A. PAPAIOANNOU: Good afternoon to everyone. Forgive me for holding today’s briefing a little later. The reasons were beyond my control, and of course we’re adapting. Normally, we will hold the briefing on Thursday mornings, as we have said.
Allow me to start by expressing the sorrow of the Foreign Ministry family because, unfortunately, since the last time we spoke, we lost a colleague, Georgia Ralli. As you know, last Sunday, the Minister expressed his condolences to her loved ones.
Whenever we lose a member of the Foreign Ministry family, the whole Ministry mourns.
Moving on, by way of an introduction, I would like to refer to some issues of recent days, talk to you about the upcoming programme, and then answer any questions you have, as we did last time.
The first thing I would like to focus on today is, of course, the statement the Minister of Foreign Affairs made this past Tuesday. I’m sure you’ve all read it. I just wanted to highlight three basic points in this statement – points that I think are fundamental.
The first is, as the Minister said, that we now need to have a common understanding at the European level regarding the destabilising role of Turkey right now. In other words, the starting point that we must have as Europe, not just as Greece, as Cyprus, but as Europe, all together, is what Turkey is doing in general. Its destabilising role, its infringing behaviour, not just in the Eastern Mediterranean, but in Libya, in the Caucasus, in Syria, and so forth. And of course, all of the other things it is doing when it supports extremist organizations in the region, exploits the migration crisis, and so on. I won’t go into detail. But by now, all Europeans should share this view.
Second – and this is key – last October, the European Union, the European Council, gave Turkey an opportunity to revert to international legality. The European Union’s message was clear. In a very composed manner, the Minister stressed that this window has essentially closed and that any last-minute statements Turkey might make in the immediate future will not change the image this country has projected over the past one and a half or two months.
Moreover, the European Union not only gave Turkey an opportunity, but also decided not to impose sanctions on it. It decided to postpone this, and Turkey, rather than using this opportunity it was given to create a prospect for a positive agenda, did exactly the opposite. It exacerbated the climate, and now it is essentially not giving us any other choice. I’m not speaking as Greece. I’m speaking as Europe.
The third point I would like to stress regarding the statement is that Mr. Dendias reiterated that our country is always ready for constructive dialogue. But always in the context of respect for international law and the Law of the Sea. And as he says in the last paragraph of his statement, Greece requires, in this regard, that its interlocutor prove its commitment to obeying international law – and I want to emphasize this – as a lasting choice and not as a flag of convenience. Not something incidental.
That’s all on the statement. We can come back to it later if you wish.
The second point I would like to raise today is that, in recent days, as you have seen, the Minister has spoken with a number of Arab Foreign Ministers, specifically those of Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
He discussed two issues in these conversations. The first, of course, was bilateral relations. As a follow up to President Sisi’s visit to Athens, to the Prime Minister’s visit to the Emirates, to the contacts with Saudi Arabia. Another issue that he raised was the upcoming ministerial meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which is taking place tomorrow and the next day in Niamey, Nigeria. And in this regard, he discussed with his Arab colleague the efforts Turkey has been making for years now by proposing draft resolutions that have nothing to do with reality and attempt to distort various issues, such as on the Muslim Minority of Thrace.
The third point, very briefly. The Minister spoke last Tuesday with his British counterpart, Dominic Raab. The main topic, as you might imagine, was of course the developments in the Cyprus issue. The British Minister asked for our view on a possible invitation to an informal five-sided meeting. The Minister responded that we are open to such an invitation, if it happens. Of course, he reiterated that, in any case, the only basis for resolving the Cyprus problem is a bizonal, bicommunal federation based on the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the European acquis. He also said that any continuation of the talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, regarding the settlement of the Cyprus problem, must resume from the point where the talks left off in Crans Montana in 2017.
Regarding the United States: The president-elect of the United States, Mr. Biden, announced that the new Secretary of State – who of course will have to be approved by the Senate in a confirmation hearing – will be Antony Blinken, who, as you know, is very familiar with Europe and our region. This is a positive development. I would also like to point out that the outgoing Secretary of State, Mr. Pompeo, has already done a great deal to strengthen bilateral relations with Greece – and also with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean. I stress again what I have said in the past and, of course, what the Minister has said repeatedly: that what we want from the new Administration is a greater U.S. presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
And today, as we speak, the Minister is briefing the representatives of the parliamentary groups on the recent agreement Greece concluded with the United Arab Emirates, as well as on the joint declaration on strategic partnership. The Minister of Foreign Affairs will issue a statement after these briefings, in particular with respect to this agreement, I will not therefore go into further details on that.
