Ladies and gentlemen MPs, it is a real pleasure to have this opportunity to address the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs today, to brief the Committee members on the state of play in our Foreign and European policy.
Before I get to the individual chapters in our foreign policy, allow me to refer very briefly to the elements that, in my opinion, comprise the strategic framework of Greek foreign policy.
The strategic framework of Greek foreign policy
• First, our foreign policy must be a policy of principles, aimed at defending national sovereignty and national sovereign rights, all of which are in effect, because only in this way do we truly defend national integrity and independence in a world that is dangerous and in turmoil.
• The second principle that governs our foreign policy – and this is self-evident, but the self-evident must be stated – is the sincere pursuit of peace, stability and good neighbourly relations in our wider region. And all of this with respect for international law, democratic principles, and human rights.
• A foreign policy principle of a country with our diaspora is, of course, the maintaining of the homeland’s strong ties with global Hellenism, with Greeks abroad.
• Of course, for a country that is a member of the EU and the Eurozone, a principle of our foreign policy is active participation in European integration, based on the institutional equality of member states. A principle that, unfortunately, is being called into question, because what we are experiencing in practice is a far cry from institutional equality of member states. The institutional policies and economic inequalities amongst the EU member states in general, and the Eurozone members in particular, are profoundly distressing.
• It is very important that our foreign policy be planned and exercised in full awareness of history, geography, and international and regional power relations. Patriotism is not rhetorical declarations or even a strong, sincere conviction. It is the ability to perceive and capitalize on shifting and fragile power relations to your benefit. From this standpoint, our foreign policy is a very important aspect – though not the sole aspect – of our national security and defence policy, which is part of the broader framework of our overall national strategy.
So from this standpoint, foreign policy must utilize – and this is what we are pursuing – all the parameters of national power. And parameters of national power go beyond just the country’s defensive capabilities and diplomatic activities to include national unity, social cohesion, safeguarding the level of economic growth despite the crisis, internationalization of enterprises, the reach and universality of Hellenic Culture, the strong historical bonds we have with many countries and regions, our tourism industry, naturally, the impressive size of Greek shipping, the multiple networks of Hellenism abroad, Orthodoxy, Church Diplomacy, energy diplomacy, and the list goes on.
Foreign policy and the economic crisis
From this standpoint I would like to expressly and categorically stress something that I can bear witness to, because during the economic crisis I have, in succession, exercised the duties of Defence Minister, Finance Minister, President of a Parliamentary Party, and, now, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The economic crisis the Greek people are experiencing with many tough sacrifices over the past three years has not negatively impacted our foreign policy, our goals, how we handle situations, our arguments, our priorities.
During the very difficult, mainly financial, negotiations for confronting the crisis, our international collocutors never attempted to link the economic – mainly fiscal and financial – crisis with issued within the purview of our foreign policy. This is of very great importance, because, naturally, a people going through a crisis must have increased sensitivity on matters concerning their national dignity, their national pride, national sovereignty – in the “tough” sense of that word – when we are acting in the field of foreign and defence policy.
So it is of very great significance for us to say that the kind of foreign policy our country needs can be based only on the broadest possible domestic political support and consensus, as is fitting for a modern, European, democratic country. This is not at all easy or self-evident, and, unfortunately, it is in no way a given. We must pursue it consciously and systematically. From this standpoint, parliamentary processes that have to do with the country’s foreign and European policy, like today’s meeting, the ongoing and full briefing of the Parliament and political parties, and the functioning of the National Council on Policy – which is to convene in early September – are of particular importance.
Foreign policy within the framework of the EU
Our foreign policy is, of course, the foreign policy of an EU member state that participates in the formulation and implementation of Common Security and Defence Policy as it is evolving in the current phase of European integration. I am referring to the institutional framework of the Lisbon Treaty, to the role of the High Representative, to the existence and functioning of the European External Action Service, bearing in mind, however, the European reality, which has Europe as a political force much smaller than it rightfully should be historically and economically.
Of course, we do not forget that, despite the existence of Common Foreign and Security Policy institutions, each member state has its own national priorities that are often “hostage” to new forms of economic nationalism, and, moreover, we mustn’t forget that there is a reality in the classical landscape of international relations, which is the existence of EU member states that are permanent members of the Security Council. And some of these are also nuclear powers, with whatever that means for global power relations.
