A. PAPAIOANNOU: Good morning to everyone. I apologize for the delay. Something came up. So, I’ll start the briefing.
First of all, before I talk about the programme, two things about last week.
The first, very briefly, was the NATO Ministerial, which took place last Tuesday.
I’d like to highlight three points about that.
First, in contrast to many NATO ministerials I’ve attended in the past, it was very interesting. NATO ministerials usually consist of prepared statements that are read out by the participating Ministers, because all of the texts have already been agreed upon, and essentially they are simply ratifying the decisions that have been made. In contrast to this practice, last Tuesday’s meeting was relatively ‘lively’.
The other thing that was very interesting – and really, over the ten years I’ve been following NATO issues, I haven’t seen this before, at least not to this extent – was the clear reference to, even criticism of, a specific country in the Alliance, which was named by a number of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This was also a very interesting development.
What I also want to note is precisely this change. The Ministers didn't focus exclusively on the agenda for this particular meeting, which was essentially the NATO reflection process, Afghanistan and Russia. In fact, they talked about a much wider range of issues, which is unusual.
It really found it to be a very interesting experience. We can talk about that later. That’s all for my introductory remarks on the NATO ministerial.
The other issue I would like to point to is that, as you know, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dendias, carried out and is continuing a marathon of telephone conversations with his counterparts from EU and NATO member states. He also talked to his counterpart from Iceland yesterday. Regarding his European colleagues, as you might imagine, he briefed them on the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the main topics of conversation included the upcoming meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, which will take place on Monday, and the European Council meeting, which will take place this coming Thursday and Friday, 10 and 11 December. By way of a general observation, I would like to say that, in general, all of the telephone conversations took place in a very warm, friendly atmosphere, and it was very encouraging that there was understanding as to the challenges we are facing. The Minister reiterated our well-known positions regarding Turkey’s perpetual illegal and provocative behaviour. And he will continue to hold these meetings, as I said.
Now for the programme. First, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Today, at 13:00, we have the swearing in of the new Secretary General for International Economic Relations and Openness, Mr. Smyrlis, here at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Of course, all of the necessary protective measures will be observed. Tomorrow, the Minister will travel to Nicosia, where he will meet first with the President of the Republic, Mr. Anastasiades, and then with his counterpart, Mr. Christodoulides. While in Nicosia, the Minister will also participate, via videoconference, in the OSCE Ministerial Council. And later the same day he will participate in the Mediterranean Dialogue, which is being hosted by Italy.
On Monday he will travel to Brussels, where he will attend the meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, which will be held with live attendance, which is a positive development. After that, a trilateral meeting between Greece, Cyprus and Jordan is scheduled for Monday or Tuesday – we’ll see – on the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in Amman.
On Wednesday, the Minister will speak, via videoconference, at the World Press Freedom Conference, which is being hosted by the Netherlands. That’s it for the Minister’s programme for next week.
The Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miltiadis Varvitsiotis, will participate via videoconference next Tuesday, 8 December, in a meeting of the EU General Affairs Council, and he will accompany the Prime Minister to the European Council meeting on Thursday and Friday.
From 8 to 10 December, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kostas Fragogiannis will head the 4th round of the Greek-Germany action plan, with the State Secretary of Germany’s Federal Foreign Office, Mr. Berger, heading the German delegation. A total of 10 Ministers will participate on behalf of Greece, representing the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Migration and Asylum, Education and Religious Affairs, Labour and Social Affairs, Environment and Energy, Development and Investments, Citizen Protection, and Culture. There will be a number of sectoral meetings, and a plenary session will take place at the end. Of course, unfortunately, due to the current conditions, this meeting will take place online.
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vlasis will participate next Wednesday, online, in the 2nd International Conference on Religious Diplomacy, on the topic of “Religions and the challenges of the new decade,” which is being hosted by the Foreign Affairs Institute and the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, with the support of the Greek edition of Foreign Affairs.
That’s it on the programmes of the political leadership. One last thing that I would also like to mention is that the civil leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary General, met yesterday with the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy on the Cyprus Dispute, Mrs. Lute.
That concludes my introductory remarks, and I’m at your disposal to answer any questions you have.
S. SIDERIS: Good morning. The leak, which came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through diplomatic sources to the Athens News Agency, regarding Pompeo’s remarks during the NATO Ministerial, hasn't been confirmed by other sources. I’ve spoken with a number of Foreign Ministries and with Ministers of Foreign Affairs from NATO countries, and they haven't confirmed what was leaked is the case.
What’s actually happened?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, I won’t comment “on the record” about what exactly was said at NATO ministerials. I don’t have the right to comment on that.
S. SIDERIS: But the leak came from the Ministry on this.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you, Mr. Sideris.
