N. KOTZIAS: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I wish you a good journey in your post. The Parliament, the Foreign Ministry and the country need it. I would also like to thank my colleagues who found the time for us to have this discussion. As you know, there are two institutional organs where we discuss foreign policy. The first is this Committee, and the second is the National Council on Foreign Policy, which, following the completion of the main opposition party’s current procedures and the appointment of its representatives, will convene regularly. I reckon that will start in January.
I come to what concerns the three subjects of discussion that we have agreed on with the President; that is, the Middle East, the Cyprus issue and the Balkans, in general. Regarding the Balkans, more specifically, we have had a discussion in the National Council on Foreign Policy, and there was a spontaneous debate in the Parliamentary Plenary. But we will have to come back to it in greater specifics.
What I think our foreign policy needs is your thoughts. Of course, we have different points of departure and, sometimes, different philosophies, but I imagine that we always have common concerns as to the fate and role of our country. This common concern, based on different experiences, can add to, enrich or correct our own thoughts at the Foreign Ministry.
I would like to refer at the outset to the framework within which we see the developments in the Middle East and, by extension, in Cyprus and, less so, in the Balkans. We all know that the end of history, predicted by certain philosophers or politicians, did not come, and nor do we have harmonious development. We have a difficult state of affairs in the region. At the same time, we have a tendency in the EU towards a crisis of identity. It has difficulty solving problems and, very often, ends up playing a ‘blame game’ rather than developing a creative policy.
The economic crisis in Europe, the non-existence of great, powerful politicians, like we had in Europe in the 1990s, the growth problems and the crisis triangle have impacted the EU’s policy in the region. For example, in the Balkans certain states are trying to make policy on the part of the EU, even with the management of its money, creating parallel organizations or institutions.
This crisis has repercussions in the Middle East, on which there is not a stable, unified policy from the EU. There were also repercussions from the fact that the EU saw the problems coming from the South only after a delay – when the refugee problem was already knocking at its door.
The refugee problem is not our issue today, but I want to say that the EU has a difficulty with moving strategically and with a single perspective in the three regions I will be looking at.
What, in our opinion, are the issues in the Eastern Mediterranean? First of all, I would say that, after the past 25 years and the era of the battle of systems and ideologies, it is not present in the manner it was 25 years ago. the issues of geo-economy and geopolitics have recrudesced and are stronger again. I would also say that, in contrast with the case of a country of the western Mediterranean, Tunisia, the Arab Spring not only failed to move the situation ahead, but actually made it more complicated, and in this complicated state of affairs there is a triangle of instability, which I described as early as last January, when I took over as Foreign Minister. At the top of the triangle is the Ukraine issue, on the left of the base is Libya, and on the right is Syria and Iraq. These are regions in a state of war or civil war, especially in the south, and these tensions and situations are not due to our own policy, or Greece is not at all involved in this direction. As I said at the Foreign Affairs Council a week ago, I would say that a number of states in the region are paying for the wars started by third parties. Within this triangle of instability, rather than have waves of instability hitting the country and dislodging it, we are trying to become a factor for stability, to create stable lines in the Mediterranean and be able to develop.
One problem, moreover, has to do with the fact that the American strategy, as stated by Obama in 2012, was not implemented. I remind you that Obama, in 2012, set out a foreign policy doctrine whereby the U.S. was preparing the major pivot; that is, the major leap towards Southeast Asia, believing that that was where things would play out in the 21st century. But developments in Europe, the manner in which certain European states handled the Ukraine crisis, and the presence afterwards of Americans and Russians on this issue, the fact that, despite the intensive negotiations he tried to carry out, Kerry failed to find a solution to the longstanding conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, led the Americans to remain in the region rather than focusing their powers on Southeast Asia, believing that, remaining in Europe, there are certain problems that can be resolved easily – and this explains a certain haste in statements, on the Cyprus issue, for example.
I would also say that, on the major problems, beyond the existing interests of social groups and states, we also have the fact that conflicting outlooks were shaped within powerful players, like the U.S. and the UK, with regard to their political and strategic line in the region. These conflicts and contradictions derive from their unsuccessful intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, we have an EU without a firm line. We have the U.S., with the UK as its central ally, vacillating on these issues. You will have seen that Cameron feels he has an inability to pass the decision on military action in Syria in the British Parliament, while France, I would say, in the classic form of foreign policy, is overstretched or overcommitted due to stress, in the sense that it has intervened in four different countries without having the corresponding capabilities.