Our foreign policy attempts a synthesis of all of our country’s separate regional identities. That is, not just its European identity, but also its Southeast European – Balkan – identity, its Mediterranean identity, and, for historical reasons, a regional identity that is not geographical in the narrow sense of the term: our Black Sea dimension.
The priorities of our foreign policy
1. Cyprus Issue: Our foreign policy is a policy of clear priorities, the first of which is the Cyprus issue. I will start my reference to individual chapters with the Cyprus issue. I needn’t stress, addressing the Standing Parliamentary Committee, that the Cyprus issue is for us, always, a problem of the invasion and occupation of a large portion of the territory of a member state of the United National and the EU. Thus, our goal is a just and viable solution within the framework of the UN Security Council Resolutions. A federal solution that is acceptable to the Cypriot people and that, obviously, must be expressed in a manner that is clearly and institutionally organized, democratic, direct. A solution that is compatible with the community acquis and European Union law and order.
For us, respect for the international legal personality of the Republic of Cyprus as a member state of the UN, the EU and the Eurozone is fundamental, despite the problems it entails, given that Cyprus is currently experiencing a deep economic crisis from which we hope and believe it will emerge very quickly. Because the small size and great flexibility of the Cypriot economy allow for an easy exit from the crisis, just as they led to the easy onset of a deep crisis.
After being sworn in as Foreign Ministry, I began my visits, naturally, in Nicosia. It was incumbent upon me to meet with the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, the President of the House of Representatives, Yiannakis Omirou, the Foreign Minister, with whom I first collaborated in 1993, when we were both government spokespersons, Mr. Yiannakis Kasoulides, and the heads of all the parliamentary parties, who also comprise, to a great extent, the National Council of the Republic of Cyprus. Our in-depth talks with Mr. Kasoulides, on the whole range of issues of common interest, were continued during his reciprocal visit to Athens a few days later.
You will be aware, perhaps, that the National Council of the Republic of Cyprus met in mid-July and, after many years, came to the decision to again appoint a Negotiator – Collocutor, as we used to say – of the Greek Cypriot Community to take on the onus of meetings and negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot Community for the political solution of the Cyprus problem.
The existence of a negotiator – a person other than the President of the Republic – who is the international advocate and representative of the only international legal personality that exists and is the Republic of Cyprus lends a flexibility to the meetings with all the actors, even with Turkey, and I would like to believe that this is the new institutional dimension that will be exploited.
Constructive proposals put forward by the Greek Cypriot side have already come out regarding a bundle of Confidence-Building Measures that can impart fresh momentum to the Cyprus issue. I would like to believe that – in the context of the UN process as well as in the context of the EU, following the briefing of the competent Commissioner (whom I had the opportunity to talk to in a long, one-on-one meeting in Brussels) – we will have something new. In any case, some form of movement on the Cyprus issue.
What we have decided on is the setting up of a mechanism for automatic and full coordination between Greece and Cyprus, between the two governments. This concerns all the issues, from energy diplomacy and matters concerning exploration for and exploitation of hydrocarbons, to the prospect of the Republic of Cyprus’s joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Greece and Cyprus are two sovereign states, members of the UN and the EU, in the Eastern Mediterranean space. This determines everything, the whole framework of national strategy and the whole framework of the strategic cooperation between the two states.
2. Greek-Turkish relations: The second chapter in our foreign policy that is of major regional importance is Greek-Turkish relations, which we want to be good neighbourly relations, relations of good-faith cooperation aimed an safeguarding stability as well as the pursuit of prosperity for the two peoples. Historically, we must note that in Southeast Europe, Turkey and Greece are two countries that have been very hesitant in recent decades with regard to the phenomenon known generally in international relations as “revisionism.” This is of very great importance, because the basic goal is always respect for existing borders.
I visited Ankara, in response to an invitation extended to me by my counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu when he called me to congratulate me on my new duties. I chose to visit Ankara, for a few hours, on 19 July, because I wanted my meeting and talks with Mr. Davutoglu to take place before the informal meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Majorca and, mainly, before the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 22 July.
The agenda for this Council, which was called upon to look at the major pending issues in the region, the situation in Egypt, the situation in Syria, made it imperative that we know the Turkish point of view so that we might convey it accurately. Turkey’s view on these major issues diverges from the common European position, and that is why it is very important for Greece to know, first hand, from the Foreign Minister himself, what Turkey’s views are, so that we might convey them.
