OPENING STATEMENT
Let me start by thanking the Chair for the invitation, I thank all of you for coming so that we can have a first discussion of the foreign policy issues. I must tell you that this is my first time in Parliament, because, even for the government’s Platform Speeches, I was travelling abroad, so my thanks are double, because today is my first time in the Temple of Democracy. I have a few thoughts to share with you about foreign policy – most of the information exists in the public space, in any case; certain special information is not for the public space.
I would say that the first positive thing about the six weeks during which I have had the honor of being the Foreign Minister of the current government is the rise in the importance of foreign policy. Foreign policy is a sector of political action the importance of which, the promotion of which, the public appearance of which, I would say, has fallen off a great deal over the past five years, along with the degree to which it is a subject of public debate.
The first thing I tried to do as Foreign Minister, for negotiating reasons, was to take measures to shift the agenda away from being exclusively the economy – and the economy, in fact, with neoliberal outlooks – to a policy of perceiving the things that are also linked with geopolitical position. To underscore the repercussions of all of the policies that have been imposed on the country over the past five years, as concerns the country’s geopolitical position and the environment in which it finds itself and which is characterized by great instability. The environment is characterized by fluidity, whether one takes the vertical line – Russia-Ukraine-Western Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean-Middle East-North Africa – or simply the description of the phenomenon more simply, as a triangle (Ukraine-Libya-Middle East) of instability and destabilization by a number of forces, with Greece at the center of that triangle and, to the extent that it is stabilized and resolving its problems, sending out at least small waves of stabilization in the region, rather than the opposite happening, which would mean the country’s destabilization under pressures from the region.
These views of mine are well known. But they were reported on abroad in a curious manner and were systematically distorted in the international media, and there were those who commented on it based on the international press, but that is of no importance here.
The second major shift – that is, supplementing an economic negotiation – was through a negotiating policy and an analysis of the geopolitical developments over the past six weeks and is an orientation of the EU exclusively towards the north. When I first went – after many, many years, when I went as an employee of the Foreign Ministry – to a Meeting of Foreign Ministers, its structure and makeup was new to me, because the discussion that took place at the first meeting of the Council was heavily weighted towards the three Baltic countries, the Visegrad countries and the four Scandinavian countries, but mostly Sweden and Britain. At this meeting of the Council, the sole subject of discussion was the situation in the Russia-Ukraine region and the instability emanating from there and the sanctions policy.
I must tell you that I sat and counted that, at the past 15 meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council, the main subject of discussion was the crisis in Ukraine. There was no discussion of the issues of the Middle East and the South and the repercussions of the political choices of specific countries-states in North Africa and the Middle East.
Our opinion, as the government, but also mine, was that to discuss Russia-Ukraine constantly is an agenda of special interest for foreign policy. But the Middle East and North Africa are also matters of special interest, and especially for the South, in foreign policy, also linking to certain domestic policy issues, such as the jihadists and the attacks we saw in Copenhagen, Brussels and Paris.
Under these conditions, the Foreign Ministry undertook two initiatives within the framework of our limited capacities and the economic capacity at our disposal. The first was special measures for Mariupol and the protection of the population there. Special assistance measures.
Mariupol is virtually cut off. It has 300 Greek passports and another 300 citizens who are linked to holders of Greek passports. We are the only state with a Consulate there, and thus there are diplomatic missions and a direct picture. In Mariupol there is no access to the port. It is destroyed and shallow, and a vessel cannot moor there. The airport has also been destroyed, along with at least the first 110 kilometers of the railway line inland. Nevertheless, we were able to send both economic assistance and medical assistance, particularly for the Mariupol health center, which needed a new x-ray machine and other machines. We also delivered pharmaceutical and economic aid.
Six members of the Greek Ukrainian community in Mariupol have been killed. The community is about 120,000 strong in the center of Mariupol and the surrounding villages. According to the Consulate’s data, there were 37,000 Greeks in the center of Mariupol. Some 30,000 have remained, as 7,000 have departed in the direction of Rostov. Seventeen of the thirty-five villages have been taken over by the “federalists” or “separatists” who have a Russian-speaking orientation. The rest are 10 kilometers from the battles close to Mariupol, based on the picture we have from our own missions and not the international agencies. So our first initiative was for Mariupol. There are emergency crisis plans, military and police, but, of course, it remains to be seen how well organized they are in practice. For the time being, the aid is being delivered despite the special circumstances I mentioned earlier.
Our second initiative concerns the Christian populations of the Middle East as an element of the general principles and values we have as a European country, regarding the multiculturalism, multi-religiousness and multi-ethnicity of the region.
These are communities that have existed for 2,015 years now, one might say, and that are suffering multiple attacks and destruction at the hands of the forces active there; forces that are relentless, brutal – just as the two forces around Mariupol. Our initiative has evolved into a coordinating initiative with Cyprus, Italy, France and Holland. We have communicated with the Islamic countries, the Muslim countries, that is – Muslim countries that have a Muslim population and not an Islamist regime, just so there’s no misunderstanding. We are in touch with all the churches, the Orthodox Patriarchates, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, rabbis and Muslim leaders from Egypt to Europe.