What is new in this framework is Russia’s intervention in the war in Syria, where we have the shaping of a “game”, in the sense of game theory, where many players are intervening to confront different sections of Syrian society or the Syrian armed forces in a different manner. To put it differently, today, on the central stage of war and problems in the Middle East, which is Syria, we have the involvement of many and different forces and the appearance of two different alliances. Syria has a significance, because it is strengthening the instability in the region and, as you know, is the source of the main volume of the refugee issue.
In Syria we are facing – as the EU and as Greece – a classic problem in international relations: that of how and whether cooperation can be shaped between two different alliances. On the one hand we have an alliance formed between Russia, Syria, Iran and various players, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which is present in Syria. To a degree, in something of an historical paradox, there is also Iraq. On the other hand are the countries of the Gulf, but mainly Saudi Arabia, with the interpretation of the Koran that it represents, there is Bahrain and, to a degree, the United Arab Emirates, with a greater interest in Yemen. And both of these lines, both of these alliances, express different state interests, just as they express a profound internal differentiation in Islam. That is, we have state interests expressing themselves together through religious currents.
In this conflict, as I have observed in recent weeks, the main issue that has arisen in the cooperation of these two alliances is the hierarchy of the enemy; that is, whether the main enemy is Assad or ISIS, whether the main enemy is the fundamentalist Muslims and groups of them that, in any case, are linked to terrorism or Assad. The one perspective is that the main enemy is Assad, because he creates the problems, he is the source of the problems, because most of the migrants are leaving because of him, and the other is that the terrorists, the extreme form and dissemination of terrorism is what is forcing people to abandon their homes.
Of course, in this debate there are also other sources – and you know of them – that are creating the tension. These are both extremist ideologies and jihadism among the Islamists, the sense that exists in sections of the Arab and the Muslim world that this world, which gave us huge achievements in international politics, but especially in culture, is in the midst of a long-term crisis, and there are the internal problems, in combination, of course, and with the contrast and the manner in which Israel is handling the issues in the Palestinian problem. This is the big picture: war, instability and conflict between two lines expressed in terms of religion.
The question is, what is our perspective? We believe that it is imperative and in the interests of Syria and the region, and Greece, for there to be a political solution. The role we have taken on is not the role of referee between two sides, but that of mediator. We are mediating on certain terms where, with a certain satisfaction – not great, of course, because our role is small and we cast a short shadow – we are mediating between the two alliances, and I don’t want to say that we expressed these needs, but they are being assimilated.
The one position is that there needs to be a mutually acceptable constitution in Syria; a constitution that will be the framework within the conflicting views move, because there are always conflicting views. The problem is, in what framework and in what form are they moving. The second is the need for an immediate understanding, which is expected to come in January or February, between the two conflicting sides so that they can talk. The planning is easier than actually having this happen in practice. The third is elections; that is, for Syria, with a constitution and with an understanding to go in a coordinated manner to elections. I don’t want to go into theories of probability, but we all understand that this is difficult-to-improbable under these conditions, but Greek foreign policy certainly has to help in this direction. For the elections, the understanding and the constitution we urge the inclusion of the need to establish a rule of law, for productive reconstruction to be ensured – so there is a problem of funding Syria – with new jobs and, of course, we underscore the important role of education.
In this context, I hardly need explain to you, we support the Vienna processes. And we are inclined to open up and change the deployment of our consulates and embassies. As you know, the day before yesterday, I signed a presidential decree for our opening a consulate in Erbil. Moreover, we have closed five consulates and two embassies in regions where there wasn’t a large enough Greek population. We have assigned nearby embassies to do the consular tasks, going to these regions once a month. The only new consulate we are opening is in Erbil, because we believe that there is a major strategic interest for our country in Kurdistan and Iraq.
A firm point in our policy on the Middle East is the need – and we are pressing for this – for the European Union to shape strategic, cohesive support for Lebanon and Jordan. In Lebanon and Jordan, we have 3,000,000 refugees, we have a major collapse of the finances of the UN and the international organizations providing aid to the camps. This collapse of financing has led to hundreds of thousands – some 320,000 people – sleeping outside of the camps, selling everything they have to get to Europe. It is obvious, we argue – and if you agree, please argue for this – that economic assistance must be given there, and not for people to be relocated and displaced a second time because there is no assistance, and for an effort to be made for this assistance to be provided here, in Europe.
