UN more generally. Our neighbouring country’s accession to NATO and European institutions can and will take place only when it has met all the general criteria in effect for all candidate states aspiring to participation in the Euroatlantic institutions, and, more specifically, in NATO and the European Union.
These criteria, especially for the European Union, have been formulated for many years now and are the so-called general political criteria of Copenhagen. Correspondingly, there are the criteria in force in NATO. These criteria are respect for Democracy and rule of law, respect for fundamental rights, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, respect for regional stability, and assistance towards the goals of either the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union.
Such issues are raised by all the states, regarding all the candidate countries. This is of very great importance, because otherwise one might make the claim that, based on the resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, one can join all the international organizations using the provisional name.
But it isn’t an issue of a name – provisional or definitive. It is a broader substantial issue of respect for international law, respect for the European community acquis, respect for all those criteria that were set down in the General Affairs Council conclusions of 17 December 2013 and ratified in the conclusions of the 19-20 December 2013 European Council.
So, for the European perspective to open up, this whole package of criteria must be respected, and, more specifically, because our neighbouring country experienced and acute institutional problem of democracy and rule of law with the events of 24 December 2014, the political agreement concluded on 1 March 2013 must be implemented, and this is now a condition of the conclusions of the European Council, which is waiting for tangible steps in this direction from our neighbouring country.
And because I will be visiting the six capitals of the Western Balkans, as the President of the Council of the European Union, this is also what I intend to say on my visit to Skopje.
If our neighbours realize that they must take the steps required by the European acquis and international law, Greece will assist as much as it can – directly, substantially, practically – in ensuring their perspective.
Now, with regard to the referendum, Mr. Kammenos, Mr. President of the Independent Greeks, the referendum is an argument stated directly and internationally only by Mr. Gruevski, the Prime Minister of our neighbouring country, who, in order to strengthen his argument that the so-called constitutional name of this country cannot be amended, says that “in any case, we need a referendum for that kind of change to the constitution.” So it is, in reality, double-talk, a merely ostensible argument.
We cannot allow him to upgrade this argument of his by taking up, ourselves, the discussion of a referendum. Because, naturally, referenda, when and if they are held, are held on both sides. You cannot refuse to allow someone to hold a referendum, so that he fortifies his position behind the referendum; that is, behind the so-called constitutional name; that is, behind intransigence and the lack of willingness to proceed productively on these issues.
Withdrawal from the Interim Accord would mean the overturning of the international legal framework within which this issue has been moving for years, and I don’t see what the benefit is, and why Greece has to shoulder the weight of overturning the international legal framework when we are proposing something friendly, creative, specific, responsible, with prospects for the region; something European, modern, with respect for Democracy and human rights – why we should put ourselves in the position of having to explain why we are calling the international legal framework into question.
We have to bear in mind what the processes are at the UN, what the processes are that exist not only in the Security Council, but also in the General Assembly.
So when we want to protect our country’s interests, when we want to implement a foreign policy that is not rhetorical, but specific – a foreign policy that is based on specific moves and is grounded in knowledge and vision – we need to do the things I am describing. And this really does require maximum, absolution national consensus.
I would like the Independent Greeks to participate in the spectrum of national consensus on these issues. Undoubtedly, however, bearing in mind the stances that have been expressed from time to time by parties in the Hellenic Parliament, there is broad consensus on this issue; consensus that, in the long term, has coincided with the positions of Greece’s governments.
REJOINDER
Ladies and gentlemen MPs, in April 1993, the country’s foreign policy was being exercised by the New Democracy government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis. Since the relevant resolution was passed by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, the term “Macedonia”, with qualifiers that concern the historical course and political identity of the country – and not geography – has been used as the provisional international name of this state.
Because, naturally, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, whether someone says the name in Greek or English or another language. I imagine that the President of the Independent Greeks knows this, because he has served as a select and dynamic member of the New Democracy party.