C. KRATSI: I would like to ask you this: The Greek side has repeatedly stated that it will not sit at the table for dialogue with Turkey if the provocative actions aren't stopped for the long term, rather than opportunistically. What does ‘long term’ mean? How long? A month? Two months? Three? Six? How do we define that? In other words, how much time needs to go by for the Greek side to feel that it can sit at the same table with Turkey?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, the long term means that it doesn’t suffice that they suddenly withdraw the Oruc Reis. And if they provoke us 3, 5, 10 days later, that we’ll say nothing has happened. I also said this at our previous meeting. The last time Minister of Foreign Affairs Dendias met with Mr. Cavusoglu was in Bratislava on 8 October, when the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs said he would give him “dates for the exploratory talks.” And instead, we had six NAVTEXs and the “picnic” in Varosha. And of course, this behaviour is anything but constructive.
As for what you’re asking: long term. First of all, this is a political decision. When it is deemed that there has beenadequate time in which Turkey will have avoided provocative actions. I can’t tell you right now exactly how long this time horizon is. It will have to be a reasonable length of time. And I stress, this isn't something that I can define right now. I don’t have the authority to say what this length of time will have to be. As a purely personal estimate, I think it would be a period of some weeks. In other words, not 10 to 15 days. For example, it could be two months, but, as I said, this is a political decision. The main thing is for there to be consistency and continuity in de-escalation from the Turkish side. That’s the main concern right now. In other words, Turkey will have to show, in practice, that it actually wants to move towards a constructive dialogue based on international law.
A. MANGIRIADIS: Good morning. What European Council decisions next week will satisfy the Greek side?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you very much for your question. Right now, we are entering into negotiations – not just Greece, but all of the 27 member states. We are entering into negotiations where each country has its own positions on what it wants from this European Council meeting. And allow me to stress at this point that the European Council will not discuss only the Turkish issue; it will discuss a number of issues. So, each country has a negotiating position on all of these issues. Each country is more interested in some issues and less interested in others.
It is in this context that our country, too, has prepared its negotiating position, as always. This isn’t just for this European Council meeting. It’s true for all negotiations, and we always look for the optimum result that we would like to achieve. Beyond that, we always carry out planning as to the minimum that we would be able to accept. That is the negotiating framework in which our country is moving.
And I stress that everyone does this, not just Greece. So, right now we are formulating this negotiating framework at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in collaboration and coordination between the Minister and the Prime Minister, naturally. Let me underscore that: There is always coordination. In this framework, we will determine the lines on which we will be moving.
Of course, allow me to say, I can’t go into detail regarding the framework in which we will be moving. Because, ahead of difficult negotiations, I cannot publicly reveal – no one can publicly reveal – what our negotiating position will be. Revealing that could undermine our position.
But I say again that we have a complete picture of where we stand. The Minister has spoken with his counterparts in the other EU member states. The Prime Minister has also had contacts in previous days. And of course these talks will continue on all levels.
As the European Council meeting approaches, the Minister of Foreign Affairs will continue his meetings in person during the Foreign Affairs Council meeting, where Turkey is also on the agenda. No decision will be made at Monday’s FAC meeting with regard to Turkey. But there will be a discussion so that we can see where we’re heading. And of course, on the sidelines of the meeting, the Minister will be able to promote our positions again.
The main thing I’d like to highlight is that, right now, the current challenge posed by Turkey is not a problem between Greece and Turkey or Cyprus and Turkey. I say this and I want to repeat it, because this has to be understood not just by you, but in general. It is a broader European problem, and the response should come from all Europeans. There needs to be a common understanding and, based on this common understanding, a joint response, which of course should be based on the conclusions of this past October. In the conclusions of this past October, I remind you, briefly, that the heads of state and government of the European Union gave Turkey an opportunity. Unfortunately, Turkey did exactly the opposite. That’s one thing.
Second, we said that there are prospects for a positive agenda if Turkey’s behaviour is positive. Right now, I would say that any room for a positive agenda has been ruled out under the current conditions.
And third, in October the European Council decided that by December, at the latest – meaning next week’s meeting – they would have to consider the situation and make the necessary decisions.
In the end, we want the European Council to make decisions based on how Turkey has behaved in recent months, at the least.
P. TZANETAKOS: Good morning. If I’m not mistaken, a couple of days ago we heard the new Turkish Cypriot leader raise the two-state solution with the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy for the Cyprus dispute, essentially sidelining the bizonal, bicommunal Federation. How are you dealing with this development, and what will Athens do if it is called upon – assisting Cyprus, obviously – to negotiate on the two-state solution?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: The key message that we conveyed yesterday regarding the Cyprus issue has two points. The first is that, if we are invited to an informal five-sided meeting – 5+1, because the UN Secretary-General will be there – we are prepared to participate. We are not setting terms for our participation in this informal meeting. We don't think there will be a substantial discussion at this meeting. That’s one thing.
