P. TZENOS: We have Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikos Dendias on the line. A man who I imagine has been working very hard, doing very serious work, since he took up his duties.
Good morning, Minister. I’d like to start with the good news.
You met with the Pope yesterday. But I don’t think it was just a religious meeting.
N. DENDIAS: Not at all. The visit to the Vatican was not a religious visit. I went to meet with the Pope, the Substitute of the Secretariat of State and the Secretary for Relations with States, in their capacity as state officials.
Our interest is not religious – we leave that to others. It doesn’t concern the Foreign Ministry. What interests us is the Vatican’s extensive experience and the views and influence it has in certain regions. And I won’t hide it from you that there was a special topic of discussion that concerned the wider western Balkan area, and especially countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, where the Vatican has roots, views, and where it will probably be launching an initiative in the coming months.
P. TZENOS: Was there a discussion of the migration issue, Minister?
N. DENDIAS: On the migration issue, first of all, the Pope has very vivid memories of his visit to Lesvos. But the migration issue is something that the Catholic Church, like the Orthodox Church, has shown a great deal of humanitarian interest in. But part of the discussion concerned the political aspect of the migration issue. In other words, how Turkey is handling it. How it is trying to use all these things as leverage, and we needed to discuss that.
P. TZENOS: I think this was a good opportunity, because the Greece-Vatican relationship was a little neglected, and there is the potential for the Vatican to influence things.
N. DENDIAS: You’re right about this: you shouldn’t see the Vatican as just a church. You need to see it very clearly in the way I said. The Vatican state has a vast and extensive network. Embassies aren’t the only network. The Catholic Church itself is the network. So you have all of this accumulated experience, information and influence there. And it is a huge mistake to ignore this. We are Orthodox. Our church doesn’t pursue a global role to this extent – it doesn’t pursue it, it’s not in its culture. We are talking about a religious phenomenon and then a state phenomenon. We have to realise this and use it in the positive sense.
P. TZENOS: Let’s go to the burning issues, Minister, and as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handles very delicate issues that, for better or for worse, have a domestic impact. Of course, we realise it a little later. I want to start with what is happening in Turkey. It seems that they’re starting to lay down arms – I’ll put it that way – and that the diplomatic path is coming to the foreground. But I want your opinion. And in what sense am I saying this? In terms of our foreign policy, our country has a specific status quo, it follows international rules, it invokes these rules, unlike Turkey.
We have seen what happened with the invasion on the Syrian border and we see Mr. Erdogan’s statements. And Mr. Erdogan is re-tabling an issue that he raised in a very provocative manner when he visited our country during Syriza’s time in office: the issue of the Treaty of Lausanne.
It is an issue that Mr. Erdogan brings up again and again, and of course in relation to the fact that we have developments on Turkey’s borders there, because the Treaty of Lausanne does not concern only the relations between Greece and Turkey, but the borders in that area in general. Are you concerned about this rhetoric?
N. DENDIAS: I’ll tell you. First of all, we don’t like it. Greece is against the revision of Treaties. In general. We think people have suffered – there’s no question of this in the Balkans. The last thing we need is to see the framework we are standing on being torn apart. This is a recipe for disaster. Greece, the Mitsotakis government, is also trying to open channels of communication with Turkey, so we can talk about these things. Of course, we clearly condemn the unacceptable Turkish actions when these violate or clash with international law. We are always very clear about this. On the other hand, however, Turkey is our neighbour. We need to have open channels of communication with our neighbour. So, with international law as its frame of reference, Greece is trying to pull Turkey in the direction of this frame of reference, explaining in every way and in every tone of voice that Greece is not pursuing militarisation, is not trying to exacerbate the situation. We respect Turkey’s reasonable positions and fully reject the Turkish positions that run counter to international law and the existing treaties.
P. TZENOS: I guess, this is a rhetorical question, you saw the statements from your Turkish counterpart, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Cavusoglu, who once again, yesterday – apparently assuming that things had been resolved on the Syrian front – is returning to the Mediterranean front.
