A. PAPAIOANNOU: Good morning, everyone. First of all, I apologize for the delay, but that’s how this job is. My schedule isn’t up to me. The Minister had a long conversation with his Moldovan counterpart, and that just finished. Thank you for your patience.
I’ll get right down to business, because we don’t have much time. This will be the last briefing of 2020, barring any unforeseen developments. Let’s hope we won’t need to hold another one. Next Thursday is Christmas Eve, and the Thursday after that is New Year’s Eve, so, barring the unexpected, our next briefing will probably be on 7 January. We’ll see what the agenda is like then, whether we need to have one then, or we might do it the following week.
I’ll be very, very brief. I had various things to tell you, but since our time is short, I want to hear from you.
First of all, we have the results of the European Council and the U.S. sanctions. The Minister has already talked about this in Parliament. We have issued an announcement on the U.S. sanctions. You will have seen those. So I won't add anything on that. I’d be pleased to discuss it, but, as I say, there was the speech in Parliament, and the Minister said it all there.
Regarding the trip to Jordan that took place about 10 days ago, some information has circulated. The talks the Minister had at the trilateral meeting – both with his Jordanian colleague and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Mr. Christodoulides, were very interesting. There was a very interesting discussion, not just about the trilateral cooperation mechanism – that was one of the items on the agenda – but also about various broader developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. There was a briefing on various issues from the Jordanian Minister. He made a lot of interesting comments regarding Iraq and the situation in the Palestinian territories. He also expressed concerns – and this was very interesting – over Turkey’s conduct in the region.
Finally, and again, very briefly, I want to note the Foreign Minister’s trip to Nicosia, which took place two weeks ago, where he met with Mr. Christodoulides. As you might imagine, one of the main topics of conversation was preparation for the Foreign Affairs Council meeting, which took place a few days ahead of the European Council meeting.
And of course, the other topic was coordination on issues concerning the Cyprus problem and in view of a possible invitation from the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Guterres, to an informal five-sided meeting on the Cyprus problem. If that meeting happens, it will happen in the new year. We aren't expecting anything in the next two weeks.
And again, I apologize for the delay, and we’ll go right to questions, because we’re already way behind schedule.
S. SIDERIS: Good morning, everyone. I’d like us to look at Bulgaria’s stance. At the Summit Meeting, Bulgaria wasn't very friendly towards Greece, at least from what was made public. And Ekaterina Zakharieva confirmed that Germany and Bulgaria worked together to block the sanctions.
Does this mean Greece will change its stance on the dispute between North Macedonia and Bulgaria? Will there be an initiative from Greece to support North Macedonia’s European perspective?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Greece’s stance on North Macedonia’s accession perspective remains firm. I’ll repeat it once again. We have been in favour of this perspective for decades – from 2003 on. Of course, with the conditionality we are all well aware of, and this stance has not changed at all.
Mr. ARGYRAKIS: In the Council conclusions it is mentioned that the European Council asks the High Representative to promote the proposal for a multilateral conference on the Eastern Mediterranean. What is our position on that point in the conclusions?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Our position is set out in the conclusions of the European Council. I’ll read out the text: The European Council – and therefore Greece – asks the High Representative to take forward the proposal of a multilateral conference on the Eastern Mediterranean.
In principle, I stress, we have no objection to the convening of this Conference. Beyond that, all of the states that are invited will have to respect two fundamental criteria that are self-evident to us.
One is that they recognize all of the other participants. In other words, we can’t have a state that wants to participate, not recognizing all of the other participating countries. It has to respect the territorial sovereignty of all of the other states. That’s one key criterion.
The other, which is also self-evident, is that each state must respect the fundamental rules of International Law and the Law of the Sea.
Those two things are self-evident. We’re not asking for anything out of the ordinary. But at a Conference, all of the states will have to respect these two criteria. Beyond that, if there is a state that doesn’t want to respect these criteria, this would obviously hinder it from taking part in a possible conference.
Mr. KOUTSOMYTIS: Good morning. Mr. Cavusoglu made some statements today to the effect that Turkey will not cancel the purchase and installation of the S400s, in spite of the sanctions imposed by the U.S. What is Greece’s stance with regard to this weapon system? Do we tolerate Turkey’s having it? Are we asking for its withdrawal? Will we raise the issue in NATO? What do we plan to do on this issue? Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: We mentioned this matter in the announcement we issued last Tuesday night, in which we referred to this system. I have nothing to add.
Mr. MOUTSOS: Good morning. My question is this: Yesterday, in an interview at the forum, with Athanasios Ellis, Mr. Dendias said that, while sanctions are not a punitive measure for Turkey, they are a way for us to show where our red lines are.
However, European Council did not deliver EU sanctions we had hoped for. So, what are we expecting in March? Are we looking forward to something new, something more tangible?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: The European Union, the European Council, made two important decisions on restrictive measures. The first was the imposition of sanctions on additional individuals and legal entities involved in illegal drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean, based on the decision of 11 November 2019. It isn’t referred to expressly in the conclusions, but the decision of November 2019, on which the new sanctions will be based, has its legal basis in article 29 of the Treaty on European Union.