The Interim Accord was signed against the historical backdrop I explained to you, of the dynamic decision of the embargo, which rearranged the international correlations and cut off the bilateral recognitions that had already taken place by October 1993 under the so-called constitutional name of this country, and was signed by Karolos Papoulias, not as Foreign Minister of the Simitis government, against which Mr. Kammenos is turning, but as Foreign Minister of the Andreas Papandreou government.
We can also talk about Imia and the Aegean and the arc of Greek-Turkish relations from 1974 until today, whenever you want, on any level you want – in the Plenary, in the competent Standing Committee; I prefer this to take place in the National Council on Foreign Policy – so that we can look at the who, what, when and why of what was done and how this has shaped the state of affairs.
So it is of very great importance that we be precise and sincere, so that we can also be credible.
The position of Greece – of all the Greek governments, of the broad majority of the Parliament, which is much greater than the governing majority – is what I set out for you, and this is what we state on all levels, including to the UN Secretary General, to Mr. Nimetz, to our international collocutors and to the other side.
In fact, in his last two letters of response to Mr. Gruevski, the Prime Minister has proposed the signing of a new Memorandum of Cooperation between the two sides, so that we can impart fresh momentum to the collateral issues of our cooperation. This proposal was first put forward many months ago, before I took on the duties of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.
From a certain point on, all of this cannot evolve publicly, because in that way we would be allowing the other side to convert this issue from a matter of international responsibility and obligatory respect for international legality into a game of domestic political posturing.
Greece is a country that is historical, institutionally mature, responsible, European; an old member of the European Union and NATO. It is a pillar of stability and security in the region. We have to stand as an example, in the name of international law, with vision. We have to shape international relations.
At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest – and not in Belgrade, as you mistakenly said – I repeat yet again in Parliament, Greece did not exercise any kind of veto, because no such issue arose that would have required such a mode of conduct.
The issue of NATO enlargement is confronted by the North Atlantic council – on all levels: on the level of heads of state and government, on the level of Foreign Ministers, on the level of Permanent Representatives – with consensus. There is a very broad group of member states who have precisely the same outlook on the criteria for and pace of enlargement.
This group of countries, which in actual fact guides the decisions of NATO, emerged at the 2008 Summit Meeting and at every other Meeting at which the issue of the implementation of NATO’s Open Door Policy has been raised.
The same thing happened in Chicago. The same thing happened at the latest Meeting of Foreign Ministers. We see an inclination toward the same thing happening at the renewal of this discussion on the level of NATO Foreign Ministers, in June, ahead of the NATO Summit Meeting this coming September, in Wales.
I told you how Greek foreign policy is formulated with regard to NATO’s Open Door policy and the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policy. I told you what our neighbouring country needs to do if it wants to become a member of these two organizations; what it needs to respect. If you think that the problem is the name and Greece, that is an extreme misreading.
We would be making a big mistake if we turned these two organizations into arenas for a dispute between us and a neighbouring state. No! Because we are an old member state of both organizations and we move in the name of criteria that concern the identity – in terms of both policy and values – of these two international organizations.
Mr. President of the Independent Greeks, ladies and gentlemen MPs, international negotiations, foreign policy, economic policy – which are linked to the country’s sovereignty, its institutional equality, its dignity, its perspective – are extremely difficult. What is involved is neither the exercising of political rhetoric, nor a domestic political and electoral game. It is the defence of vital national interests with difficult collocutors, in the context to exceptionally difficult European and international relations.
What the rapporteur of the European Parliament’s Economic Affairs Committee, Mr. Karas, said yesterday regarding how the leader of the main opposition party, Mr. Tsipras, talked to him about the great importance of the troika issue, points to a lot. It shows that words at home are easy, negotiations abroad are very difficult; that without anything specific, responsible, tangible to say, we cannot defend the country’s interests and we cannot improve correlations in favor of Greeks, because everything we are discussing has a direct impact on the economy, on day-to-day life, on the lives of all Greek families.
So let’s stop the easy words for domestic consumption, and let’s rally together based on the criterion of national unity and social cohesion, so that we can ensure our exit from the crisis and, mainly, fortify our national sovereignty and dignity.
January 30, 2014