He said that Turkey intends to move ahead with its drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean, to protect its interests – as he said – and extend them a little further. He said that by sending its second drill ship to this region, Turkey showed the world that it is protecting its interests, and he repeated Turkey’s position that the Greek Cypriot side is carrying out drilling activities unilaterally. So he brought back this whole debate, which is very much alive, from what I see. The discussion isn’t finished.
N. DENDIAS: First of all, Greece is not a country that wants to exclude Turkey from the sea along its coast. What Greece is saying to Turkey is that Turkey has to respect international law. That is what we are saying. If Turkey has an opinion – a dispute, if you will – that is within the framework of international law, it can certainly put it forward. Greece reacts sharply when Turkey exceeds the limits of international law. So we understand each other. Greece is not trying to exclude Turkey. We are not an ‘anti-Turkish’ country. Our policy, our alliances, our trilateral mechanisms, are not aimed against Turkey. We are pursuing good and friendly relations with everyone. And besides, this was Turkey’s foreign policy doctrine. Do you remember Davutoglu? No problems on Turkey’s borders, which has become ‘problems on all of Turkey’s borders’?
This is how Greece sees it, and we are conveying this to Turkey very clearly. In other words, Turkey probably feels insecure and thinks – for reasons of its own, reasons we don’t really understand too well – that Greece wants to exclude it from its legal interests.
But legal interests are found in international law. Turkey is currently violating the legal rights of the Republic of Cyprus. That’s the truth. What can we do? Turn everything upside down?
So, if Turkey wants to implement international law, it will find its best interlocutor in the Greek side, and especially the Mitsotakis government, which holds this view. We are completely against militarisation. I say this very clearly.
P. TZENOS: I understand what you’re saying.
N. DENDIAS: Probably because Greek fighter jets went to Cyprus. You know this, in recent days.
P. TZENOS: Of course.
N. DENDIAS: They went as part of an exercise that had been planned for some time. Greece does not take military action unless it is provoked. We need to be crystal clear on this. Greece is against militarisation. Absolutely against.
P. TZENOS: But the thing with Turkey, Minister – and you know this very well – is that this isn't a recent policy, but one that has been in place for many years. It doesn’t respect international law, and it makes moves that create de facto conditions. De facto conditions that it subsequently tries to convert to de jure. Right now we have de facto moves being made in Cyprus. How is the Greek side going to respond there?
N. DENDIAS: Illegal actions do not create any de facto or de jure status, except in the case of physical occupation, of course. In other words, what Turkey has done in an unacceptable manner, in an illegal manner, on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
But honestly, tell me, at the end of the day – I say this as an honest interlocutor of the Turkish side – does this help Turkey? How much has all this cost it? How much has this whole story with the drilling cost? How much of the product of the Turkish people’s toil, at a time when the Turkish economy needs to be strengthened? How much of the Turkish people’s toil has Turkey had to spend on these pointless actions? Wouldn’t it be much simpler for us to reach an understanding? Honestly, wouldn’t it be much simpler for all of us?
In other words, what purpose is served by all of these violations in the Aegean? I’d like to know. Do they help in any way? Do they create some legal precedent? Do we accept anything? We scramble our planes too, we intercept the Turkish planes, we both burn fuel. There’s wear and tear on our equipment. Does this apparent effort to escalate things help in any way? It helps in no way at all. This conduct belongs to another era. I always say this. The era of gunboat diplomacy is in the past, and if you don’t understand this, you are doing a great deal of damage, mainly to yourself.
P. TZENOS: But as this policy, including in Syria and generally, the political instability that exists within Turkey, and given that Mr. Erdogan intends to unload migrants, or is threatening Europe that he will open the floodgates. Because we are where we are – we will be the first ones to pay if he does this. The migration part of the picture – and I’m not using the term migration loosely, because from the data we have seen lately, these are not refugees who are entering the country. They are migrants.
People here, our listeners, those who listen to the government, which says that we have to de-congest the islands, and we really do have to de-congest them – they are asking whether there is a plan to stop this process, or are we just filling up the mainland now?
