Once again, I would like to thank you for honouring me with this invitation, and I look forward to the conference so that we can draw important conclusions regarding Europe, the world, and Greece.
I’m very honoured to be on this particular panel with representatives from two countries that are currently the focus of European interest. On 25 June, Moldova and Ukraine embarked on their journey towards the European family. This is truly a great moment for Europe. And I think that – beyond the message we need to send: that there is one Europe and it is founded on principles and values – it is very important for us to convey a message of unity and perspective to the peoples of Europe. What is most important, I think, is what unifies us. And what unifies us are European values and the vision of a Europe of peace and prosperity.
Allow me to say a few things about my perspective on Europe’s course, the global course, and the course of Greek foreign policy.
First, regarding the global diplomacy. There are two characteristics that are extremely important in the current state of affairs. These two characteristics of all phenomena, all developments throughout the world are, first, supraterritoriality – in other words, the multiplier effect on other geographical regions or how phenomena grow in intensity. And of course, there is also the asymmetry of these phenomena, the difficulty of predicting where the world is heading and where the phenomena are heading.
This is very easy to see. Just look at what’s happening with the climate crisis. Scientists say that the flooding in Thessaly – caused by storm Daniel – occurs once every 400 years. We experienced it twice in three years. So, we understand how radically things have changed. And the reality is – for someone who wants to exercise a foreign policy based on predictability and prudence – it is now extremely difficult to predict where things are heading. Aggression is supraterritorial and asymmetrical. The climate crisis is supraterritorial and asymmetrical. We see it in the daily reports of wildfires. Public health is supraterritorial, as we experienced during the global Covid pandemic. And it is also asymmetrical. Phenomena are no longer local or regional in nature.
Foreign policy has to adapt to this state of affairs. Foreign policy used to be about seeing where things were headed and managing that course. Now it is more about drawing up all the possible scenarios so that, whatever happens, you have a management plan in place. The ‘what if’ scenarios that are the most critical tool in the exercising of foreign policy. And I want to assure you that this is an extremely difficult exercise. You need more than just capability, knowledge, insight. There is often an element of luck, and an element of intuition. Our intuition often leads us to assumptions that are even more critical than our knowledge of history. And you can see how things can change abruptly, from one day to the next.
On 5 January 2021, two senators were elected in the U.S. state of Georgia. The state’s first black senator and first Latino senator. A major shift for a state like Georgia, for those who follow American politics. The very next day, we had the events at the Capitol, and we understand how this democratic phenomenon – the phenomenon of the majority being pressured by a minority – sets us on completely new and difficult paths.
Therefore, what is most important for us is to be able to draw up the scenarios that will enable us to be completely prepared. And this is what we do in Greek foreign policy. The Prime Minister has chosen to develop a foreign policy based on principles, values and rules. We will never employ different criteria for similar cases.
I often hear: “But isn’t it more in the country’s interest to transact, to gain benefits clandestinely sometimes, so that we can promote our policy?” The answer to that, in my opinion, is that this would be a short-sighted approach. The post-war international security architecture was built precisely on the logic of principles and rules. And the most important rule was to empower small and medium-sized states – the more peripheral states – against the larger powers.
Look at how the veto has functioned in the large international or international organizations, the UN and the EU. The veto was the defence of countries that did not have the power to impose their will.
Over time, unfortunately – and this is how things evolved politically – we have seen the veto, which was adopted precisely to defend the weak from the powerful, have the exact opposite effect. It is a weapon of the powerful. Because if a powerful nation opts to interrupt a course towards security, peace and prosperity, it can do so. So, what is certain is that we need to be able to rely on these rules. Perhaps we should reconsider – prudently and after careful reflection, because this is not a simple process – how decisions are made in international organizations. Because we need to be frank: The international security architecture was unable to impose the self-evident course of action with regard to the two major wars in our neighbourhood.
I’ll take the example of the Middle East, which I think is very characteristic because all of us, including the two interested parties, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, can see that we need a ceasefire. Humanitarian aid has to reach the people who need it. We need to see the immediate release of the hostages, so that they are not used, in violation of every notion of human value, as a negotiating tool.
On the other hand, the international community – in spite of unanimously supporting these basic assumptions – has been utterly incapable of finding a means to this end. And there is something interesting here. What usually happened in diplomatic history is that we knew the means, the way, but we didn’t know where this decision-making process would lead. Today, we have a unique situation where we all want to have peace in the region, under conditions that are more or less known and accepted and have been specified within the framework of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. But we have a very serious inability to impose what we see to be self-evident.
The same holds true for Ukraine. I often hear: "But why should Greece be so directly, so strongly and so intensely on Ukraine’s side in this war?" I want to say this: A war that has an aggressor and a defender, where the aggressor’s main goal is to alter sovereignty and territorial integrity, is a war that we should all see as being our own war. Because if, at some point in history, we maybe consider the benefits it might have for the policy of a country – a country like Greece – not to stand by the nation under attack, at some point we will have lost the legitimate interest of being able to invoke international law, the international security architecture. So that we can then mitigate the aggression as much as possible and utilise the great core of international security, which will be aligned with international law.