With regard to what we are underscoring, despite any critical observations there are regarding the form of the regime in Egypt, we support the stability and security of the Eastern Mediterranean and, consequently, the inclusion of Egypt in such a policy. If you look at the statistics, Egypt currently has a population of 96 to 97 million by the end of the year. Of these, 62 million are under 28 or 29 years of age. Of these 62 million, the majority do not have work, are not participating in educational processes, and are, thus, a great risk of explosion. The explosion of society is an explosion that creates refugee flows. Behind Egypt and its 97 million are the 45 million in Sudan, which until recently was in a state of civil war. It is a potential civil war, because it is being exported at a low level. At the same time, behind Sudan there are states that are failing or have already failed, like Somalia. There, we are talking about a population of 150 to 200 million, which our region should not allow to enter into greater instability, because this would have direct repercussions for the Eastern Mediterranean.
At the same time, we support the trilateral collaborations that were planned in the 1990s and implemented by the previous governments. This was a good thing and was successful. Thus, from the decade of the 1990s to today, this policy was implemented in recent years and is the trilateral cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Israel and the trilateral cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, which are lines of stability. As you will have read, we have made a proposal to Cyprus and Jordan for the shaping of a third such axis of special cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Jordan.
We are also providing special support to the Palestinians and to the need for a second state to be formed in the region, so that there can be two states, Israel and Palestine. I would like to inform you, though you may already know this, that the day after tomorrow, on Thursday, I will be accompanying the Prime Minister to Israel, and on Friday I go to Iran.
Finally, with regard to the Middle East we have taken special measures to assist the religious, cultural communities that exist in the Middle East and that express a major cultural heritage, as well as cultural plurality for the societies that existed there. We held, successfully, I would say, the Athens International Conference, and we have agreed to create an International Observatory, which will be ready at the beginning of January.
Also in the Eastern Mediterranean is Cyprus, the golden-green leaf cast upon the sea, as the poet says. In the case of Cyprus, I must say that the government’s basic line, first expressed in February and stated publicly and in private meetings at the UN, in April, is that we, as Greece, have no say in the internal development of Cyprus, nor in the negotiations on the internal aspects of the Cyprus issue, except to the degree that our opinion is requested by the Cypriot government. There are two issues on which we do have a say. One is the European acquis and Cyprus’s position in the EU, and the second issue, which we are raising with urgency, is the issue of the abolition of the system of guarantees and the withdrawal of the occupation troops. I must say that, looking at the Ministry’s archives, this issue of the guarantees had not been raised in recent decades and it wasn’t raised in the negotiations on the Treaties that took place from time to time.
Our main arguments for abolition are, first, that this system of guarantees is historically shaped for when there wasn’t a Cypriot state, in order to set it up. Today there is a Cypriot state, so there is no need for such things. Second, the Treaties of London and Zurich have been violated multiple times. The main violations were that they provided for consultation, which Turkey didn’t do, among the three guarantor powers. Second, they provided for the goal of any intervention by a guarantor power, following consultation, being the restoration of the previous status; that is, one could interpret this as the restoration of the governance of Cyprus by President Makarios, there are Turkish Cypriots who say the restoration of the Zurich agreement of 1960, but, in any case, neither the one nor the other was done by the Turkish occupation forces. They entered Cyprus illegally, they are occupation forces. The third thing said by the guarantee Treaties is that following the restoration of the previous status quo, the guarantor powers withdraw. Turkey not only didn’t restore the previous status quo, but created a new illegal occupation. Certainly, the Republic of Cyprus wants to replace the system of guarantees with a system of security for Cyprus in the international system.
The second issue with the system of guarantees is that it is an anachronistic system. All of the UN resolutions prohibit the use of violence. It is a system that was created when Cyprus did not exist as a state and was judged by three powers. Today, Cyprus is not judged by third powers, but judges them. A characteristic example is that the accession of Turkey or the opening of chapters in the EU is a different legal situation, because Cyprus is the one judging Turkey, and not vice versa.
And, very briefly, one last issue – a favorite of mine – regarding the issue of guarantees. In the past, guarantor powers served to protect third parties and the interests determined within the protected state.
As a result, Greece, as a guarantor power, has stressed that it does not want to contribute to the perpetuation, but rather to the abolition, of this anachronistic, outdated, anti-democratic and violent system of guarantees, and we support the Cypriot side’s efforts towards a solution.
I have asked the Cypriot government – and when it feels that the negotiations have progressed enough, it will come to our Committee, if there is no objection – to have a conversation with us about how they themselves see the internal aspects of the Cyprus issue.