Earlier today, he spoke with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. The main points they discussed during this telephone conversation: Mr. Stoltenberg elaborated on the agenda for the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which will take place next Tuesday and Wednesday, via videoconference. I’ll come back to that when I discuss the programme. Of course, in this context, the Minister reiterated in detail our positions on Turkey’s provocative and illegal behaviour and, in general, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
That’s my introduction.
Regarding the programme: Tomorrow, the Minister will speak with his Italian counterpart, Mr. Di Maio. I had announced that this conversation would take place last Tuesday, but it couldn’t happen on Tuesday. It will take place tomorrow. Of course, they will be discussing the same topics. Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya.
The Minister, as I said, will participate online at the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which is taking place on Tuesday and Wednesday. Allow me to say a few things about this. First of all, in their first session, the Foreign Ministers will discuss the report on the NATO 2030 Reflection Process. Mr. Stoltenberg appointed a group of experts to prepare a report on how NATO should move ahead over the coming decade.
The co-chairs of this group, a German former Defence Minister and a U.S. former assistant Secretary of State, will present the main points of this report.
Allow me to underline one thing with regard to this report. The text stresses that it is imperative for the Allies, all the NATO Allies, to reaffirm their commitment to and respect for the principles and values of the alliance (e.g., democracy, rule of law, human rights, and so forth). It proposes the adoption of a code of conduct for the allied countries.
Moreover – and this is a very important point – the report highlights that Allies must avoid inhibiting the work of the alliance for self-serving political reasons. Need I say more?
That's it on the Reflection report. The Foreign Ministers will then discuss Afghanistan and Russia. Subsequently, under another heading, they will discuss China, with the Foreign Ministers of South Korea and New Zealand, as well as EU High Representative Borrell, in attendance.
And finally, there will be an online discussion with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and Ukraine regarding Black Sea security. That’s all on the NATO ministerial.
Regarding Foreign Minister Dendias’ programme, I want to stress at this point that we are also scheduling two trips abroad, possibly for the following week. As they haven’t been finalised or confirmed yet, I’ll get back to you with details next week, provided they are confirmed.
And the following Friday, though I’m jumping ahead a bit, we have the OSCE Ministerial in Tirana, which will also take place via videoconference. But we’ll talk about that next week.
Now on to the schedule of the Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Varvitsiotis. First of all, today Mr. Varvitsiotis has the videoconference of the EU meeting with the Southern Neighbourhood, which will be co-chaired by the Spanish Foreign Minister and High Representative Borrell.
Tomorrow, again online, he will participate in the ministerial meeting of the Union for the Mediterranean.
Next Tuesday, 1 December, he will participate, online once again, in the informal General Affairs Council meeting, which will focus on the Conference on the Future of Europe and on enlargement. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of candidate countries will participate in the discussion on enlargement.
Regarding the Deputy Foreign Ministers, Mr. Vlasis is meeting today with Metropolitan Igantios of Madagascar, and on Tuesday he will participate online in the EU Ministerial Meeting with ASEAN countries held in Singapore.
That’s it for the programmes of the political leadership, and, as always, I am at your disposal to take any questions.
G. MOUTSOS: Good afternoon to everyone. A little while ago it was announced that a majority in the European Parliament, with 440 votes in favour, have essentially passed a resolution in favour of imposing sanctions on Turkey. The question is, how close are we to the imposition of sanctions at the 10 December meeting of the European Council, given that the European Parliament cannot impose sanctions?
And in a follow-up to that, if you will, we see countries that were hesitant until now, like Germany, Italy and Spain, slightly altering their stance. And of course, whether you have any feedback or information on what it is that essentially made them change their stance on Turkey. Thank you very much.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Regarding the European Parliament, indeed it does not have executive power on this issue, but of course this resolution in and of itself – and with such large a majority of 440 out of approximately 700, is important. I don’t know how many voted, but 440 is a significant number of votes, and this alone sends a political message. And from what I understand, there was broad support from a number of parties in the European Parliament. So, this alone is an important development.
