• “Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues, as you know, Greece is located in a very important geographical region – geostrategically important, historically, as it is the cradle of major civilizations, the cradle, essentially, of all the monotheistic religions, with a decisive contribution to the history of civilization. But it is also close to a region of longstanding instability, a region of long-term crises that threaten security not only on a region level, but on a pan-European level, as we are referring to the arc of the Middle East and of North Africa.
• Within this unstable environment, the presence of Greece is a point of stability, a guarantee of stability for the whole region. And this is despite the fact that we are going through an economic and fiscal crisis that has entailed many tough sacrifices, provoking strong social reactions.
• Greece functions as a bridge between north and south, between Europe and the Middle East and North Africa. It is the link that facilitates, to the greatest possible extent, the qualitative deepening and strengthening of the European Union’s relations with the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood. Although the current burning issue in all the debates, in all the fora, is the Eastern Neighbourhood – due to the crisis in Ukraine and the crisis in the relations between the West and Russia, NATO and Russia, the EU and Russia – we are focusing today, here in Greece, on the perspective of the Southern Neighbourhood.
• Greece maintains close relations with all the countries of its region, and in recent years has succeeded in strengthening its relations with countries such as Israel, through a sincere course of approach that is not based on a zero-sum mindset, but on a win-win rationale.
• This applies to our approach to Greek-Turkish relations, which are naturally impacted decisively by developments in the Cyprus issue. This is the guideline of our policy in the Western Balkans. And I would like to take this opportunity to tell you that on 8 May we are hosting, jointly with the High Representative and the Commission, a ministerial meeting in Thessaloniki between the EU-28 and the six countries of the Western Balkan Region. Moreover, here in Athens, we will be hosting another important ministerial meeting on 10 June, between the EU-28 and the member states of the Arab League.
• I want to remind you that the Hellenic Presidency’s horizontal priority, which has also been adopted by the Italian Presidency following ours, constituting a Mediterranean Year of the Presidency of the EU, is a comprehensive maritime policy with the focus on the Mediterranean. We are faced with the need to revisit the discussion of the implementation of the International Law of the Sea in the Mediterranean basin, as it has been shown by studies ordered and presented by the European Commission, through the competent Commissioner, Maria Damanaki, how beneficial is the implementation of the provisions of the International Law of the Sea on the delimitation and exploitation of maritime zones. And I am referring mainly to the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones in the Mediterranean.
• We want the Agreement of 2009 on the delimitation of maritime zones between Greece and Albania to be completed and ratified. And we have begun very important technical talks with Egypt on the delimitation of maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean.
• With more specific reference to the Cyprus issue – which for the European Union and, naturally, for Greece is always a matter of the highest priority – it is obvious that Greece, as deriving from our obligations as well as our national sentiment, fully supports the efforts of President Anastasiades as well as the joint communique of the leaders of the two sides in Cyprus for finding a just and viable solution, based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation, with a single sovereignty, a single legal personality and a single citizenship. Thus we support a federal configuration fully in line with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the Community Acquis, given that we are talking about a member state of the European Union and the eurozone. Naturally, the critical link is always Turkey, Ankara. This is the subject of my frequent meetings and talks with my Turkish counterpart. Greece and Turkey support the corresponding communities, but it is obvious that Turkey has a recognized international responsibility, in accordance with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, that is critical for the military balance of power on the island, for the presence of its troops, for the presence of settlers. So Ankara bears a heavy burden of responsibility. We will welcome with great pleasure any move that indicates a substantial change in intentions and perceptions on this issue. Moreover, this is something that the European Union is awaiting, given that it is linked to the Copenhagen criteria for all candidate countries.
• You know better than I that the situation in Syria, unfortunately, continues to be dramatic. The humanitarian repercussions are starkly manifest. These repercussions are being felt, via refugee flows, by the southern, Mediterranean countries of the European Union.
• Allow me to make special reference to the Christian monuments and the role played by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates of the region – the Patriarchate of Alexandria and the Patriarchate of Antioch.
• An issue of special concern to us is the operation for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal, in accordance with the decisions of the UN and the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We would like this operation not to take place in the closed sea of the Mediterranean, but in the open ocean. If, in the end, this operation is carried out in the Mediterranean, we want all the relevant guarantees to be met.
• The role played by Egypt is particularly critical for the whole Southern Neighbourhood. We have close cooperation and contact with the transitional government within the framework of the relevant decisions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council. We would like to hope that the upcoming presidential elections will lead to the implementation of the principle of inclusiveness, that all sources of tension will be resolved – which will be very difficult, of course.
