Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen MPs,
The government took the initiative, in combination with a request from the Communist Party of Greece, to convene the Committee following the recent incident in the southeastern Aegean. After incidents of this kind there is a lot of analysis and talk regarding what happened and what did not happen, and even regarding the country’s foreign policy in general.
The convening of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee is the appropriate step for clarifying what happened and what our policy is.
I am certain that, as always, the Parliamentary Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee will handle these issues in a level-headed manner and with sound judgement.
So I look forward to a substantial and constructive discussion.
Ladies and Gentlemen MPs,
I don’t need to repeat that our thoughts are with our pilot, Kostas Iliakis, who lost his life performing his duty to his country. We all express our deep regret and solidarity with his family.
Our support and solicitude must be considered a given by all the members of the armed forces, including our pilots, of course, who carry out their mission selflessly.
At this point, I want to congratulate the Hellenic Parliament for its initiative in support of our pilot’s children following his untimely death.
You have already been briefed by my colleague the Minister of Defence regarding the operational dimensions of the recent tragic incident in Aegean airspace.
I will give you the political appraisal of the incident.
Two things had to be done.
And they were done.
First, Greece fully ensured and confirmed – in practice – its jurisdiction and the competencies that it has and exercises in accordance with international agreements and international practice.
It ensured and exercised them with regard to both the Athens FIR and search and rescue in the air and at sea.
Second, we acted instantly and effectively stopped a tragic incident from becoming a major crisis.
Communication was immediate, and was carried out at the appropriate level for each issue.
This brought immediate results.
I want to stress – in order to halt the relevant misinformation – that all of the actions concerning notification of our partners in the EU, NATO and the ICAO were also taken immediately by everyone. On my instructions, all of our diplomatic missions immediately informed the countries to which they are accredited.
And last Saturday, I myself briefed the EU Council of Foreign Ministers – all of the Foreign Ministers of the member states – on the whole issue. It is no coincidence that immediately afterwards Mr. Solana made public statements regarding the incident.
Ladies and Gentlemen MPs,
In the same way – in a positive and level-headed manner – we can appraise the case of the scientific research carried out by the German ship “Poseidon”.
Permission was requested of Greece by a university of a third country to carry out scientific research in specific areas of the Aegean. And this is the case because it is within Greece’s competency – which was confirmed by the request from the German university.
This is clear.
So here, again, Greece exercised its authority fully.
The permit was issued and, despite the usual reaction from Turkey, the research is being carried out smoothly, based on the original plan of the German University of Kiel. The University itself has exclusive responsibility for the manner in which the research is conducted.
I remind you that when Turkey, in representations it made to Germany, demanded that permission be asked of Ankara, it met with Germany’s categorical refusal.
Ladies and Gentlemen MPs,
I want to make it clear here that in situations like this the culprit is the mass military activity – beyond all reason – of our neighbour in the Aegean.
This state of affairs has to change.
And in order for it to change we must first – and above all – make full use of all the potential provided to our country by Turkey’s accession process; a process that is – whether one admits it or not – the most powerful mechanism for the long-term monitoring of Turkey’s conduct.
This monitoring is multi-staged.
Is it a mechanism that produces immediate results?
No, it isn’t.
But does the fact that it is not, by its nature, a mechanism for producing immediate results mean that we must disdain it? Abandon it?
I honestly don’t believe that there is anyone who would seriously propose this.
We often “praise” Turkey, here in Greece, saying that it implements long-term strategy. At the same time, we are prepared to call into question our own medium-term strategy, which made Greek-Turkish problems European.
We are still in the first six months of what will be at least a ten-year course of constant, stage-by-stage monitoring and evaluation of Turkey, but we want the results of a decade right now.
Ladies and Gentlemen MPs,
In the wake of such incidents, there are even those who hasten to call into doubt even our overall policy regarding Turkey’s European course.
But Greece – and this, as you know, is supported not only by the government, but also by a large majority of the political powers – has every reason to pursue, with patience and perseverance, Turkey’s adaptation to the European acquis, to European principles, values and conduct.
This is a choice of a strategic nature.
Such was the choice, mutatis mutandis, to accede to the European Community 25 years ago.
But today we know how frivolous and dangerous it would have been if we had abandoned it after the first setbacks. Even public opinion at the time of our accession was opposed to our country’s European perspective, as we can see from the opinion polls of the time.
Ladies and Gentlemen MPs,
Strategic choices must not be called into question without reason or in haste, much less in the heat of the moment.
I repeat: We are still in the first six months of ten or more years of Turkey’s European adaptation, through negotiations with the EU and – I stress this – all of its member states.
Another question we have heard during these past few days is: Has Greece raised – in a safe and clear manner, within the European framework and in the form of prerequisites – issues of particular Greek interest?