I repeat, we are open to attending the meeting if an invitation is extended. And we believe that this informal meeting will take place in the coming weeks, probably early in the new year. This is up to the UN Secretary-General, of course, not us.
The second is that we – and, I stress, that not only us but all of the members of the UN Security Council have reiterated this publicly – remain committed to a viable solution to the Cyprus problem in the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation based on the resolutions of the UN Security Council and in line with the European acquis. That doesn’t change. That is our firm stance. I also repeat once again that, if and when the negotiations resume, they will have to resume from the point where they stopped. As you know, that was in 2017 in Crans Montana.
K. TSAMOURI: Good morning. If the European Council does not take measures or, in any case, doesn't move in the direction we want on 10 and 11 December, what will Athens’ next move be?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, right now our attention is focused on preparation for the European Council meeting. That’s the main concern right now. And as I have said before, when we enter into negotiations, difficult negotiations, each member state starts with its own positions. We are one of 27 member states. We are starting with what we could call an ideal scenario: what we would like to achieve. But at the same time, I also stress that we have some specific lines that we won’t cross. That is our negotiating framework.
I repeat, we, too, are part of the European Council. The Prime Minister is a member of the European Council, so he will have to give his consent for a decision to be made. So, our main focus right now is for the debate to move within the framework that we consider acceptable. With our arguments and the efforts we are making towards all of the Minister’s European counterparts, as well as the European institutions – let’s not forget them, because they also play an important role. And I’m referring to the President of the European Council, with whom the Prime Minister spoke, the President of the European Commission and the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission. And in this way we are trying to create a climate for the best possible and most satisfactory result at the European Council. But I stress again that the decisions are made by everyone together. In other words, they won’t make a decision without us. That can't happen.
M. GASIAMIS: Apart from cessation of provocative moves, does the Greek side intend to send the message that it’s won’t enter into dialogue as long as the casus belli stands?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: That’s another issue. Unfortunately, the casus belli has been on the table for 25 years now. That’s a fact. What is this casus belli? It is a threat of war in violation of a key provision of the UN Charter, of article 2 paragraph 4, which talks about refraining from the threat or use of force against other UN members. And why? To stop Greece from exercising and inalienable right based on International Law, the Law of the Sea, which has been ratified by the majority of UN states and by the EU itself, and which is a rule of customary law. In other words, Turkey is in clear violation of the UN Charter. This is a very important issue for us. It is fundamental and we will continue to raise it. It’s not something we forget. It’s always on the table. And we will raise it not only with the Turkish side, but with all of our interlocutors, starting with the Europeans and our other partners.
K. ALATZAS: Good morning.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Good morning.
K. ALATZAS: I would like to ask you this: At this meeting of the European Council, are we expecting written proposals from the High Representative of the European Union, Mr. Borrell? Because last summer we had a number of proposals for possible sanctions if Turkey did not comply – but the proposals were made verbally. Are we expecting something in writing at this European Council meeting?
And as you mentioned earlier that it is not just a matter of Greek-Turkish disputes or Greek-Turkish relations, but an EU-Turkey issue, do our partners in Europe see Turkey's provocations in the same way we do?
I also have a third question, but I can ask it later so my colleagues can have a turn.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: No, it’s okay, ask it.
K. ALATZAS: All right. If we aren’t satisfied with our partners’ proposal – because you said we won’t leave the table if we’re not satisfied with the proposal – are we prepared to use our veto? To make some sort of move? Thank you very much.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: One question is how our partners see it, the other is the veto, and the first was Mr. Borrell’s list.
K. ALATZAS: Whether we are expecting Borrell’s proposals in writing.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I’ll answer in the order you asked. First of all, yes, there was a discussion at the informal Foreign Affairs Council, at the Gymnich meeting, last August in Berlin, where Mr. Borrell referred verbally to an informal list. What I want to stress is that there have been developments since then and the whole debate has a certain dynamic. I won’t linger on the matter of a list. But I will insist on and emphasise the conclusions of the October European council, which clearly speak of taking measures. That’s why I say it is a dynamic debate. Allow me to read from the text again: "... the EU will use all the instruments and the options at its disposal, including in accordance with Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States.”
What’s important here is the political part: that is has been stated and that decisions will be made based on that statement.
K. ALATZAS: I don’t understand whether we expect anything. I understand that we are expecting something based on the previous Council decisions, but I don’t understand whether there will be something in writing. Or don’t we know?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I’m saying that, right now, the form this takes is a political decision. In the conclusions of the European Council, we see the framework in which decisions will be made. And we want to see the application of the conclusions of the October European Council, which say that we will use these instruments on the art of the European Union if Turkey does not take steps to de-escalate – if it continues to violate international law. This is what the Heads of State and Governments say.
Now, as to how that will be translated, I wouldn't say that’s something for us to discuss here. It’s part of the debate. The political decision is the main thing. That’s what I want to stress.