• We have an open trilateral dialogue between Greece, Cyprus and Egypt. It is also very important that we take a timely stance regarding the pending problem of Libya.
• There is an urgent need for the European Union and its member states to continue to offer all possible assistance and know-how to the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood for building state institutions and effectively handling challenges. And we reaffirm, daily and in practice, our commitment to work with them. This is linked to our decision to maintain funding ratios between the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods.
• Regarding Ukraine, the European position is and must always be a stance of principles; a stance founded on respect for the international legal order; a stance based on absolute respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, because this is the foundation of the functioning of the international community. With regard to the European continent in particular, this is the basis on which the OSCE has functioned since 1975. The foundation on which all of this is built is, in reality, the rejection of revisionism.
• We mustn’t forget that, precisely because respect for international legality is our doctrine, the resolution passed by the UN General Assembly regarding the balance of power is of very great importance, recognizing that Crimea is a part of the territory of Ukraine, and this is of some importance. The mechanisms dependent on the UN Security Council may not be mobilized, but the General Assembly’s resolution has its very significant value.
• We never seriously and openly discussed what our strategic working hypothesis is regarding the Russian reaction or the developments within Ukraine, because Ukraine is a complex country, a country in which we must take into account many parameters: the presence of ethnic and linguistic minorities, various development disparities that are historical. I think that our analysis needs to be more thoroughgoing and comprehensive.
• We are being called upon to reassess our strategic relationship with Russia on the levels of the European Union and NATO, so we are under a de facto obligation to bear in mind the U.S. approach, which has a strategic frame of reference and a practice that consists – rightly, in my opinion – in ongoing phone communication between President Obama and President Putin, and meetings, naturally, between the two Foreign Ministers, Messrs. Kerry and Lavrov.
• Thus we came to the wording, this past Tuesday, of the official and unified, unanimous position of the Alliance, in Brussels, on the level of Foreign Ministers, saying that we are cutting off, in practice, all political and military contact with Russia, in the context of the NATO-Russia Council, but at the same time we want to keep the political and diplomatic channels open, so that we can reach a solution that is mutually acceptable and political. And obviously that is legal, in accordance with international law.
• Do we have the final state of affairs, and do we have to get a definitive solution, or do we need to work seriously before we get a final solution, so that we can achieve a political and diplomatic solution regarding the Ukraine crisis?
• And this is very important, particularly for the European union, because on the economic and energy levels, the U.S. does not have the problem we have with Russia. At the same time, the European Union is not prepared to confront any matter that consists, in reality, in the inequality amongst member states with regard to Russia. That is, each member state, individually, wants to maintain energy, economic, trade, and even defence advantages with regard to Russia, but no one is prepared to open a debate on the real unification of European policy with regard to Russia in these sectors.
• We have to be very cautious and, in any case, if we conclude on a choice – which is a choice of change of doctrine in both NATO and the EU – we have to look at the economic and energy repercussions, and we have to look at what will happen in the world: what this means for Syria, what it means for the P5+1 or EU3+3 negotiations with Iran, what this means for the situation in Afghanistan, what this means for the fight against terrorism and asymmetrical threats. We have to look at the whole picture.
• What I would like to recommend is that our thinking must be composed; that is, strategic; that is, when we make a decision, we should at least know what the next two decisions we are going to take are. Because this trait – our knowing or having planned the next two steps before we take the first one, which could set off a chain of repercussions – we haven’t seen it anywhere up until now, in any region of the world or in any crisis.
• The presence of the International Monetary Fund in Ukraine is a problem – and I have to say this from my experience during the time I was Finance Minister – because the conditionality of the assistance granted by the IMF is a very heavy burden on society.
• I agree with an idea that was presented now by the Weimar Triangle ministers, regarding the need for an international conference on Ukraine’s economic problem. I said this about a month ago, in Budapest, at a meeting of the three Balkan EU member states (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria) and the four Visegrad states. And I am pleased that it is now being widely accepted that there is this need, and that this proposal was made.
• I will have the opportunity to visit Moldova in a few days, this coming Tuesday, within the framework of the activities of the Hellenic Presidency of the Council. We will talk there about how integration can be accelerated. We perceive how critical the Transnistria issue is.
• Our political discourse in relation to our societies, in relation to our electorates, in relation to our civil societies must have these strategic elements, which must always govern our thinking, and this of course applies to Greek politics as well.
• The fundamental lesson of our relationship with history, which we have to put into practice, is the need for strategic thinking and strategic composure.”
April 4, 2014