You ask what has changed their stance. It is what I said earlier. On the one hand, Turkey’s delinquent behaviour, which is now obviously a clear challenge, a threat for stability in Europe. Through its actions, Turkey is destabilising the whole of Europe. I don’t want to repeat all the areas where this is the case, they are well known . But this is now becoming a common denominator, not just for the countries experiencing it first hand on a daily basis, but for all of the countries of the European Union. That alone, and of course we are contributing as well through our briefings of European colleagues. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has mounted a diplomatic marathon, and this is delivering results.
S. SIDERIS: Good afternoon. I’d like to go back to the first issue: the tragic loss of Georgia Ralli. She is the first coronavirus victim at our diplomatic missions, but, according to reports, there are many other cases at diplomatic missions.
In Turkey, where we had six or seven coronavirus cases, there are now allegations that an order was given, in the midst of the pandemic, for the Embassy to be painted, without the necessary measures being taken. Is the Ministry leadership considering taking measures for the health and safety of the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
My second question is, why was it, in the end, that Mr. Dendias issued a videotaped announcement on Turkey? What was intended? Because the reactions from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs spoke of avoidance of direct dialogue between Greece and Turkey, which is something Turkey insists has to take place. Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, allow me to say that I don’t want to go into detail. I referred to the deceased, and anything else is personal information and we won’t go into detail.
With regard to avoiding coronavirus cases at the Foreign Ministry and abroad, I want to stress that, as of March, the Foreign Ministry has issued instructions on the precise measures to be implemented. We have installed a thermometer at the Ministry to limit the spread of the virus among the personnel here in Athens, and of course we comply strictly with all of the circulars issued by the Ministry of Interior and the General Secretariat for Civil Protection.
Regarding the missions abroad, we promptly sent instructions to all of the missions abroad regarding increased protective measures, and, second, we have highlighted that they must comply with all the measures imposed by the local authorities. This is obvious. All of the measures are adequately followed. I believe we’ve avoided much worse and that, under the circumstances, the situation is as good as possible.
Unfortunately, we can’t avoid it completely. It’s impossible to have zero cases. Since you referred to Turkey, allow me to say that, yesterday, the Turkish authorities officially admitted that Turkey currently ranks third in the world among countries with the largest number of cases. Yesterday, the Turkish authorities announced that they had 28,000 cases.
Regarding the Foreign Minister’s statement, I told you earlier what the Minister said, and I have nothing to add to that. Thank you very much.
P. TZANETAKOS: Good afternoon. If the European Council does in fact proceed to impose sanctions on Ankara, is the Ministry considering scenarios where there could be some sort of reaction from Turkey against our country and, by extension, the European Union? And what kind of reaction do you think that could be?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Allow me to quote a Portuguese coach. A great football player died yesterday, and I remembered an old coach. At some point they asked him, before a match, “What are your predictions?” And he responded, “I’ll give you my predictions at the end of the match.”
So, in that context, I would like to say that, at this stage, what we are focusing on is ensuring a common understanding on the part of the Europeans with regard to what Turkey is today, the challenge and threat Turkey poses today, focusing on the implementation of the October conclusions of the European Council on this issue. Allow me to read to you what the European Council said on 1 October.
“Paragraph 21: "In case of renewed unilateral actions or provocations in breach of international law, the EU will use all the instruments and the options at its disposal, including in accordance with Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States.”
And the conclusions continue: “The European Council will continue to closely monitor developments and will revert accordingly and take decisions as appropriate at the latest at its December meeting.”
That is what the European Council says. Beyond that, we are preparing for the December meeting of the European Council.
A. ZACHARIADIS: Good afternoon. I wanted to ask you, in practical terms, because you have said this and the government spokesperson says it repeatedly, in practical terms, what does Turkish continuity and consistency mean for Greece? Do we think the Oruc Reis will leave on 29 November? Are we expecting something else? Are we setting some other condition or expecting something specific from Turkey apart from that? Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Look, I think that what the Minister said last Tuesday speaks for itself. He talked about a lasting choice and not a flag of convenience. He said that Turkey missed a major opportunity to cease its repeated illegal conduct while there was still a point in doing so.