As regards the term “veto”. When decisions are taken unanimously, there is no issue of one country vetoing. For a decision to be made unanimously, everyone has to agree. So, I don’t like the term veto to be used in this sense. I’ll give you another example that has nothing to do with this case. Two EU member states – we all know who they are – do not agree with the proposal currently on the table for the multiannual financial framework, for reasons of which we are aware. I won’t go into detail right now. These two countries have not vetoed a decision that has already been made. It’s just that right now, when we’re still discussing it, we haven’t managed to achieve unanimity on this issue. That’s why I don’t like the term veto. The decisions are made by everyone together.
What all of the Europeans are saying on the Turkish issue – I mean in the debate on the decisions to be taken on this issue by the European Council – is that the cohesion of the European Union is key. We must come out in one voice, preserve the cohesion and credibility of the European Union, and I think we are all on the same page there. Now, how this will take shape in the context of the negotiations is another matter. But that is what all of us are pursuing. Nor does any country want to isolate another. What we are trying to see here is how the 27, united, will send a joint message to Turkey on this issue, a joint decision.
And the last question: how our partners see it. I’ll tell you something that might sound odd or naive. But the fact is, due to the geographical location of our various partners, their understanding of Turkey’s provocations cannot from the outset be the same as ours. It's one thing to be next-door neighbours and experience Turkey’s behaviour, and another to be on the other side of Europe. It’s obvious that the starting point for the 27 partners’ understanding of Turkey’s provocations is not necessarily that of Greece or Cyprus. There's no question that this is the truth of the matter. And this is one of our main concerns and the object of our effort. And this is why the political leadership – the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs – are undertaking this diplomatic marathon: to explain and to facilitate optimum understanding and bring them round to our position.
And I must admit that this is changing, even with regard to countries that may not always be so interested in the fact that Turkey is a threat, countries that see this as a regional issue that concerns only certain member states of the European Union. Of course, this can’t change from one day to the next. It takes a great deal of effort and convincing arguments. We need to explain and present our arguments to them, and tell them that “you can’t remain indifferent to this because what’s happening in what you see as a single region of Europe essentially has repercussions for you as well, and you will have to deal with it.” This is a diplomatic victory: better understanding.
Because if they understand the situation better, afterwards they will be able to say, “you really are right, so, we need to make some decisions in response to this provocation and threat.”
K. ALATZAS: Thank you very much.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you.
S. RISTOVSKA: Good morning. Can you give us any details about Mr. Dendias’ conversation yesterday with Ms. Zakharieva about the Western Balkans, given that we know Bulgaria’s stance on North Macedonia’s European perspective? Has there been any change? Any detail you might give us. Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you. Yesterday, the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke with his Bulgarian colleague, Ms. Zakharieva. The main topic of discussion was the developments in the Southeastern Mediterranean and, more broadly, Turkey’s provocative behaviour.
In this context, of course – as expected – there are discussions of the European course of the Western Balkans. That is a sine qua non. I have nothing to add on that right now. Thank you.
M. RIGOU: Good morning, everyone. On the NATO meeting you referred to and that you said you would come back to, beyond the relaxed structure compared to previous Meetings – in other words, that they didn't stick strictly to certain texts – if I understand correctly, references were made to Turkey, highlighting its provocative behaviour.
Could you be more specific? And in the end, what is the practical significance of this for us?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: What do you mean by “relaxed.”
M. RIGOU: That they went off script. That was my understanding.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Yes. Usually, as I said, at NATO ministerials the negotiations on texts that have to be agreed upon and approved by the Ministers have been completed on the working-group level and on the level of Ambassadors. And essentially, when the time comes for the ministerial meeting or summit meeting, the texts have been finalised and have been approved by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Defence, or by the Heads of State and Government. They essentially put what the English call their “rubber stamp” on texts that have already been approved. And what usually happens is that there is no exchange of opinions. Just twenty or thirty monologues. Each Minister of each Head of state or government – I’m saying this from experience – comes in, reads his intervention, thanks his colleagues for being there, and leaves. Sometimes, when they have a working luncheon or dinner, there is a more strategic discussion, which might leave the beaten path.
At this meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at least during the first session – which I attended via videoconference, which unfortunately limits they extent to which we can fully experience the atmosphere, the body language of the various participants – what I observed and what really left an impression on me was that a number of those who spoke seemed to say things that were off script, as it were.
I stress again, I will not name names. I am bound by the confidentiality of these discussions. I can’t speak officially about countries. I can’t say who said what exactly, unless the representatives of those countries want to do it publicly themselves.