I also had the opportunity to convey the content of the telephone conversation I had with the new Egyptian Foreign Minister, who contacted me and a few other EU Foreign Ministers to convey the climate and the assurances of the Egyptian government regarding said government’s dedication to restoring the democratic institutions.
In the talks with Mr. Davutoglu, we naturally talked about the whole range of issues, during both the one-on-one meeting, with the Secretaries General of the two Ministries in attendance, and the meeting of the two delegations. We talked about all the issues that concern bilateral relations, always within the framework of international law and Greece’s well-known national positions.
Naturally, we talked about the Cyprus issue, because according to European Court of Human Rights case law, Turkey is an occupying power in the northern section of Cyprus and is directly responsible for the violations of human rights and, thus, the European Convention on Human Rights.
We agreed, naturally, to strengthen our bilateral cooperation, mainly in the economic, commercial sector and in the so-called low policy sectors. You are aware that in 2010 the Greek-Turkish High Level Cooperation Council was formed – the two sides exchange visits and meetings of their cabinets. The first meeting was held in Athens, in 2010, and the second took place this past March, in Istanbul. And now we decided to hold the third meeting of the Greek-Turkish High Level Cooperation Council in Greece, during the Greek EU Presidency in the first half of 2014. In any case, the EU-Turkey Association Council will be taking place.
It is of particular importance that I refer to everything I and Mr. Davutoglu said in the joint press conference we held in Ankara, following our meeting. In the transcript of the press conference, you can see my reference to the Cyprus issue, maritime zones and the general framework for cooperation between the two countries.
I am pleased that Mr. Davutoglu publicly thanked Greece for its cooperation on issues concerning the combating of terrorism. This is a direct and official response to various comments in the Turkish media regarding Greece’s stance on terrorism issues.
Naturally, we also discussed the major current issues I already referred to: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran. I imagine that you are following the curve of Turkish foreign policy on these issues and perceive where that policy differs from the common European stance I mentioned, so it is of very great importance that we accurately assess the regional relations and the role of the states in our region.
3. Balkans: The third major issue is that which concerns the Balkans. We have welcomed the accession of Croatia to the EU, we welcome Serbia’s European perspective, as the opening of accession negotiations has already been decided on for January, almost simultaneously with the beginning of the Greek EU Presidency. The Belgrade-Pristina agreement reached on Kosovo is very important. We are prepared to deepen our relationship with Kosovo and welcome an Economic and Commercial Relations Office in Greece.
We are monitoring developments in Albania very closely: the election result, the impending formation of the new Rama government. I had the opportunity to communicate with Mr. Rama – we both head our countries’ respective socialist parties – and with his government partner, Mr. Meta, who is set to assume the duties of the speaker of the new Albanian Parliament. The protection of the rights of the Greek minority and the resolution of issues of mutual interest, as well as of wider Mediterranean interest, such as the delimitation of maritime zones, are the foundations on which a new phase in Greek-Albanian relations can rest, and of course we are greatly interested in Albania’s Euroatlantic perspective.
From this standpoint, Montenegro is much further ahead, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is further behind due to the domestic political and institutional problems the country is facing, and due, of course, to the complex institutional system in the country.
4. FYROM: You know that the firm position that enjoys broad political support in our country is support for the Euroatlantic perspective of our neighbouring country, on condition, of course, for both NATO and the EU, of our neighbours’ meeting the criteria applicable for all candidate countries, whether they are trying to join NATO or the EU. It is not the name issue that is blocking FYROM’s Euroatlantic perspective, but the whole package of general criteria that must be met by candidates for membership. This is of very great significance, because in the end the criterion is respect for international law and the maintaining of good neighbourly relations. This is of very great importance, because the name comes precisely under the need for international law to be respected, for the Interim Accord to be respected, and for there to be sincere, unbiased and substantial good neighbourly relations.
I met with Foreign Minister Poposki on the margins of the 22 July Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels, the thinking being that this meeting would be useful and productive in view of the fact that the next day, 23 July, a meeting of the FYROM-EU Association Council was to take place. It was very important to send this message through the meeting I held with Mr. Poposki. We reviewed the issues through the prism of each side, based on our public, well-known positions, which comprise our national strategy. You are aware, moreover, that the two Prime Ministers recently exchanged letters. You are aware of the content of Mr. Gruevski’s letter and the Greek Prime Minister’s response.