In the framework of precisely this foreign policy of power, principles and rules, we have chosen an extremely multilateral, polycentric foreign policy, a proactive foreign policy. I would like to remind you that, over the past five years, in the context of the EU, perhaps the biggest decisions that were taken either bear Greece’s mark or Greece among other countries put forth those decisions. There is the Recovery Fund, a proposal supported by the Greek Prime Minister; the digital certificate for COVID; the European Migration and Asylum Pact, in which we participated very actively. And today, the proposal of the Greek Prime Minister, together with the Polish Prime Minister, to develop a European defence that will fortify Europe, while freeing up the forces of the member states so that they can emphasize peace.
These principles apply everywhere. They apply in Greece’s relations with Türkiye or with our neighbouring countries. Regarding Türkiye, I want to stress that I really feel that serving one’s country means being able to discuss things with one’s neighbour. Not everyone will agree with this. I know that. We are not naive. We are pragmatic. But what we must do – and what is, if you will, something that we owe to future generations – is create the conditions for dialogue, de-escalation of tensions. We need to create a path of dialogue, diplomacy, democracy. And this is what we are doing, step by step, without any excessive demands. We have built a good positive agenda. We are seeing the results right now in the migration flows, which are under control thanks to the good cooperation between the two countries. We are seeing the development of interpersonal relations between Greeks and Turks on our islands, where, through tireless the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an agreement was reached with the EU in order to simplify procedures and have a large number of visitors from Türkiye. And of course, we have reduced overflights and air interceptions over the Aegean to zero.
For anyone who does not understand the value of these facts, I am sorry, but my patriotic duty dictates this. Because when there is an accident over the Aegean, we won’t be able to settle it with VAR. The accident cannot be undone. As the Middle East has shown us, one accident, one event, can have a multiplying catastrophic effect. And we wouldn’t want to see that.
Regarding the European perspective of the Western Balkans, the accession of all of these countries to the European Union, the European family, is a top priority for Greek foreign policy, and we strongly support it. We will continue to do this. The 2003 Thessaloniki Agenda clearly declared that the natural course of these states is the path towards the European family.
We all understand that conditions have to be met along this path. It is a path that often requires work, faith, commitment to the European vision. In particular, it requires full incorporation of the European acquis, full respect for the values of the rule of law and democracy, and full compliance with international law.
International law is not a cherry-picking process. International law exists to regulate the relations between states, bilateral and multilateral, and we cannot pick and choose.
In closing, I would like to say what I feel about Greece. During the past five years, as a product of time and the previous government, and I think now more than ever, Greece commands significant diplomatic capital. It has earned recognition as being able to talk to all parties – with the strong parties, with the United States, with India, with Brazil. But we can also discuss with all our neighbours so as to resolve our problems. Greece has earned everyone’s appreciation because it follows these principles precisely.
In its election, early in June in New York City, to serve as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Greece received the votes of 182 out of 188 countries, with four of the other six countries not voting for anyone. So, practically speaking, we saw unanimous support for Greece. Why did we get this support? Because what we supported as priorities is what the whole world wants today: To restore real meaning to the peaceful resolution of disputes. To strengthen the effort towards a more sustainable world. To be able to combat violence against vulnerable groups, women and children. We will continue on this course.
Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Question on Albania and North Macedonia.
G. GERAPETRITIS: As I mentioned, I think Greece has been the pioneer of the European enlargement towards the Western Balkans. I think it is of utmost importance that we work together, because the truth is, as you indicated, that the Western Balkans is a true minefield. Hence, it is historically necessary to preserve the momentum that we built 20 years ago with the Thessaloniki Agenda. If I may say so, I think we need to produce a success story. This is why I think the enlargement to Moldova and Ukraine, but also to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro is important. We need to provide a vision to the people. It is very important, because the truth is that it has been 20 years and some fatigue is understandable. And I can see why people have partially lost faith in the European dream. This is why I think we should just reflect upon it, revisit it, and reinforce it. This is what we are going to do in the new composition of the European Parliament, the European Council, and the European Commission. Apart from this, there is an additional reason why we should be more active in the enlargement process, because more and more, the European project is becoming a geopolitical project.
It started as some sort of a domestic financial project in order to have a strong economy. Then we moved to some sort of a political union, and now we are facing the challenges of geopolitics in all respects. There is an evident, I think, transition towards this geopolitical principle, and this is why all candidate states need to be integrated.
Now, you asked me about Albania and North Macedonia. With all due respect, I think that it is not a bilateral matter in either case. In the case of Albania, we have the imprisonment of an elected mayor. He has stayed in prison for about 20 months. There are some serious concerns with regards to the principles of rule of law that have been applied. And obviously, we have to be particularly careful when we speak about representatives of the minorities. For us, for Europeans, it is important that we, obviously, safeguard diversity and we look after all the minorities. The road is there, but there must be some clear evidence that there is full respect.
When it comes to North Macedonia, as I mentioned, International Law is no cherry-picking process. It is as simple as this.
International law is the foundation of the international security architecture. If there was a case of just picking some of the provisions of the treaties and then letting some other in inertia, obviously, there would not be any sort of International Law or international community. We need to stick by the international treaties. We had some serious concerns. Our party, as opposition in parliament, clearly reacted to the Prespa Agreement, and we indicated very early that clearly there are some grey areas in the Prespa Agreement.
However, we timely stated that once there is a ratification of the agreement, then there is no way back, and we have to fully respect it. This is what we actually demand from North Macedonia, and we think that the international community is clearly on our side. As I mentioned before there are three conditions in order for the European perspective to advance: first, European Union acquis. Second, International Law, international treaties. And third democracy and the rule of law. There is no way to have any concessions on these issues.
July 2, 2024