What I will reiterate again is that it was very interesting that clear reference was made, starting with a Minister of Foreign Affairs who was the first to take the floor, from a country of great importance, especially within NATO – and who, precisely because he was the first to take the floor, set the tone for the discussion. And he said things openly, things that we were discussing within NATO but that had never come out, at least not so strongly as at the ministerial level. And in fact he accused another country in the Alliance, by name, of essentially undermining, through its actions, the Organization and the Organization’s cohesion. And of essentially undermining this Organization’s security by purchasing military equipment from third countries, which he named.
This was something I had never seen before in NATO.
This intervention created a kind of momentum. There were other countries that came out and reiterated these points, perhaps not so extensively.
What I also observed – and this was very interesting – is that while the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country that came in for this very strong criticism started reading out his remarks on the items on the agenda, regarding Afghanistan, Russia, and saying what his country is doing for all of these regions and how much it is helping, subsequently, and obviously irritated – at least judging from his voice – and perhaps feeling a little awkward, he tried rather aggressively to refute what had been said earlier. At least the way I heard it – and this is a purely personal opinion, I might be completely wrong – this created an even worse impression among those in attendance, if only via videoconference. It essentially highlighted what this country is being blamed for, not him personally; there was nothing personal about this criticism and no names were mentioned. It was purely about countries’ policies. From this perspective it really was a very lively and interesting meeting. But again, I won’t go into detail as to who said what. No more need be said.
M. RIGOU: Were there any statements from the other side by Ministers of Foreign Affairs of countries you were not expecting? Namely, was there a change in attitude which may bear some importance?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: A change in attitude? I repeat, what was interesting was the public statement and intervention by certain countries. I mention this because it is unusual — at least in my short experience — by NATO standards.
Namely, discussions at Ministerial meetings, at least the ones I have attended, have always been “sanitised”, and the Ministers were very explicit in avoiding referring to other countries and criticising the policies of other countries sitting at the table. What occurred behind the scenes is a different matter altogether, but at that table, in the meeting room, that wasn’t done in the past. So, from that perspective, this development was quite interesting.
Please allow me to give the floor to the rest of your colleagues who have not yet spoken. Mr Agrolabos please.
B. AGROLABOS: Good morning. During the videoconference Ms Merkel had two days ago with the Committees of the European Parliament, she made evident her disappointment with the political framework and the challenges of Turkey, the aggression, etc. What I have not understood as regards the immigration issue and the recognition the European Union owes, as the Chancellor said, to Turkey, is there a new funding framework, namely an update to the agreement, a proposal to update the agreement of March 2016? Is that on the table at the Council, do we know if there is an amount, a schedule, a time frame?
And since we are on the issue of Turkey’s agenda, regarding visas, is the gradual removal that was supposed to be on Turkey’s agenda still in place for Turkish citizens?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: We could discuss this for hours.
Let’s start with the statement of March 2016. Please allow me not to enter into the domain of other Ministries. The Ministry of Migration and Asylum leads the way when it comes to the international dimension of the immigration-asylum issue.
But, in short, let me stress that as regards the statement of 8 March 2016 by the European Union-Turkey, that particularly well-known statement regarding the immigration-refugee issue, as far as I know there is no proposal on the table to amend it, change it, or anything else.
What we always stressed is that Turkey must fully implement the obligations it has undertaken in that statement. For example, one of these obligations is not to allow new migration flows. Another is to stop and take measures to reduce the flow of would-be immigrants to Europe.
As regards these things, Turkey has not done what it has been obligated to – quite the contrary, in fact, as we have witnessed on many occasions. I am not referring to recent months when migration flows have decreased significantly. I believe that this is due to the pandemic. But I can characteristically recall the summer of 2019, in August, September, October, and November, we had approximately 9,000 to 10,000 arrivals in Greece.
The other point I would also like to stress is that Turkey must not create new migration channels. By sea, by land, or even by air. This is an issue that concerns both us and Cyprus, and which we have stressed repeatedly.
As regards ‘FRIT 2’, which is what you were obviously referring to, which is called ‘Fund for Refugees in Turkey’, and which concerns not funding for Turkey, but rather for programmes concerning refugees who are located in Turkey, €3 billion had initially been earmarked in 2016. At some point later, the European Union earmarked an additional €3 billion, which they are funding from various actions. Without wanting to go into details, once more, if I recall correctly, some months ago it was decided that certain needs had to be covered by new funds by the end of the year. But this was for purely humanitarian reasons, because that money is used, for example, for refugee children education issues and medical care. The basic principle in place is that as regards any monetary support to refugees located in Turkey, the resources go to the agencies and they carry out any projects. Not to the government of Turkey, and not the state of Turkey, I repeat. This money does not go to Turkey.
As regards the subject of visa liberalisation. This is a long story. The European Commission has set specific criteria, which Turkey must meet in order for this to move ahead. Things have been this way for some time, long before the discussion of the European Council of October.