Our position can be summarized in two points:
The first is that we fully respect the Security Council resolutions and the mission of Ambassador Nimetz. We also support the mission of Greece’s special representative Ambassador Vassilakis, who has full political authorization to participate creatively and in good faith in the meetings, the discussions, the dialogue.
What’s more, in the Prime Minister’s letter we reiterated the proposal for concluding with our neighbours a Memorandum of Understanding that places the present phase of our relations within an organized framework and creates momentum, always within the framework, of course, of the broader framework of the 1995 Interim Accord. We come back to that proposal, which we believe can be extremely creative and helpful in dealing with all the problems that exist.
Greece is Skopje’s most important neighbour and partner – Skopje’s true gateway to the Euroatlantic institutions. And Greece is Skopje’s second largest source of foreign direct investment – the largest source if one takes into account total investments that have been made in this country.
Our message is very clear, and we will have the opportunity to discuss these issues with Ambassador Nimetz at the end of the summer, in early September, whether he comes to the region, or on the margins of the UN General Assembly.
5. Eastern Mediterranean: Bilateral cooperation with Israel and trilateral Greek-Israeli-Cypriot cooperation are of very great importance to us, as you can see. The Energy Ministers of the three countries are preparing to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on 8 August, in Nicosia, on waters and energy. This is something very important.
6. Egypt: In my meeting with Mr. Davutoglu and at the EU Foreign Affairs Council and the informal meeting in Majorca, we dedicated a significant amount of time to what is happening in Egypt. As you can see, the situation in Egypt is taking a dramatic turn. Our position is set out with very great care, in a creative manner, with respect for the sovereign rights of the Egyptian people. But a systematic and sincere effort must be made by all the involved sides to avoid the escalation of violence. Egypt must not lapse into a state of civil war or quasi-civil war. The process of restoring democratic institutions, of re-establishing Egyptian constitutional order, must be fast, clean and clear, and include all Egyptian social and political forces, with no exception. Because for us, the criterion of respect for human rights, respect for democracy, naturally, the recognition of the sovereign rights of each every people, every society, is of very great importance, so that the European message is very clear.
The Greek position is a European position, a friendly position, a creative position, a realistic position that, naturally, fully respects the criteria of European political and institutional culture. Any escalation in violence must be avoided.
It is very important that Ms. Ashton went to Egypt for the second time in a month, and it is very important that she had a two-hour meeting yesterday with Mr. Morsi. We are waiting to be informed by Ms. Ashton of the content of her talks, and I will be talking by phone in the coming days with my Egyptian counterpart for a first-hand briefing on what is happening.
We must note here, of course, that Turkish President Gul sent a telegram of congratulations to the new President of Egypt.
7. Lebanon: One of the most critical decisions taken at the 22 July Foreign Affairs Council – a unanimous decision – was the characterization of the military arm of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. This was done in tandem with a statement stressing the importance of the existence, the institutional existence, and the national, religious and social unity of Lebanon. The EU is continuing funding for Lebanon and contacts with all the political forces, and, thus, naturally, all the parties participating in the government of Lebanon.
8. Syria: The crisis in Syria was also discussed in depth. As you know, we now have a change in stance on the part of the international community regarding the arming of the opposition. What interests us right now is the amelioration in some way of the very serious humanitarian crisis, which is of added interest to us because it increases the pressure of migration flows. The goal is a Geneva-2 that will be called upon to shape the conditions for the implementation of the Geneva-1 decisions. What is important is for their to be trusted collocutors and for the humanitarian crisis, which is costing thousands of Syrian lives, to be stopped.
Naturally, referring to Syria, I must make special mention of the situation of Christian groups, particularly the Greek Orthodox, and of the hope that the two bishops who have been abducted and whose fate has been unknown for 100 days now are alive and will be freed at some point. The contradictory reports that come out in the press from time to time concern us deeply, but unfortunately there is no diplomatic information that differs from that of the open journalistic sources.
9. Middle East: During the Foreign Affairs Council we – the twenty-eight foreign ministers and Mrs. Ashton – had the opportunity for a long teleconference with U.S. Secretary of State Kerry on the Middle East peace process. We naturally support this effort and hope it produces results. It is a long process that is linked to internal political developments on both sides. We are prepared to provide our good offices and support wherever necessary.
10. U.S.: As you know, the Prime Minister will be visiting the U.S. – Washington – on 8 August for a meeting with President Obama, and I will be in New York, heading the Greek delegation to the UN General Assembly in the last week in September. Today I will be receiving the outgoing U.S. Ambassador in a farewell meeting, and in a few day we will be receiving his replacement.