And the other is precisely that the High Representative and Vice President of the Commission and the European Commission were asked to prepare a report on EU-Turkey relations, including economic and trade relations.
That was what was decided, and we are awaiting the presentation on that in March. That’s how things stand right now.
A. MANGIRIADIS: Good morning. Back to the issue of the multilateral conference. What is the object of this conference? For example, the Berlin conference was on the Libya ceasefire. What will this conference look at? Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, the framework has to be agreed. Right now, for this conference, the framework, participation and what will be discussed include certain things on which High Representative Borrell is preparing some proposals.
Naturally, we, the member states, express our opinion on these proposals. And of course, I repeat, this conference cannot be convened without the consent of the member states of the European Union and the states that are invited. We’re still a long way from discussing the agenda, because right now, at least on the table, there is not an agreed framework for convening this conference.
But it will be multilateral cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean region. In various sectors. Beyond that, the items remain to be determined. But right now I would say that’s the least of our concerns, in the sense that everything else is secondary if the basic rules governing any discussion aren’t determined first.
And what I mentioned – respect for International Law – is a fundamental issue. Because everyone will have to agree that anything we discuss will be discussed on the basis of International Law. Afterwards, that will allow for the talks to be expanded. That’s why I say that the agenda will depend on acceptance of the basic principles. And I repeat, as a country, we are not asking for anything unreasonable. We are asking for what we see as self-evident for all of the states in the region and in general. In other words, we don’t have any special demands. We made this clear.
Mr. ZACHARIADIS: Good morning. I would like to ask you this: In the budget debate, Mr. Varvitsiotis said that the Greek government didn’t use its veto at the Summit Meeting because there were significant references to Varosha and Turkey’s stance on Cyprus. In other words, was there an understanding with the Cypriot government? Did the Cypriot government ask Greece not to use its veto?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: The coordination between the Greek and Cypriot delegations, both in Athens and in Nicosia – as I said earlier, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was in Nicosia a week before the European Council meeting – as well as in Brussels, is self-evident. And in this context, there is always very close coordination and cooperation between the two countries on all of the issues of concern to the two countries.
Mr. TZANETAKOS: Good morning. At yesterday’s conference on Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean, I heard the Minister link, in some way, the U.S. sanctions not just with the obvious issue of the S-400 system, but also with Turkey’s behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, Libya. Regardless of our stance, is this borne out in any way by the American texts, by the decision on these sanctions?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I won’t comment on the American texts. You saw the statement Mr. Pompeo issued on this. I have nothing to add. What the Minister said is that the sanctions imposed by the U.S. concern Turkey's behaviour in general in the region. What I can point out to you is that the U.S. Secretary of State, in another context, in the context of the recent NATO Ministerial, referred at length to the whole range of Turkey’s actions, which – and he said this clearly – undermine the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, of NATO, and weaken its southeastern wing.
And he didn’t just refer to the S-400s. He referred in general to Turkey’s provocative actions.
Ms. TSAMOURI: I’d like to know why Athens bought the torpedoes from the Italian company in the current state of affairs – in other words, when the Italians didn’t back us at the Summit Meeting.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I’m sorry. Honestly, I don’t know about that. I don’t even know about the procurement of Italian torpedoes. Maybe you need to ask the Defence Ministry. Arms procurement programmes are beyond our Ministry’s portfolio. Regardless of where they come from, this is not a Foreign Ministry issue.
Ms. KRATSI: Good morning. I would like to ask you this: At the previous briefing, you said that the Greek side, more or less – this was your personal estimate – considers a period of 2 months without any Turkish provocation as the time that would be needed for the exploratory talks to start.
How do we define ‘provocation’? Is it just the Oruc Reis in the Eastern Mediterranean, or is it also the statements of Turkish officials? Because those statements haven’t stopped. There’s pretty much a constant flow – from Akar, Cavusoglu, Erdogan. Do we see this as continuation of Turkey’s provocations? Or do we consider only actions to be provocations?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, as you said, it was a purely personal estimate, the time span I gave you around the end of November, of a two month period. That's not an official stance. That was a personal estimate. And I repeat that to avoid any misunderstanding.
What I did say, and this is our official position, is that a reasonable amount of time will have to pass for us to be ready, provided we’re invited to exploratory talks, to talk about the sole issue that we have discussed until now: the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. That’s the sole issue.
How long this reasonable period of time is, as I said then, is not something I can decide. It's a decision that will be made at another level.
And again, it was a purely personal guess. And my guess was two months because – and I stress that this is my personal opinion – I had in mind that the new Administration will take over after 20 January. That was the reasoning behind the timeframe.
Beyond that, when we talk about provocative actions, what we want is for Turkey to show us that it really wants constructive dialogue based on International Law. In other words, we want Turkey to show in general, through its behaviour, that it is open to this dialogue – again, dialogue based on International Law.
And that’s what the Minister said in his speech yesterday. That’s what we want to see from Turkey. In other words, we’re not making unrealistic demands. We’re asking for the obvious so that we can have a constructive dialogue. And, as I said, Turkey will have to show a real will for this dialogue. So, it will have to desist from any provocative actions.