Turkey has not met many of these, especially one of these, and in that framework the European Commission, regardless of the rest of the relationship framework as it has taken shape today, was never in a position to propose to the Council the liberalisation of visas for the citizens of Turkey. That is where we are. And that has not changed. At this point, and I will stress this again, it is an issue of the European Union, not Greece. The European Commission underlines that there are certain specific technical criteria. And as long as those criteria, which are known, are not met, the process cannot proceed.
Besides that, as regards the issue of the positive agenda, I repeat that we cannot refer to a positive agenda while Turkey is acting the way it is. And regardless of that, there is also the technical dimension.
D. MANOLIS: Good morning. How does Greece see the change in rhetoric by Turkey in recent days following the withdrawal of the Oruç Reis and in view of the European Council? And is it your assessment that it will impact the position of the partners at the Summit Meeting?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: We have been clear about this. We have stated that these moves, the belated interest Turkey is suddenly displaying, or at least trying to display— I say display, I did not say act upon — good intentions, we do not consider this adequate to cover, to hide what it has done over the recent period. I say again: I am referring to the last two months only, since the European Council of October, I am not going further back, because that is where the decisions were made.
And the European Council is saying: We present Turkey with an opportunity on October 1st, and what has Turkey done since? It has issued six NAVTEXs, they had their “picnic” at Varosha, and so forth.
And I will not even go into all those statements that anyone can find on the official sites of the Government of Turkey, statements made by senior officials of Turkey against Europe, or, in several specific cases, against State Leaders and Governments of European states, which were completely disrespectful.
So, from that perspective, as you can understand, we cannot of course ignore this, and just because the Oruç Reis was withdrawn all of a sudden — as they said — on 29 November, that does not make it a gesture of good will. It would be completely naive to believe that.
Correspondingly, and I would like to stress this also, the European Union, I mean our European counterparts, also admit this. Namely, they too are not naive enough to say, “Turkey is suddenly showing a positive attitude”. They can see how things are. Things have become obvious, they cannot be hidden, there is no one who would say, “right now, Turkey is good”.
Right now, Turkey’s moves have come late. I even read publications that an announcement is expected on the day of the European Council, as regards reforms, and I say this very tentatively, because I have seen this in publications, I do not know if this information can be corroborated, but, if you will allow me the English expression, it is all “too little, too late”.
A. ZACHARIADIS: Why did Mrs. Lute not meet with the Minister, yet saw Mr Demiris? And, secondly, what do you mean when you say that there will be no substantial discussion at the five-sided Conference?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: It was decided that Mrs. Lute would meet with the head of the civil leadership at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which she did. Secretary General Mr Demiris and Mrs. Lute had a long meeting yesterday, during which they discussed the most recent developments in the Cyprus issue.
Regarding your second question, when I say, “there will be no substantial discussion”, I mean that it will be an informal meeting. We are not there for an substantial discussion. It is an informal five-sided meeting to see where stand. And I repeat, if it is decided that discussions should commence, they will resume from where they left off. Please forgive me for repeating this, but, for me, it is fundamental. That is our position, it remains our position, and that is what we told Ms Lute yesterday.
G. MANDALIDIS: Good morning, everyone. If, in the framework of the German position regarding a positive agenda at the Summit Meeting on Turkey, the issue of the multilateral Conference on the eastern Mediterranean that Turkey proposed is raised, what will Greece’s position be?
And, so I don't have to come back to it, I would like to ask a second question which I did not write: Do you see any or is there any concern about countries that are not directly involved in the eastern Mediterranean presenting obstacles or even vetoing any sanctions against Turkey? I am referring, for example, to Hungary, or possibly Finland and other countries which are not directly involved in the issue of the eastern Mediterranean, but which are friendly towards Turkey. Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I would also like to thank you very much. First of all, allow me to say that the framework for the positive agenda, the possibility of there being a positive agenda, to be exact, is not something that Germany mentioned. It was something the European Council mentioned, which says that we want to create the framework for a positive agenda, and it is in that framework that the proposal for the Conference for the Mediterranean was proposed.
That happened in October. But all this was based on one main condition: That Turkey would display good behaviour. Namely, do what is self-evident. Respect International Law, stop its provocations, and stop its threats. The European Union is not asking for things that are unrealistic.
This is what it had asked for and, in fact, the High Representative of the European Union and Vice President of the European Commission Borrell had been assigned to explore the framework for this Conference on the Mediterranean. At this moment, I repeat, there is no momentum for the implementation of any idea that has been put on the table regarding a positive agenda, even less so for a Conference on the Mediterranean right now.
And this is just not an issue for Greece. I want to stress this. It is not that we, Greece, are opposed whilw everyone else is in favour. There is no longer momentum for this Conference. That is one thing to keep in mind within the European Union.
Allow me to also to add that there is no momentum or interest, to put it differently, regarding a Conference at this point, from other countries, third countries, non-member-states of the European Union, which may be invited to this Conference.