11. Russia: Needless to say, we attach very great importance to Greek-Russian relations, and I would like to hope that I will have the opportunity, perhaps at the General Assembly, for a first meeting with Mr. Lavrov.
12. Azerbaijan: Energy diplomacy, as you know, is a top priority for us. In Brussels, I had a long, one-on-one meeting with my counterpart from Azerbaijan. The agreement signed on the Trans Adriatic Pipeline and the acceptance agreement signed by the three countries – Greece, Italy and Albanian – shape a new state of affairs in our bilateral relations with Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan understands that Greece is now a gateway of contact with the EU. We have to link this to the fact that, to date, there are no diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and the Republic of Cyprus. We want to contribute towards the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the prospects for cooperation that are opening up are much broader, because the Caspian deposits are much more that what we now know as Shah Deniz 2.
13. War reparations: At the beginning of my term, I had the opportunity to receive, in the first visit of a counterpart of mine to Athens, German Foreign Minister Westerwelle, who wanted, with his presence here, to support Greece’s efforts to stand on its feet in the midst of the economic crisis. Naturally, we talked about the whole framework of our relations. Naturally, in our one-on-one meeting, I raised the issue of war reparations and the occupation loan. You know what the Greek position is. it is the position I had the opportunity to set out during the recent interpellation from SYRIZA during the Plenary Session, and you are aware of what economic context – in the broad sense – we are moving in. On this issue, when we make a move, we have to know what we can do next and effectively. I don’t want to expand further on this at this stage – perhaps during the discussion.
Greek EU Presidency: Allow me to refer very briefly to the upcoming Greek EU Presidency in the first half of 2014. The Greek Presidency, which is the country’s fifth presidency since joining the EU, coincides with the elections for the new European Parliament. Thus, it is a Presidency that, parliamentarily speaking, is shorter than six months, because the European Parliament term will expire.
But naturally our Presidency coincides with the major political and social dialogue on the future of Europe, on its course, on its strategy, on its inertia on very many issues, on the need to develop another narrative for the European peoples, who are living through a crisis. Many countries are experiencing the crisis directly, and others, not at the center of the crisis, are experiencing the crisis through a general recessional European environment. For us, the six-year recession and extremely high unemployment, particularly among the young, is the central experience, but all the peoples of Europe, all the European societies and economies have unemployment and youth unemployment problems. The European vision has become blurred, and, naturally, we need a new European narrative that is practical, specific, and, if you will allow me, progressive.
From this point of view, of very great importance is the European political south, which is comprised of the countries of the south, with a decisive factor for power relations being France, which also participates in the Franco-German line and has a real impact on internal European power relations. This effort is being participated in by parties, political forces, intellectuals, opinion-making mechanisms. It is imperative that the need for clear priorities, other priorities, be seen. This also impacted our decision on the political priorities.
The Cabinet will convene on Thursday afternoon to make official the priorities of the Greek Presidency, and the visit from Italian Prime Minister Letta was a very good opportunity for us to discuss the succession of presidencies, which are Mediterranean, which are southern, and it is of very great importance for there to be the continuity that sustains this perspective.
• So, our number one priority with be growth with jobs – because there is always the risk of what is called jobless growth – and, naturally, social cohesion. I won’t go into detail. We will discuss this at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee jointly with the European Affairs Committee.
• The second priority is migration and security issues.
• The third and imperative priority is the changes to EMU economic governance. This is very important to us, because it is linked to the viability of our fiscal data.
• The fourth priority – but in reality the first, because it is of an horizontal nature – is comprehensive maritime policy. This means growth, it means environment, it means shipping, it means fisheries, it means maritime zones, environmental shelf, exclusive economic zone, fishery zones in the Mediterranean. It is important that it be understood that the Mediterranean is a European, naturally, and international and regional source of wealth, and the EU has need of a comprehensive maritime policy.
I won’t talk to you today about our organizational preparations, but the role of the Parliament and Parliamentary Diplomacy and the relations between the Hellenic Parliament and the European Parliament during the European elections is very important.
I will stop here and supplement based on your questions and observations. Just one invitation/request: that we shape the conditions for national unity and the broader political and parliamentary consensus in the always sensitive and decisive field of our foreign policy.
Thank you.
July 31, 2013