The truth is, the issue has focused on the property aspect and the so-called special majorities. The property issue is one of who, and on what terms, will regain property they lost in the invasion, and who comes first in the allotment of this property: the user, on what terms, or the owner, and under what conditions. It is a debate being carried out right now, but this debate is interesting for one element that I want to describe to you: the so-called special majorities.
As you know, it has been agreed by the two sides – the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot Community, say with Turkey, to a great extent, but not always – that the solution to the Cyprus problem be bicommunal, bizonal. Three issues of majority arise and exist here. On the first, I tell you from the outset, from what I see, there is agreement. There is major disagreement on the second and third.
The first concerns the majority of the electoral body; that is – and this is logical – in a bicommunal federation, the Turkish Cypriots do not want there to be two Greek Cypriot communities, and as a result that want, electorally, to ensure that the majority of those who vote in the region of the Turkish Cypriot community will be Turkish Cypriots. But, and here there are disagreements in the negotiations, they demand that this majority be expressed in two different ways; the first being in the majority of residents. That is, it isn’t enough for the regions under the responsibility of the Turkish Cypriot community to have a majority of Turkish Cypriot voters, but they want a majority of residents as well. But this means a violation of the Community Acquis and European law on freedom of the movement of persons. Together with this, they are asking that there also be a majority in property, that there be a majority in the electorate, a majority of residents and a majority in property ownership in the region under their responsibility, which is also in violation of the Community Acquis. Personally, I believe that a large portion of the Greek Cypriots will opt for monetary compensation over the return of their property, but it is an issue that doesn’t concern me.
Why did I go into detail regarding the three special majorities? Because the second and third majorities are in conflict with European law and, in fact, with the fundamental principles of the free movement of persons, property and commercial capital and so on. This point concerns us as Greece, as a member state of Europe that should, like the other member states of the EU and the institutions, evaluate the extent to which the agreement on the Cyprus issue corresponds to European fundamental values and rules of functioning.
In our opinion, the existence of permanent fundamental divergences cannot be accepted. Divergences exist as a rule in the enlargements or in the case of the reincorporation of East Germany into Germany in the unification. They are of a temporary nature. In the enlargement to the east we had divergence for up to seven years, which concerned the labor force; Austria in particular pursued this for itself, but other countries did too. So there are divergences for a limited time with regard to fundamental rights such as the movement of persons. There cannot be permanent divergences. Transitional divergences are one thing, but permanent – and fundamental – are another.
Now, to finish with the Cyprus issue, I would like to make an assessment. In my assessment, from my monitoring of the issue – and this is a personal assessment, certainly not an assessment of the Cypriot government – there is relative progress in the negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. Often, however, Turkey presses for things to be taken back; that is, agreements that are reached – thus, in the compromise it is clear at what point the two sides can compromise – Turkey tries to take these things back on certain points, to press for a more difficult compromise. The second is that, due to the very brief geopolitical analysis I set out for you regarding the non-realization of the ‘pivot’, there are many international players who are in a hurry to resolve the Cyprus issue fast, and they are pressing in such a direction. This haste is reflected in the timeframe; that is, that they want to set a timeframe within which the Republic of Cyprus is to reach an agreement. Perhaps you read yesterday that the Turkish Cypriot side proposed, if there can’t be a timeframe, and because we have elections in the Republic of Cyprus in the spring, that these elections be postponed.
I would say that the negotiations have moved ahead. There are positive points of understanding. Akinci, when not pressed, as I have said, still has a Cypriot identity. It is no coincidence that he reads and understands Greek. I saw him in 2005-2006 at two international conferences in Oxford. His children don’t speak Greek. His is the last generation that has a Cypriot identity and not a Turkish Cypriot or Turkish identity, and in this sense his presence assists the situation and is historically important.
Steps are being made, but they aren’t the steps as they are being presented in the picture provided by the international media or the international players who are involved in the Cyprus issue. There is an exaggeratedly good picture that plays down the problems in order to push through a solution that requires thorough debate on many sides.
Personally, I have stressed two things many times at the UN and to its representative. First, that he needs to provide a real picture. He gives to his collocutors at the international fora or to UN member states that are interested – particularly states in the Security Council – a better picture than the real situation. Second, I have asked him many times to express the resolutions of the UN Security Council and not the pressure from one or the other side. He is the representative of the UN and shouldn’t show understanding, e.g., for Turkish demands, saying that they, too, have a point. I tell him that the standard must always be whether what they are discussing violates or corresponds to the Security Council resolutions, because, for us, the Cyprus issue must be resolved based on the Security Council resolutions, without permanent or fundamental divergences from the European acquis, and this solution will give security to the Cypriot people, who will not have the sense that third powers can intervene in their lives, and at the same time it will secure to the maximum possible degree the rights of the communities, particularly the three minorities and the smallest community on the island.