Mr. PSAROPOULOS: Hello. I have a question about the U.S. Energy Secretary’s visit today. Is there anything more you can tell us beyond the press release that was issued, saying simply that there will be a discussion of further cooperation in the energy sector in the context of the strategic dialogue?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: You obviously mean the press release issued by the Ministry of Environment and Energy.
Mr. PSAROPOULOS: Yes.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: No, I have nothing to add on that. I won’t interfere in the business of another Ministry. And it’s a visit from the U.S. Secretary of Energy, which is handled by the Ministry of Environment and Energy.
Mr. PSAROPOULOS: Thank you.
Mr. SIDERIS: It’s Mr. Argyrakis’ turn. He asked a second question and you cut him off.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I’m not cutting anyone off. I just want to give the floor to each person to ask one question first, and then we can go to second questions. Mr. Argyrakis, your question.
Mr. ARGYRAKIS: It’s okay. I can wait. Let Mr. Sideris ask his question.
Mr. SIDERIS: I’d like to talk a little about the issue of the arms embargo. The Greek Foreign Ministry appeared to have been misled by the European Union regarding the former’s urgent tabling of the arms embargo on Turkey. Or were we misinformed that the EU can’t decide on this and it's up to the member states.
Do you plan to promote the idea of an arms embargo on Turkey in some other way?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you very much for your question. First of all, regarding the issue of the arms embargo, as you know, this matter falls within national jurisdiction. It isn’t up to the European Union. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have raised it in a European context, but always bearing in mind that it is a national competence. That’s one thing.
As you know, the European Union adopted a stance on this issue in 2008, which requested from the member states – and I stress this: the European Union cannot impose a European arms embargo – not to licence the export of weapons systems to countries that are destabilising the region. That was in 2008, I stress.
And then, of course, there are the October 2019 conclusions of the European Council immediately following Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria. And here, too – I don’t remember the exact wording used in those conclusions – the member states were urged not to export weapons systems to Turkey. And the Netherlands and France have not exported weapons systems to Turkey since then. But these decisions are national, not European.
Mr. SIDERIS: But it was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s office that insisted on raising the arms embargo issue on the European level. It was the Foreign Ministry. Does that mean there was some misjudgement?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you very much for your question, and I’ll reiterate what I said. This issue is one of national competence. So, we have raised this issue both bilaterally and on the European level, but fully aware that this decision will be taken nationally by each member state of the European Union. It isn’t something that the European Union will impose as a European decision.
Mr. ARGYRAKIS: Following up from the previous question, given that Turkey’s position is that, if a conference on the Eastern Mediterranean is convened, occupied Cyprus will have to participate, what is Athens’ position? Would it accept that?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I’m sorry, I answered that question. I think the answer I gave earlier was very clear: that to participate in such a conference, one of the fundamental criteria is obviously that they recognise the other participants. To us, that’s not even up for discussion. It’s a sine qua non.
Mr. ARGYRAKIS: So, you’re clear that Athens says no to the participation of occupied Cyprus.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I answered your question.
Mr. ARGYRAKIS: I wanted to ask something else. Should I ask now?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Please, go ahead. I don’t see anyone else who wants to take the floor right now.
Mr. ARGYRAKIS: In the text of the conclusions, there is different phrasing in various languages. The Greek texts talks about illegal activities on the part of Turkey, while the English and French texts call these activities unauthorised. In other words, one says ‘a little pregnant’ and the other is crystal clear: ‘illegal’. Can you explain why there is this difference between the texts? And which one is in force?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, all of the texts which are official texts of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union – and, of course, are translated into the 21 official languages of the European Union – are of equal force. That answers your one question.
Regarding the other issue you raised, I will refer you to the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, who sent these texts to the member states. These texts have been sent by the General Secretariat of the Council. I have nothing to add on that. Thank you.
Mr. Gasiamis has a problem with the audio. Anyway, Mr. Gasiamis is asking if there have been any developments in the consultations with Egypt regarding the delimitation of the rest of the EEZ to the east of the EEZ that has already been delimited.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: As you know, this is why Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Shoukry visited Athens in September, and then President Sisi visited. We are in contact with the Egyptian side. The process is underway.
S. SIDERIS: Yesterday, the NATO Secretary General criticised the U.S. sanctions on Turkey, saying, among other things, that there cannot be sanctions between two members of the Alliance. Does Greece intend to react to these statements from the Secretary General, as he appears to once again be taking Turkey’s side?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: When the NATO Secretary General speaks as the Secretary General, he commits himself, not the alliance. What he says as Secretary General are the positions of the Secretary General.
Every ally has an open channel of communication with the NATO Secretary General. We talk and exchange views, and in this context the Greek side continues its contacts with the Secretary General.
But again – I wanted to stress this – this is not a text the allies have agreed upon.
Pardon me. We have to stop here. But before we do, I would like to thank you for your patience. I really do apologize, but my schedule often isn’t up to me.
And I wish you happy holidays with health, above all, and we’ll see each other in the new year. And I hope we will be seeing each other in person, as soon as we can, in the new year.
December 17, 2020