I think that speaks for itself. We don’t need to do any guesswork. I think what we need to see is what long-term stance Turkey will adopt. What we expect from Turkey.
You said that the Oruc Reis might leave on 29 November. We’ve heard that. Turkish officials have said this publicly. We’ll see. But again, what I’m stressing is that we’re not talking about expressions of supposed good will at the last moment.
I think that says it all. Allow me to stop there. I have nothing to add on that.
C. AGROLABOS: Good afternoon, everyone. What will happen if the Oruc Reis does leave on the 30th and an invitation is issued for the exploratory talks in Istanbul, which is still pending?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: The Minister has already responded to this as well. Allow me to repeat what he said: That we remain committed to the idea of sincere dialogue. And he added: But such a dialogue requires an interlocutor who has proven that its obedience of International Law – and I stress this again – is a lasting choice and not a flag of convenience. I think that speaks for itself. I have nothing to add.
G. EVGENIDIS: Hello, Mr. Papaioannou. Given that the Minister spoke with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg today, whether there is any plan – if the ministerial is held with live attendance – for a meeting on the sidelines with Mr. Cavusoglu
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Unfortunately, due to the situation, the ministerial will be held via videoconference. That’s certain.
M. GASIAMIS: The Turkish Defence Minister continues to blame countries like Germany and France for the boarding of the cargo ship in the area covered by Operation Irini. In the Turkish press, they’re even talking about retaliation on Greek merchant vessels. What is your comment on that stance?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, I wish to stress again that Operation Irini is a European Union operation that, pursuant to the relevant UN Security Council resolution, is implementing the arms embargo on Libya. It was in this context that the German frigate, which was under European command, proceeded with the boarding of the Turkish vessel. We all know what happened after that.
Mr. Borrell has already responded on this issue, and I have nothing to add.
K. BALI: If I can go back to an earlier issue, because it isn't so clear to me what the Minister means by follow-through on the part of Turkey. In other words, do you rule out the possibility of exploratory talks starting if the Oruc Reis leaves tomorrow and an invitation is extended?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Allow me to come back to the Minister’s words.
K. BALI: If that’s it, don’t trouble yourself.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: It’s no trouble. I’ll just answer your question. The Minister says that, regardless of last-minute statements Turkey might make, it isn’t that easy to fool the European Union. Because the European Union is not naive. I think the meaning of this is very clear.
G. MANDALIDIS: You already responded on this, and maybe it’s pointless for me to come back to the issue of merchant vessels. There really are reports that Turkey will respond in the field, and this is something Cavusoglu insists on. What is your comment, and what measures are being taken? Are there concerns about the reports alleging that Greek merchant ships will be inspected? I think you just answered this. I don’t know if you’d like to add anything.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I have nothing to add. I’ll stress once again that we are talking about a European Union operation. It’s crystal clear, and that’s why I don’t want to come back to it. Everyone taking part in this operation is operating under a European cap. That’s the main takeaway on this issue.
T. ARGIRAKIS: Hello. If possible, I’d like a clarification regarding the announcement issued by the Association of Diplomatic Personnel regarding the death of the employee in Ankara, which says that the tragic incident underscores the need for immediate medical and insurance coverage for Foreign Ministry personnel in countries outside the EU, which means the vast majority of foreign service personnel, and goes on to say that this is a longstanding demand and so on.
From what I understand, there is an issue of medical coverage in non-EU countries, and I would like you to tell me if the Foreign Ministry Service has any plan to cover this issue.
And second, in the press release he sent us, Mr. Katrougalos says, “an appeal in the meeting with the Minister today regarding the need for a clear protection protocol ... at our Embassies abroad following the death of the employee.”
I’d like you to respond to that. And I also see that, in his meeting with the Minister, Mr. Katrougalos raised the issue of Greece’s red lines with regard to Turkey’s moves. He noted that Turkey’s latest NAVTEX raises an issue of illegal activity at 5.8 nautical miles, asking what our red lines actually are and whether the red line is a Turkish drillship being sent west of the 28th meridian. I’d like you to respond on both of those issues. Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I heard three.