I now come to the Balkans and our general policy, without special reference to states. As you know, there is a suspension of EU enlargement until 2019. There is a weak economy in the Balkans, the economies have receded in most countries, like the Greek economy – and perhaps, by reflection, the Greek crisis is having a negative impact on them – and we have a weak institutional system, which creates many, many internal problems with regard to human rights, rule of law, trade-union and other freedoms. There are, that is, in all of the states, and particularly those of the Western Balkans, shortcomings in the sectors of justice, effective administration and rule of law.
The most worrying thing is that, due to the weak institutional foundation and the region’s economic problems, there has been a resurgence of nationalism. We respond to all incidents via diplomatic channels, here and in the capitals, wherever incidents occur, but I don’t think that Greece should enter into a public controversy over nationalism and fuel the choices of the leaderships of third countries that cannot play creatively in their Balkan and foreign policies. This is why it is wise for there not to be anything that gets by us, but isn’t right for us to get involved in public controversies constantly – when we need to, we do – because that’s what they want, and they bring us down to their level.
The second, which is more worrisome, is the emergence – in a region characterized by its secularity – of religious fundamentalism, and we also have the appearance of jihadism or armed criminal actions in neighbouring countries.
The third, which I want you to bear in mind, and I went into this in detail with the National Council on Foreign Policy, is the extension of Turkey’s influence in the Balkans. It is an influence that is cultural, it is influence on the elite of these states that had deep philhellenic sentiments twenty years ago. Please, you must all bear this in mind in the handling of individual state entities.
With regard to the Balkans and our policy in general following this evaluation, I would say that, as I have followed the issue personally, in the Balkans, in the decade of the 1990s, we had a policy to create, in the positive sense, a cultural hinterland. There was an increase in investments, of economic relations, the English-language university in Thessaloniki was created. There were international programs in which students or other scientists or other agencies from the Balkans participated. There were many exchanges, mixed marriages, with interlinking of families being a necessary condition, particularly in the northern regions, for closer relations between the two peoples. That was the line in the 1990s, or its results.
After 2003 and Thessaloniki, the interest shifted more onto the orientation of the states of the Balkans towards the EU, and there was, I would say, a competition: which country would convince the Europeans or other players that it was closer to them so they could join. My personal opinion is that this resulted in the disorganization of the Balkan hinterland and the linking of a number of states with stronger non-Balkan states, beyond the member states of the EU; that is, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and even Croatia. I would say that this has to a degree broken up the Balkan hinterland, and there is a certain extroversion.
My personal strategic perspective is that today we should not go into the one dilemma or the other, but link together and create an amalgam among European policies and the orientations of a number of Balkan states through the construction of a strong hinterland and the strengthening of our positions. If these countries, which are not currently in the EU, but may be EU member states in ten or fifteen years – if the EU exists and in its current form – if we say that, ceteris paribus, all other things being equal, then we will be talking about an EU of over forty members, in which the role of small states will be more subordinate than it was for the small states when there were a total of 9 or 10 EU member states. And then the need to shape cohesive alliances, understandings amongst the Balkan states will be greater, not just within their states, but to defend their interests in wider regional and global organizations.
I remind you that, apart from the five or six large EU states, all the others have formed fronts: the Visegrad group, the Baltic countries with Poland, Finland, the three Benelux countries, since the time when there were six member states, the Scandinavian countries. As a result, we have to see how we can forge such a Balkan union and alliance.
This, of course, has to be done with two guides. First, that no decision should be taken under pressure, and the second, which has to do with what I said earlier about Turkey, that inertia does not work in the country’s favor. The sense that existed in the 1990s, that we don’t move in the Balkans with great force beyond the hinterland, and the others will be forced to respond, is not proving correct. First, because all of the countries have developed relations with the rest of the European major forces and, second, because Turkey’s influence is strong.
What are we doing? We are promoting dialogue – as you know, I have visited all of the Balkan states – but we are also promoting the creation of networks, which concern energy, pipelines, railway hubs, highways, social networks, political and cultural cooperation networks, with the aim of their being networks of stability in the region, without one depending on another.
In the Balkans, as I have stressed very often, our policy is based on three principles: international law, what is happening in Europe – and especially in the EU – and, above all, our national interests within the global and European framework in which we are moving.
Thank you very much for your attention.
November 23, 2015