Of course they have been raised.
We took care to raise them in a clear manner in a whole series of binding European texts. Among these, I make special mention of the Negotiating Framework, the Commission’s Progress Reports, the Accession Partnership, the European Declaration of September 2005, etc.
All of these texts formulate cumulatively the political European acquis with which Turkey must comply.
Recently, however, it has become clear that our neighbour, due to domestic weaknesses and problems, is exhibiting irregularities with regard to meeting the need to implement the reforms requested by the EU.
So there are more and more of those who say that, in the end, Turkey will not be able to accede to the EU.
So only one twentieth of the way along Turkey’s accession course, they jump to the conclusion that the policy of Turkey’s European adaptation has failed and must be abandoned. At the same time, they say that we did not set strict conditions and timeframes for Turkey’s European course.
I gave you my opinion on both of these views earlier. If there is another policy – beyond that which was chosen by the overwhelming majority of Greece’s political powers, minus the Communist Party, of course – let me hear it.
Ladies and Gentlemen MPs,
Of course, I hear everything that is being said, mainly by PASOK, about abandonment of Helsinki. I do not intend, in my speech, to clash on this issue.
I just want to point out that nothing of what was in fact – and not based on retrospective interpretations – provided for by Helsinki was abandoned.
On the contrary, it was reinforced and improved.
First of all, we set binding conditions and prerequisites for Turkey’s accession in all of the texts I mentioned to you earlier. All of the Greek-Turkish issues became Euro-Turkish issues.
Not only did we not abandon the Helsinki conclusions, but, in a series of texts, which I will mention for you again:
· the conclusions of December 2004,
· the Negotiating Framework of October 2005,
· the European Counter-Declaration of September 2005, and
· the Commission Progress Reports of 2004 and – to an even greater extent – 2005
we succeeded, as a country, in fully and strictly setting down – in the form of specific terms and conditions for Turkey – the issues of interest to Greece.
But I pose the question: If, at Helsinki – as many claim – strict timeframes were set down for the opening of Turkey’s accession process in December 2004, why were almost five years allowed to go by in idleness?
How is it that afterwards there were those asked us to reverse this situation within six months – the first six months of our government’s term?
Furthermore: if, in December 2004, we had moved toward the International Court – as they tell us would have happened – what precisely would have been the subject matter of the Greek-Turkish dispute being settled? Had Turkey consented to a special agreement? And if yes, what issues did it cover?
This doesn’t mean that the Helsinki conclusions did not contain positive points. That is why I do not want to clash on this issue.
But it had a number of vague points. And it is not at all certain that at the critical moment these texts would be interpreted precisely as the interested party would like.
Now, with the terms that we ensured regarding Turkey’s accession course, I must point out that never in the history of pre-accession processes have stricter and more binding terms and conditions been set than in the case of Turkey. And Greece was a basic co-author of this extremely binding framework of EU terms and criteria.
Finishing up with the European dimension of our relations with Turkey, I want to stress that promoting and supporting the suggestion that Greece has “put all its eggs in the EU basket” is a mistake.
Our policy is multi-levelled.
Of course, our principal concern is to exploit the potential given to us by the European mechanism for Turkey’s adaptation.
At the same time, however, we are also promoting our issues in other areas, shaping and utilising every opportunity for this.
We promote our issues. We plan and shape alliances within and outside the European Union.
We talk – and we will continue to talk – with the other side, because we believe that constant communication can have positive consequences for our overall effort.
As you know, the extremely complex and difficult – and this is clear from their number – Greek-Turkish exploratory contacts are continuing.
The so-called “low policy” issues are being worked out steadily and effectively. But are they “low policy” issues? Are economic cooperation, energy, tourism and other kinds of cooperation between the two peoples – cooperation that is developing rapidly – “low policy” issues?
Do these not help effectively in our broader pursuit, which is none other than the improvement and normalisation of our relations with Turkey?
And there are, of course, the direct and practical measures for the avoidance of incidents and tensions. The prospect of the installation of a hotline between the Larissa and Eskisehir headquarters is being pursued in this spirit.
Ladies and Gentlemen MPs,
I finish this short speech by stressing once more that Greece is simultaneously pursuing stability and peace in its region, and the securing of its interests. This is also the case with regard to our relations with Turkey.
We perceive Turkey’s European perspective, on the one hand, as a comprehensive plan for the Europeanisation of Southeast Europe, and, on the other, as a mechanism for the monitoring and adaptation of our neighbour to European standards.
In this policy of ours – and I want to be clear on this – there are no blank cheques.
But this policy, though it is our basic choice – and not just ours – is not the only framework within which we are active.
As I said earlier, our policy is multi-levelled.
We will implement it with resolve, consistency and seriousness.
But we will do so while also securing our interests.
May 30, 2006