The prospects of any positive agenda or discussion on a Conference on the eastern Mediterranean right now are non-existent, I would say. And again, allow me to say, I avoid using the word “veto”; it is not a word I like using, because, I repeat, the word “veto” would mean that everyone is in agreement. There would have to be consensus.
You referred to specific countries. The Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke with his Hungarian counterpart; in fact, it is the second time they have spoken in recent weeks. Another conversation had been held over the telephone, following the destructive earthquake on Samos. I do not want to go into the negotiation position of other member-states of the European Union.
But what I would like to stress once more is that there is a general approach by European Union member-states, that what is at stake right now for the European Union is to maintain its cohesion and to emerge united, with a message, from this European Council.
In that framework, of course, everyone has their own priorities, their own positions, which they will present.
M GASIAMIS: The Deputy Minister of Interior of Turkey, Mr Çakatli, referred to increasing immigrant push-backs by the Greek side in the Aegean. Do you have any comment?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: No comment. This issue has been covered repeatedly by the Ministry of Citizen Protection, the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, I have nothing to add to that.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: Hello. You said earlier that Mrs. Lute met with Mr Demiris. From what I recall, all UN envoys on the Cyprus issue used to meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. My questions is this: What was the thinking behind the decision for Mrs. Lute to meet with Mr Demiris this time?
And a second question is this: As far as I am aware, there is a pending UNESCO report regarding Hagia Sophia. Do we have any news about this? And has the Greek side pressed UNESCO for further explanations? Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Allow me to start from your second question, and thank you very much. As regards UNESCO’s inspection report, you will allow me to refer you to UNESCO on this matter. Naturally, the Greek side both in Athens and in Paris has implemented, since before last July, all necessary actions towards UNESCO as regards the issue of Hagia Sophia and we continue to do so – there is no question about that. But as regards the first part of your question, I must refer you to UNESCO.
As regards Mrs. Lute, I repeat that Mrs. Lute met with the head of the civil leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They had a very interesting and long discussion, during which, as I mentioned earlier, the Greek side repeated our well-known positions. I have nothing to add to that, thank you very much.
G. KOUTSOMYTIS: Good morning, everyone. A question about NATO. I understand that you cannot reveal your discussions from the Council. However, last night there was an official announcement by the Presidency of the French Republic about the discussion Mr Macron had with Mr Stoltenberg, which specifically mentions that President Macron told Mr Stoltenberg that “Turkey’s strategic choices, [...] must be clarified in a frank discussion within the Alliance in the new transatlantic context". Seeing as, at this point, it is being made public that there is an issue with Turkey within the Alliance, will Greece take a position on this matter?
And secondly, based on the plan, the design, the specialist report presented to the Ministers, what is Greece’s position on it? Is there a proposal from Greece regarding the future of the Alliance? Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you very much, two minutes, because your second question will require a lot of explaining, Greece’s position about the future of the Alliance. But first I would like to respond to your first question, regarding Mr Macron’s statement.
First of all, I will not comment on what the President of the French Republic discussed with the Secretary General of NATO. That is beyond the scope of my competencies.
As regards whether or not Greece raises an issue regarding Turkey, the behaviour on the part of Turkey towards other allied countries, such as Greece, we have done so constantly, for decades, I would say, at NATO, to the Secretary General, as well as to our allies within the alliance. This is nothing new. For example, at regular intervals, very regular, we deliver démarches and inform the NATO Secretary General, regarding, for example, Turkey’s violations of our national air space.
At the NATO Council, which meets at least once a week, we have repeatedly raised issues as regards Turkey’s violations, and please allow me to say that there have also been interventions by other allied countries, on an Ambassador’s level, there have been extensive discussions, quite lively discussions on this matter in the past.
I will not mention which other countries have raised an issue. I believe it is clear as day.
As regards the future of the alliance, allow me at this point, we often speak of NATO in Greece and say, “NATO did this, NATO did that”, etc. Allow me to tell you that NATO consists of 30 member-states, decisions are always made by consensus, and that will never change, it is something we believe should continue.
That is why in English we call it “consensus”, not “unanimity”. I mention this, because “unanimity” means that someone can abstain. At NATO there is no option of abstaining, you vote either for, or against. In Greek, both these words are translated as “unanimity”.
I mention this because in 1952, almost 69 years ago, we were already an ally, that is what NATO member states are called. So we are also part of NATO. NATO makes no decisions without our consent.
As regards the future of the alliance, it must adapt to the new standards of the new emerging threats in general. What we continuously stress as regards our position in NATO, is that it must remain committed, all of its members, to the basic values that govern the Organisation, which are in fact, mentioned, if I am not mistaken, in Article 1 of the Washington Treaty, the Founding Treaty of NATO. These values are respecting democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and so forth.