T. ARGIRAKIS: There are two. One is the coronavirus.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: One is the announcement of the Association of Diplomatic Employees that was sent to all diplomatic personnel, all the members of the association. Colleagues responded to this announcement via internal mail. I won’t comment any further. Any colleagues who want to, can in the context of the Association of Diplomatic Employees express views on the association’s announcement.
Regarding the NAVTEX, since you mentioned it, we issued an announcement on the matter last Saturday. The Minister also spoke on this matter last Tuesday. I have nothing to add. Thank you very much.
G. MOUTSOS: I would like to ask you this: Given that we have the European Council meeting on 10 December, if we don't see any white smoke and the European Union doesn’t reach a conclusion regarding the sanctions. What will the Greek side’s next step be? What will we do?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I’ll come back to what I said about the coach. I’ll give you my predictions at the end of the match. At the risk of boring you, I repeat that what we want right now is for there to be a common outlook on the European level with regard to Turkey’s behaviour. And in that context, we want to see the implementation of the decisions already made by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union in the European Council. I have nothing to add on that.
K. TSAMOURI: If the Europeans don’t decide to impose sanctions/measures against Turkey, in spite of Turkey’s having done exactly the opposite of what was included in Octobers conclusions, what will Greece’s next moves be?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I say again: Right now, we are preparing for the European Council meeting. We have a clear line. We have set out the issue and we have said what the European Council needs to do. That’s where we stand right now. That is our main objective at present.
S. SIDERIS: There’s a unilateral aspect to the Greek Foreign Minister’s contacts with Gulf countries, the Arab world. He has even talked with Algeria. But we do not have representation in Libya, for example, as we have expelled the Libyan ambassador, nor do we have representation in Syria, and these are two important pieces that certainly impact the policy of the Arab League and the Arab world.
What are we going to do on this? In recent months, I have seen that there is contact between the Greek Foreign Minister and the U.S. Ambassador in Libya, along with the U.S. Ambassador to Athens. Have we transferred out diplomatic competencies to American diplomacy? Is that what’s happening? Because this is the first time I have seen the Minister talk to an Ambassador with another Ambassador present in the meeting.
Might this unilateralism create problems in the Balkans, where we have serious issues, with everything going on between Kosovo and Serbia, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, what’s happening between North Macedonia and Bulgaria, on which we have not taken a stance. Should we maybe take a stance, take an initiative on the North Macedonia-Bulgaria dispute to minimise the problems that exist in the region? Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you very much. With regard to Libya and Syria, as you very well know, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has appointed a special envoy for Libya, Ambassador Lazaris, and a special envoy for Syria, Ambassador Athanasiou. And as I said last time, a charge d’affaires for Syria has been appointed, with residence in Beirut, so I have nothing else to add.
Regarding what you said about the Balkans, I will come back to what I have already said: that Greece firmly supports the European perspective of the countries of the Western Balkans, based on conditionality, including, in this framework, North Macedonia, because we believe that this will help stabilise the wider region.
C. AGROLABOS: There are 193 MEPs who voted against sanctions on Turkey, and 52 MEPs abstained. One hundred and ninety-three votes against a resolution on sanctions is a lot, and they obviously echo the views of countries’ governments.
If the governments of the MEPs insist on pushing for a positive agenda – for which our Minister said there is no room, no room for formal dialogue – what will happen?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, MEPs do not represent their governments.
C. AGROLABOS: They echo their governments views.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: No, they do not echo the views of their governments. They echo the views of those who elected them. They belong to European political parties and echo the views of those parties.
I want to say something here. This doesn’t mean that those who didn’t vote in favour of this resolution – and I haven’t seen the contents of this resolution. In other words, I don’t know if those who didn’t vote in favor disagreed with the whole resolution. They may disagree with part of it. I can’t know that right now, so I don’t want to make any assumptions.
But I want to stress one thing: I haven’t heard anyone say that, right now, after all of this behaviour on the part of Turkey over the past month and a half, there is room for any move towards a positive agenda. I’d say the opposite is the case.
That's what I wanted to stress. Because the positive agenda is another thing, and the European Council conclusions say what a positive agenda is. Allow me to look it up.