N. DENDIAS: You’re right. The migration issue is a major problem. You are right to use the word migration. The refugee issue is a very small part of the problem. Most of it is migration. In other words, economic migrants who, violating the applicable laws, are trying to get into Greece and Europe. I say this: of course flows have increased, an issue was created. The government will create a mechanism for dealing with the problem. Greece cannot fall prey to intimidation. Europe, that is – to be honest – cannot fall prey to intimidation. On the other hand, I have to say that what Turkey is trying to do is a huge mistake. In other words, it is using the efforts of desperate people as a tool – people who are looking for a better tomorrow. All this about opening the floodgates, when we’re talking about human beings, is not a serious message. Greece has consistently tried to have money sent to all of these organizations that are helping these people survive in Turkey, in spite of the escalation on the Cypriot front. Greece had the political courage to separate these two things. And Mr. Mitsotakis took a clear stance on this. The misfortune of these people in Turkey is one thing, and our differences over the Cyprus issue, etc., are another. But Turkey also has to understand that it cannot exploit the despair of human beings and statements about opening the floodgates, etc. Excuse me, but this doesn’t stand up to criticism and simply is not serious.
P. TZENOS: Yes, but at the same time we have another problem. We have what I’ll call a dysfunction. We have a game of delays from the European Union as well. The EU may be condemning this whole process on the rhetorical level, but I don’t see any results with regard to some sort of burden sharing.
N. DENDIAS: Internally, you’re saying.
P. TZENOS: Of course.
N. DENDIAS: You are absolutely right.
P. TZENOS: In other words, I don’t see a common view, a common position, with Europe saying, “we will share the burden with Greece, which cannot be transformed into a warehouse for human beings.
N. DENDIAS: There are countries in Europe – I won’t name them – who have taken their share of the burden in this joint effort. There are countries in Europe that refuse to participate at all. They believe the European Union is a free ticket, with only benefits. That is not how it is. And in the end the European Union needs to impose sanctions on these issues, internal sanctions, economic sanctions against the countries that are just along for the ride, for the benefits, but when things get tough, they given up and blame others.
P. TZENOS: Do we have the tools to impose this? Or is this just wishful thinking, Minister?
N. DENDIAS: It not not wishful thinking at all. In the context of the Common Agricultural Policy, we can propose specific things. Of course, Europe is unanimous on most issues. We all have to agree. But on a few issues there is the potential for a majority decision. I must say, decision-making based on a majority would not necessarily benefit Greece on some issues.
Europe has a specific decision-making process, but I think you’ll see Europe wake up on the migration issue. Of course, the new Commission has to take office. We have to see what happens with the new President, we have to see all of this. But the reality remains: that Europe needs – and you are right to say this – to take specific measures against those who refuse to share the burden.
P. TZENOS: Let’s go to another topic: our northern neighbours, North Macedonia. We had the development with the veto from France, from Holland and Denmark, regarding the accession of our neighbouring state and Albania – regarding the launching of accession negotiations ...
N. DENDIAS: A date for opening the negotiations.
P. TZENOS: A date for opening the negotiations.
N. DENDIAS: We don’t agree.
P. TZENOS: I want to say something, which I imagine you have seen too. At the time this agreement was being passed, the rhetoric from New Democracy was, “we disagree.”
N. DENDIAS: The Prespa Agreement. Yes, we disagreed with the specific article of the agreement. And we still disagree. We haven’t changed our mind.
P. TZENOS: But there may be a response that might be unavoidable: that the government, the state has continuity and we are obliged to respect it. But there are reactions to this. You can understand that this gives rise to reactions and criticism, and we are hearing from people who, if you will, voted based on this particular agreement and what Syriza did.
But I want to go to the crux of the issue: I want you to comment on this, because some people, including Syriza, are asking where all the opposition to the agreement went. I want to go to the crux of the issue: The agreement has specific results. People have to know that the Prespa Agreement, in its key articles, says that the use of the name, erga omnes, in relation to everyone ...