That is a basic, fundamental criterion. We consider NATO a main channel for the preservation of the transatlantic connection that we consider very important, and one final piece of information that I would like to stress is that we are in favour of strengthening the relationship of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance of NATO with the European Union, always in the framework of complementarity. But it must take place with no exclusions for any member-states of the European Union in the framework of the NATO-European Union cooperation, sapienti sat.
And, naturally, the autonomy of each Organisation must be respected. We are talking about two completely different Organisations, we are in favour of deepening relations, while retaining autonomy, what we call institutional status of the two Organisations.
But also as a country, as a NATO member state, which, as I said, we have been for 68 years, we are participating in and we will continue to contribute to the dialogue on the future of the alliance. And in that framework we are looking forward to a NATO Summit, with new US leadership, within the new year.
TH. ARGYRAKIS: Seeing as a few days ago Mr Stoltenberg said that he wants to move further ahead with the de-escalation mechanism between Greece and Turkey, and, in fact, he said he had spoken with Athens and Ankara, have you received any specific proposal of what Mr Stoltenberg wants to do?
A. PAPAIOANNOU: I am aware of no such thing. However, he did speak with the Foreign Minister last week, but the main issue that Mr Stoltenberg raised were the items on the agenda of the NATO Ministerial Meeting, which took place early this week.
And as I mentioned last time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Secretary General, in detail, about Turkey’s provocations and violations in the eastern Mediterranean. The conclusions from that are self-evident.
SP. SIDERIS: Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kotzias yesterday, in an article published in almost 5 languages, talks about the conflict between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, indirectly blaming the Greek government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for taking a stance that positions it in favour of Bulgaria, thus creating and strengthening “Great Bulgarian” chauvinism.
As we saw on Twitter, which has now become the only medium through which we can communicate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and get updates, as updates are only released on Twitter, it seems that the Minister spoke with Zakharieva. Will he speak with the Minister of North Macedonia, Mr Osmani? Will he take some initiative? That was the first question.
The second: Did they speak with Di Maio about the 12 nautical miles?
Third question: In the new organisational chart, to which we, many employees of the Former Secretariat of Information and Communication, have expressed our opposition, as regards the advancement table, will the advancement table be implemented as in all other sectors, or will employee progression follow a new plan?
There have been many news reports recently that mention that there is a rift between the Prime Minister’s office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that there are two different lines as regards foreign policy. Is this true?
And lastly, as regards what I mentioned indirectly earlier about Twitter: Will there be some real update with some non-papers as regards either the discussions of the Minister or Greece’s foreign policy, like we used to get until recently, so we do not have to wait for a leak to the Athens Press Agency and on-camera statements by the Minister for our updates? We are professional journalists and expect to be treated as professionals by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thank you.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: You are professionals, as are we all, and we respect that, we are trying to do our duty as best we can and with complete respect.
SP. SIDERIS: I am sorry, but it does not seem that way.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you very much for your observation. I repeat, we are all professionals, we are trying. Thank you very much for those few questions you asked, I will gladly answer.
First of all, the last question, I would like to stress that there is complete coordination between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on all foreign policy matters. The answer to your questions is clearly “no”. There is no rift, there is full coordination between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
As regards the matters of the Statutes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from what I know the draft law will be introduced to Parliament, it was publicly debated from 1 August to 31 August.
Since you are asking me about the Public Diplomacy sector, from what I know the ranks and salaries will match those of the diplomacy sector.
With Mr Di Maio they discussed the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya, as I told you, last week. It was a very constructive discussion, as always. Mr Di Maio and Mr Dendias have an excellent relationship.
As regards his counterpart from Bulgaria, Mr Zakharieva, as I said earlier, they discussed developments in the region. The Minister, in view of the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council, spoke extensively about the challenges Greece faces and the European challenge we are facing from Turkey. In that framework a discussion also took place on the European perspective of the Western Balkans.
Please allow me a short observation regarding Twitter. It is one of the means by which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicates with all of you, and I believe it is a useful means for immediate updates. Besides, it is not just our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all Ministries use Twitter in Greece and internationally, but furthermore, it is not our exclusive means of communication; allow me to inform you that we very frequently make a number of announcements, we hold briefings, and, as I have stressed, I myself am always at your disposal.
As regards the article of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Kotzias, I saw it and I have no comment. Mr Kotzias is expressing his views. Greece’s position is to always support the accession progress of the countries of the Western Balkans.
SP. SIDERIS: You did not provide an answer about the 12 nautical miles and Di Maio and whether the Minister will communicate with Osmani.
A. PAPAIOANNOU: As regards Mr Di Maio, I have responded, thank you very much. As regards Mr Osmani, right now, the conversation with Ms Zakharieva took place in the framework of the preparations for the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Council, in the framework of the discussions the Minister of Foreign Affairs had with his counterparts from European Union member-states.
Thank you very much for your time, once more. If all goes as planned, we will speak again next Thursday morning. Be well and have a good day.
December 3, 2020