This is from the conclusions, paragraph 19: “a positive political EU-Turkey agenda with a special emphasis on the modernisation of the Customs Union and trade facilitation, people to people contacts, High level dialogues, continued cooperation on migration issues, in line with the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement.”
If I may, I haven’t heard anyone say that there is room right now for us to talk about a positive EU-Turkey agenda. I’d say the opposite is the case. Everyone is saying that Turkey has gone in precisely the opposite direction and that there is no room for any of this to happen. That’s what I would say right now.
G. MANDALIDIS: It just came out on the state network that Mr. Stoltenberg had talks with Mr. Cavusoglu. Is the Secretary General making a mediation effort ahead of the NATO Summit to ameliorate the situation? Or was it just a briefing ahead of the Ministerial Meeting?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Before ministerial meetings, and especially when there are a lot of items on the agenda, the NATO Secretary General usually talks to all of the ministers of foreign affairs of the NATO member states to go through the agenda. This is standing practice, and it was obviously in this context that he spoke with Mr. Dendias earlier and, a little later, with Mr. Cavusoglu.
A. ALEXOPOULOS: Good afternoon to everyone. First of all, I would like to ask about Mr. Dendias’ meetings today. We see that Syriza, and specifically its shadow minister, Mr. Katrougalos – this question has been answered, of course – said some things concerning red lines. But the answer comes – I see a response in the statement from the representative of the Communist Party, Mr. Marinos. He said that the red line is essentially co-exploitation in the Aegean.
And on that I would like to ask whether or not, after all, we are discussing co-exploitation in the Aegean. And my second question is, taking you back to previous days and a police report. I’d like to ask about the jihadists. In the past 15 days, we have seen two jihadist having crossed into Greece, being arrested.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: What is your question on that issue?
A. ALEXOPOULOS: What actions are being taken by your Ministry? Whether there should have been a check before they entered the country.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Before they entered? Do you mean in another country?
A. ALEXOPOULOS: No. I mean when they come with migrant flows on the boats. Whether there should have been a more thorough check at that time.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: So, upon entry, when they’ve already reached the country. Because the check is carried out when they reach the country. Not before they enter. That’s why I’m saying this, and it’s important. When we talk about checks ...
A. ALEXOPOULOS: Maybe I wasn’t clear. I want to say that the last one we saw entered the country in 2018. Maybe it was already too late – after two years. He could even have gone on to Germany.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Allow me not to go into detail on this. The Citizen Protection Ministry is competent on this. But as far as I know, there are many, many major and in-depth controls on who enters the country legally or, in this case, illegally.
But I refer you to the Citizen Protection Ministry for more details on this matter. You said yourself, it was a police report.
A. ALEXOPOULOS: Regarding my first question?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Regarding what the representative of the Communist Party, Mr. Marinos, said, please ask Mr. Marinos what he meant.
S. SIDERIS: You didn’t answer as to whether we have transferred our diplomatic competencies to the U.S. in Libya. That’s one.
Second. What's happening with the supposed former MPs from Turkey who were arrested in Katakolo? Whether there has been and diplomatic contact, or any proceedings.
And my third and last question for today: What's happening with the reorganization of the Ministry? I think it has come back from the Court of Auditors and from the General Accounting Office, with a number of corrections to be made, according to reports. When will it go into effect?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: The draft law on the Statutes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be submitted to Parliament soon. I can assure you of that.
S. SIDERIS: I got an assurance of what I asked.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: It will be submitted to Parliament soon.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs may talk to various officials from other countries to discuss international developments, and in this context, he had in the past a discussion with the U.S. Ambassador in Libya.
Since the U.S. Ambassador to Libya is an American official, the U.S. Ambassador to Athens joined the discussion online. I don't see anything wrong with that.
S. SIDERIS: You didn't answer regarding Katakolo.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Please ask the Citizen Protection Ministry.
S. SIDERIS: Did the Turkish side make a demarche?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Please ask the Citizen Protection Ministry. The Citizen Protection Ministry is competent on this.
S. SIDERIS: Demarches from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs are sent to the Citizen Protection Ministry?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Sideris.
S. SIDERIS: If something has changed, please let me know.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I don't see any other questions.
Thank you very much. Barring the unexpected, we’ll talk next week. Have a good day.
November 27, 2020