N. DENDIAS: We’re living with this.
P. TZENOS: I’m just explaining it so our listeners understand. That this will be imposed within the country, on the condition that the negotiations move ahead. Right now I think we’re a little trapped. The negotiations aren’t moving ahead, our northern neighbours say they haven’t done anything wrong, that they are honouring the agreement, and that it’s Europe’s fault that the negotiations aren’t being launched, and this is having results as well. I want an answer to the first question, the accusation from Syriza that your opposition to the agreement has evaporated, and I want you to tell me how you are going to deal with this issue.
N. DENDIAS: First of all, New Democracy was not against an agreement. It was against specific articles and provisions of this agreement. The opposition and Syriza are trying to tell us that there is an agreement, only this agreement, and that there could have been no other agreement. This isn't true. We’re not saying that an agreement should not have been reached. We’re not saying we aren’t pleased with the change of the name to North Macedonia. Of course, we would prefer that “Macedonia” not be part of the name, but in any event, this was something that was put forward. But we are saying that a better agreement could have been reached. And we’re saying we would not have concluded this agreement – not in the sense that we wouldn’t conclude any agreement, but in the sense that we could have capitalised on the situation and the negotiations to get a better result. And we reproach the government that did not get the better result and gave us what it gave us.
We have to handle the reality that the previous government, the Syriza government, created. And the only tool at our disposal – because Syriza concluded the agreement in 2018 and we won the elections in the summer of 2019. The Syriza-ANEL government, initially, for a year, and then just Syriza, because ANEL left the government, did nothing with this agreement.
We got it in 2019 just as it had been agreed in 2018. Because Syriza was feeling guilty ahead of the elections and pretending, to a great extent, that the agreement didn’t exist, that they were ignorant of it, etc.
Let’s look at the situation now: This tool they gave us had one condition. The accession process. Because through the accession process, we would be able to achieve what the previous side had supposedly gained, because if the agreement had been written correctly, we wouldn’t need to struggle within the accession process – you said it yourself – to achieve an interpretation of this agreement that benefits Greece’s interests.
This doesn’t mean we don’t want to see the stabilisation of our northern neighbour, North Macedonia. Greece has a strategic interest in the existence of North Macedonia. On this we understand each other. We want this small state to exist. We want it to prosper. We want them to be our friends, but not on terms that are an affront to Hellenism and our national tradition and our interests.
Now: What did this government give us? It gave us a tool for which we made concessions, but in order to gain a quid pro quo. The quid pro quo depends on whether the French, the Dutch, anyone else, agree. And they criticise us on top of that. They have the gall to criticise us! What can I say? Tell me.
P. TZENOS: I’d like you to tell me what your next moves are going to be, because people want to know.
N. DENDIAS: The country will not stand by in silence or indifference
P. TZENOS: Because the reality of the situation right now is this: The negotiations on the country’s accession to NATO are moving ahead, domestically they continue to call themselves “Macedonia,” North Macedonia abroad. In other words, we have a reversal of the previous situation ...
N. DENDIAS: I repeat, this bill has to be sent to those who worded this agreement, signed it and celebrated it. They can’t send us the bill for that.
P. TZENOS: Okay, but you’ll be sent the part of the bill for managing it, Minister.
N. DENDIAS: What did I just say? You asked me why I went to the Vatican. You asked me politely. And I said I didn’t go to make the sign of the cross. I cross myself here. I went because this small state has specific influence. Where did I say it has the influence that interested me on this visit? In the Balkans. In the Western Balkans. So Greece has strategic and other interests in the Western Balkans and will act accordingly. We will not leave this to chance.
P. TZENOS: Of course it shouldn’t be left to chance, because, as you well know, Turkey is lying in wait.
N. DENDIAS: We are speaking in a specific way to everyone involved in this game. I have already spoken to Mr. Dimitrov since the decision. Mr. Rama will be in Athens the day after tomorrow. He will be received – not in an official framework, as far as I know – by the Prime Minister, Mr. Mitsotakis.
October 24, 2019