I thank the organizers for inviting me to address you, and mainly for having the idea to host a conference on the fundamental issue of Democracy, which is the common denominator of nearly all the international crises we are experiencing at this time.
I congratulate them on the initiative to host this meeting here, in Athens, the birthplace of Athenian Democracy.
So I am very pleased to welcome you to the brilliant new Acropolis Museum, at the foot of the Holy Rock, very close to the Pnyx, and across from the Theatre of Dionysus.
But modern Democracy is not the direct Democracy of the Ecclesia, or Assembly, of the Demos in Ancient Athens.
Rather, it is the representative constitutional Democracy that has been shaped and refined as a concept and an institutional structure over the past two centuries, inspired mainly by the two great revolutions of the 18th century: the American and French Revolutions.
Thus, when we talk about democracy today, we are not referring only to a basic institutional framework that includes free and regular elections to fill the state’s political organs, and the free functioning of political parties, but also to a broad system of rights and guarantees that constitute the rule of law.
Contemporary Democracy is thus the liberal Democracy that was developed historically and refined into its present form in the European and North American space.
But this Democracy, which now has a more or less self-evident institutional and ideological content, has gradually –and particularly since the Second World War– taken on universal/global characteristics, linked as it is with the protection of fundamental rights, starting with the very right to life itself.
Democracy and human rights are thus indivisible; they are two sides of the same coin.
International acknowledgement of this was greatly strengthened after the fall of so-called real socialism, very recently, in the early 1990s.
But this idealized description is a far cry from the global reality, in which Democracy is under pressure and being called into question in both the Western world –as the historical cradle of modern Democracy– and other regions on the globe.
Regions that accept the notion and value of Democracy, but that, for historical reasons, have a more limited cultural relationship with modern liberal western-style Democracy; the Democracy that we regard as self-evident in, for example, the space of the European Union.
In the Western space, liberal representative Democracy is under the pressure of the economic crisis, the crisis of the model of European competitiveness.
It is under pressure from unemployment, shrinking opportunities, the faltering of social cohesion and the European social model.
Very often, this economic and social pressure manifests as a crisis of political participation and representation; a crisis of legitimacy for political parties and governments.
This crisis is unfolding in parallel with the crisis of the sovereignty of the nation state, which is rendered hostage to the markets, without its functions being superseded by corresponding steps in the direction of European integration.
The European Union’s democratic and political deficit is mirrored by a corresponding deficit on the level of member states.
The rise of the extreme right, of racism and xenophobia, the emergence of various forms of political and social violence are perhaps the most glaring aspect of the pressure Western Democracy is coming under in its own home.
A great institutional and moral dilemma is being raised: The potential for enemies of Democracy to exploit democratic rights, democratic institutions, democratic processes.
Europe must never forget the manner in which the European Nazism and fascism of the interwar period perpetrated organized abuse of democratic and parliamentary processes to seize power and abolish Democracy.
But what is most critical is that we shape democratic political responses to the causes of the economic and social pressure Western Democracy is under in its own home.
This concerns the need for policies that safeguard the employment, dignity and prosperity of all citizens.
The need for policies that redress inequalities and injustices, and that safeguard social cohesion.
The manner in which the European Union has dealt with the fiscal and financial crisis in many member states over the past seven years, while costing a great deal of money, has not responded to these existential needs.
And this is the case because of the sway held by stereotypes that take into account fiscal and macroeconomic models, but not how much societies can bear or political conduct that frequently tends to call democratic values into question.
The growth of euroscepticism and the extreme right requires more comprehensive and composite approaches from the governments of countries with a de facto greater responsibility for Europe’s course.
There needs to be greater historical memory and greater historical intellect in the name of Europe’s values, starting with Democracy and rule of law.
On the other hand, mainly in Europe’s southern neighbourhood, but also in its eastern neighbourhood – within the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – we see the de facto raising of a critical dilemma that concerns the universality of liberal Democracy.
The Arab Spring and its aftermath, which we are seeing now in Syria, Iraq and Libya – with the emergence of the ISIS and the transformation of terrorist organizations, the erosion of states, the disputing of existing borders – points up an obvious ordering of priorities: To have Democracy, you must have a structured state and basic guarantees of internal and external security.
What’s more, if you are to have Democracy and security, you have to take into account –very carefully and on the ground– all the parameters of religious and ethnic identities.
The universality of Democracy and the urgency of the demand for security cannot ignore the variety and complexity of these parameters.
Otherwise, the mix becomes explosive, and the vicious circle is not broken.
Consequently, statehood is a component part of Democracy and rule of law.
The appearance of “sub-state” entities that control regions and have links to terrorism and organized crime, etc., calls into question not only the sovereignty of the state, but also the prospects for implementing democratic solutions.
To a great extent, the issue of security also concerns the Western world itself, primarily in the sense of internal security and the confronting of terrorism and other forms of organized crime.
Moreover, the issues of security, global balance of power and stability have been borne very seriously in mind in other regions of the world, like Southeast Asia, in order to facilitate the process of modernization and transition in larger countries, such as China, which plays a definitive role in the global economy and is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
We are living in a period with an unusually high density of crises. When you have so many crises that raise security issues, reacting in a fragmented manner will not suffice.
You have to look at the big picture.
You need a unified strategy that takes into account all of the open fronts and highlights priorities in relation to risks. Which means in relation to opponents and potential allies, who are not necessarily friends or even likeminded.
This strategic mindset increases the probability of real and in-depth achievement of objectives related not only to the demand for security, but also to the demand for Democracy.
September 15, 2014