We have also prepared a text, which we agreed on with the partners we have in this initiative, and we are looking at holding an International Conference in May to focus attention on these populations and on the multi-ethnicity, multi-religiousness and multiculturalism that we support with regard to these regions.
We are also preparing – so that you know, for the Committee – changes at the Foreign Ministry; small ones for the time being, which I estimate we will be putting forward next week. We have them ready, and they still have to be seen by the Legal Council of the State. They include the re-establishment of the Scientific Council of the Foreign Ministry, the need for a special agency that gathers and examines special legal issues in the long term. There is the reorganization of the Ministry’s old Analysis and Planning Centre, which is essentially not functioning. The Analysis and Planning Centre mostly, as you know, assigns studies and produces a newsletter, it doesn’t produce enough supportive work, and it remains to be seen whether we can ensure this. Also, a small amendment to the Foreign Ministry Statutes regarding secret funds, with a proposal for the setting up of a three-member Parliamentary committee that will check the use of these funds, so that it won’t just be up to the Ministry and there will be other, substantial oversight, because ministry oversight is relative.
With regard to the country, we believe, as the government, that the country has special and broader capacities. It is a European country with cultural, religious, historical and traditional ties with emerging countries like Brazil, Russia, China and India, and these countries have a strong presence on the global economic and political stage. Our country was never a colonial power, so these countries have no reservations with regard to us.
We are not saying that we are shifting our country’s geographical or political space, but we believe that we can follow and contribute to a national policy with regard to these states and to a European policy. As you know, I am personally hostile to the theory that Greece must Europeanize itself, which implies that somewhere there is a Europe, and that Greece must simply follow. I am a proponent of proactive foreign policy, which means that Greece contributes, influences and fights for its views within international organizations.
With regard to the more specific problems our country is facing, it is well known that we have a special situation in the Cyprus issue at this time, whereby the talks were interrupted on what is in our opinion a correct initiative from the Cypriot government, due to the Turkish provocations in the Cypriot EEZ. We believe that the UN must contribute, with respect for international law and forcing Turkey to respect international law, to the promotion of a dialogue for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The resolution of the Cyprus issue cannot be but just, and it must bear in mind, above all, the interests of the Cypriot population, the two communities and the three small minorities that exist in Cyprus; the dialogue between the communities and not the rights invoked by forces that want to remain guarantor powers, despite the fact that Cyprus is a sovereign and independent country.
With regard to FYROM, we have always argued that the country’s name is an international issue, that the name agreed on must be erga omnes, for all uses, that there should be no manifestations of ultra-nationalism, usurpation of history, irredentism or anything in that direction. We have made an initial proposal, which we will discuss in April, for confidence-building measures. The confidence-building measures are, first of all, aimed at resolving certain practical issues that exist, and, second, for facilitating the talks at the UN, to the degree that that is possible.
Proposals for confidence-building measures have been put forward in the past, directly or indirectly, by both sides. We have set down an initial list, which we will of course first give to them, and the main thing we want to show at this time is that the problems FYROM is coming up against and confronting at this time do not have to do with the name issue, as argued by a large number of foreign actors, but have to do with the functioning or not of democracy and the rule of law within FYROM, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is the Ministry’s assessment that FYROM’s political leaderships must show greater trust in rule of law and in democratic institutions and processes, and that the problems can’t be resolved in the manner in which some are trying to resolve them.
With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, as shown by all of the Ministry’s files, they are essentially in a state of inertia. The confidence-building measures were last discussed in 2013. We are in favor of the discussion of confidence-building measures, but not within a status of threats. An increase in airspace violations has been noted. There were two in 2012 and four in 2014. The increase in these violations concerns both Greek waters and the abuse of those as defined by international law, of innocent passage, and we support that all the talks and negotiations be held between Greece and Turkey based on international law, based on the confidence-building measures that have been promoted since 1996, and based on the lifting of the casus belli Turkey has had in place for many years now.
Our stance on Turkey is that there should not be provocations, that we are prepared to discuss confidence-building measures that do not obstruct communication within the Greek space and between Greek territory and the Greek islands, that do not obstruct international transportation.
In general, during these six weeks I’ve been at the Foreign Ministry, we believe we did the right thing in opening up the foreign policy issues. We did the right thing in moving on issues that have remained in total inertia for many, many years now. We have an economic problem, because we are still paying money from the past. I even have something to sign today for the Greek Presidency, even though the Greek Presidency ended in the summer of 2014.
It is understandable that, during the crisis, people were impacted psychologically at the Ministry. I would say that the Foreign Ministry personnel are the best personnel the Greek Public Sector has. Many consider it to be the best Ministry the country has, as compared to other Ministries. Nevertheless, the economic problem and the handling of many, many problems showed that many things at the Ministry could have functioned differently, and, in my personal opinion, the inertia and the failure to take initiatives on our major problems doesn’t help, because in international and foreign policy there are no status quos. There is backing down, reconciliations or positive actions that, through initiatives, create new potential for solutions, understandings.
That’s all, Mr. Chairman. It thank you for your attention. You will forgive me for speaking softly, because I have been ill, as the chairman knows, for many weeks now, and I have been traveling while ill.
March 18, 2015